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Abstract 
In this thesis. I give a theory of the nature of self-trust and an explanation of its 
role in autonomous decision-making. We tend to think of trust as essentially 
interpersonaL which casts doubt on the coherence of the concept of self-trust. Drawing 
on patients' experiences in reproductive medicine. I argue that self-trust is a meaningful 
as well as a useful concept. I provide autobiographical sketches of a number of women's 
experiences. supplemented by my own observations made while doing a clinical 
practicum in reproductive medicine. to illustrate that what many women feel toward 
themselves in a variety of reproductive health care contexts is analogous to what we feel 
toward others when we trust and distrust them. I ground my theory of self-trust in an 
account of interpersonal trust., in which I draw on a number of theories of trust in ethics. 
especially those of Annette Baier and Karen lones. The paradigm of trust in those 
theories is interpersonal. and I descnre how self-trust and that paradigm are both alike 
and unlike one another in the following areas: what it is that we trust about 
ourselves/others when we are trusting, what kind of mental attitude trust is. and what 
constitute legitimate grounds for trusting. [use my theory of the nature of self-trust to 
understand the relation between autonomy and self-trust. I give a feminist analysis of 
that relation by showing how oppression can be a barrier to self-trust and hence. to 
autonomy. Lastly. I discuss the practical implications of the value of self-trust for the 
duty of health care providers to respect women'"s reproductive autonomy_ 
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Chapter] 
Introduction: 
Se~trust as One Solution to Patient Vulnerability 
Lee, a nurse and a counsellor, entered an infertility program feeling confident 
about where her boundaries lay in terms of how much she was willing to go through 
emotionally, spiritually. and physically in trying to get pregnant. 1 She left the program 
feeling powerless, objectified, and as ifher identity had been threatened. Those feelings 
arose, in part, because of how little control she had over who had access to her body. 
The program she was in utl1izes a "team approach" to medicine where patients have no 
guarantees as to who will be examining them at any point in time and who will be 
conducting scheduled procedures. Because of the intrusive nature of the physical exams 
and procedures associated with infertIlity treatment, the team approach puts the dignity 
of women at risk. As one woman who went through the same program as Lee 
commented, you "park your dignity and integrity at the door and pay this price to get 
pregnant" 
With no real relationship with most of the people treating her infertility. Lee had 
the impression that she "was only another procedure to be done" or a mere "number ... in 
a blood work report" At no point did she receive adequate attention to her emotional 
n~ even from the counsellor involved with the program. Moreover. when she tried to 
advocate for her needs, she was labelled I~a problem": anothernon-compliant patient 
1 
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The labelling induced shame about what she descnbed as her "sensitivity" and it also 
made her worry that she might be abandoned by her care providers. Those feelings, 
along with being treated as a mere object of medical scrutiny, caused her to lose her 
sense of who she was and of what she needed Before entering the pro~ she had 
never thought of herself as uncooperative or as someone who tends to create problems 
where they do not exist, nor had she ever thought of her body as a mere reproductive 
vessel to which anyone could have access. In the end, Lee was left in an extremely 
vulnerable position. 
After she left the program, Lee wrote letters to two of the physicians with whom 
she came in contact. Below, [ give an excerpt from a letter she sent to the physician who 
gave her a hysterosalpingogram (HSG)-a procedure determining whether the fallopian 
tubes are blocked-and who then conducted a hysteroscopy to repair damage to the lining 
of her uterus which could have been caused by the HSG itself The excerpt focuses on 
the events that led up to her hysteroscopy, an experience which Lee herself descnoes as 
objectifYing. The events are not isolated; rather, they are representative of a larger 
pattern of unethical patient care. 
When you did the informed consent over the phone, I specifically asked 
you how many people would be in the OR [operating room} suite. You 
told me there would be three people-the anesthetist, the circulating nurse, 
and yourself This was a very important issue for me because of my past 
history of trauma. [don't know if [John., told you that I originally was 
2 
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asking for spinal anesthesia because I did not want to be unconscious in 
this type of situation. After talking with the anesthetist and with you over 
the phone, I felt reassured that I was heard. I couldn\ believe when I was 
wheeled into the room I counted eight people (men and women) there 
cleaning instruments~ laughing and showing no signs of finishing up 
before you got started (with my entire lower body fully exposed and my 
legs in stirrups). I looked at you to help me in this and to try to honor my 
need for control and personal dignity-and you responded in defense of the 
staff that were cleaning instruments rather than on my behalf. I still 
remember crying and begging the anesthetist to knock me out because 
what I was feeling at that moment was unbearable. I now wish that I had 
gotten up off the table and left the room. In additio~ I was not informed 
that I would be catheterized as part of the procedure. When I awoke, I bad 
searing urethral pain and knew I had been catheterized, which you 
confirmed when I asked you later. If I had known this ahead of time, I 
would have begun a preventive course ofPyridium because I have chronic 
inflammatory urethritis. I also find myself wondering which of the five 
extra people in that room actually catheterized me. I guess it wasn't 
supposed to be an issue because I was unconscious. It was another 
episode where I felt objectified. 3 
There are a host of ethical problems with this situatio~ not the least of which are the 
3 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
attending physician's complete disrespect for Leers prior requests and his insensitivity to 
her needs as a woman who had suffered previous trauma. Further, there was inadequate 
disclosure about the nature of the procedure (Le., the possibility or the necessity of 
catheterization). A less obvious problem, perhaps~ than the violation of consent and 
improper consent is that Lee felt she could not get out of that O.R.. suite, ancL instead, 
had to ask to be ''knocked out" by the anesthetist. She was not forced to stay against her 
wiI~ but she could not muster the will to leave. She could not trust herself to choose and 
act in ways that were consistent with maintaining autonomy and a sense of dignity. 
The value of the self-trust of patients is never mentioned in discussions about 
trust in bioethics. At most. those discussions emphasize that the vulnerability of patients 
leaves them no choice but to trust their health care providers~ and hence, it is crucial that 
they can trust them (Rogers 1998; see, e.g., Whitbeck 1995). The vulnerability that Lee 
felt with her legs up in stirrups on the O.R.. table increased exponentially when she 
discovered that she could not trust her physician. But she was vulnerable as well because 
she was not in a position to be able to trust herself. In situations ofvuInerability. it is 
important not only that we can trust others, but also that we can trust ourselves to stand 
up for our own interests and for what we value most. Otherwise, we relinquish our 
autonomy. Having trustworthy professionals is not the only ethical solution to the 
problem of the vulnerability of patients. A further solution is respect for patient self-
trust. 
The focus of this thesis is the undermining of womerrs self-trust in reproductive 
health care contexts and how that impacts negatively on their reproductive autonomy-
4 
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that is~ on their autonomy regarding aspects of their lives that concern reproduction. " 
Factors such as objectificatio~ worry over poSSIble abandonmen~ and shaming by health 
care providers can all contribute to a lack of self-trust in patients such as Lee~ an~ 
u1timately~ to a lack of patient autonomy. So~ too~ can claims to medical epistemic 
authority and the dismissal of experiential bodily knowledge in patients. I defend the 
importance of health care providers attending to patient self-trust as a condition for 
autonomy~ particularly in the context of reproductive medicine. There~ the potential 
barriers to self-trust tend to be greater than in many other health care contexts because of 
the negative influence that gender oppression and socialization can have on women's 
reproductive health care choices. My theory of the relation between patient self-trust and 
autonomy is feminist for I highlight the many obstacles oppression can pose to the ability 
of patients to trust themselves. 
To defend the view that health care providers have a duty to respect patient self-
trust, as part of their duty to respect patient autonomy~ I need the following: 1) a theory 
of trust; 2) a theory of how trust can be self-regarding; 3) a theory of where things can go 
wrong with self-trust (such that patients might lose their autonomy); an~ 4) a theory of 
why~ in f~ self-trust is important for autonomy. [develop each of those theories in that 
order in separate chapters~ beginning with chapter 2: a theory of what we trust in others. 
m a sixth chapter~ I give recommendations for how health care providers can preserve or 
bolster patient seIf:tmst in the realm of decision-making in reproductive medicine. 
Throughout, my claims are grounded in actual as weU as hypothetical cases of patients 
trusting or distrusting themselves in that area of medicine. The cases are centred around 
5 
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three reproductive health care issues~ namely, miscarriage~ infertility treatment, and 
prenatal diagnosis. 
In chapter 2~ I offer a theory of trust that can be extended to a self-regarding 
attitude of trust. I use Mark Jobnson's idea that our moral concepts are structured by core 
cases, or "protOtypes," and that we move to less prototypical cases using our moral 
imagination (1993). Modelling our concept of trust on prototype theory allows us to 
understand how self-trust is coherent given that we tend to think of trust as essentially 
interpersonaL One moral philosopher, Trudy Govier (1993, 1998), has theorized about 
the nature of trust as a self-regarding attitude. In using prototype theory to explain how 
self-trust could be meaningful, I am expanding on her work. 
In discussing the central features of trusting attitudes, philosophers tend to agree 
on at least one feature: that trust is an attitude about the competence of others to do what 
we are trusting them to do. Where philosophers tend to disagree is on the issue of the 
desired motivation of trusted others. The standard answer, given by Annette Baier 
(1995), is goodwill; in trusting others, we are optimistic that they will act with goodwill 
towards us. r give a different answer. I argue that trust is an attitude of optimism about 
someonets moral integrity. Thus, it is a moral attitude, and that makes it distinct from 
other attitudes, such as confidence and mere reliance. I explain, correspondingly~ that 
distrust is an attitude of pessimism about someone's competence and moral integrity. 
Self-trust shares with trust the feature of optimism about the moral integrity and 
competence of the trusted one (i.e., oneself in the case of self-trust)~ although it is 
missing the feature of interpersonal reIationaIity which c.baracterizes trust in others. One 
6 
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might wonder~ immediately~ how seft:trust differs then from seft:respect which on most 
accounts is an attitude about our moral character and competence. Further~ one might 
ask how it differs exactly from seft:reliance and self-confidence~ and as~ moreover~ how 
we could ever tell that a person was trusting herself to do something, rather than merely 
relying on herself to do it or merely confident that she would do it In other words, how 
can we distinguis~ in practice, between self-trust and certain other self-regarding 
attitudes? I deal with such issues in chapter 3~ where I use some autobiographical 
sketches of some women's experiences with miscarriage to support a theory of the nature 
of self-trusting and self-distrusting attitudes. 
Things go wrong with seft:trust and self-distrust when the subject tends to trust 
herself too much or too little or when she distrusts herself too much. She will lack 
autonomy in each case. In general. self-trust supports autonomy~ but not just any self-
trust will do. Furthermore, too much self-di~ even if it is justified. can be 
detrimental to autonomy. Lee may have been experiencing distrust (rather than merely a 
lack of trust) in her ability to leave the OR., and if so, she was probably justified given 
how disempowered she was. StilI, her self-distrust would have been an impediment to 
her autonomy. The question of what makes self-trust and self-distrust justified is the 
focus of chapter 4. 
The position I arrive at in chapter 5, that justified seft:trust is important for 
autonomy~ raises a number of philosophical concerns. For example, it is unclear what we 
need to trust well about ourselves to be autonomous. Which moral commitments are we 
optimistic that we will live up to when choosing and acting autonomously? More 
7 
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importantly,. perhaps, do all forms of autonomy even require such optimism? If that were 
the case,. then all autonomous behaviour would have to have a moral dimension,. which is 
controversial among philosophers,. some of whom wish to distinguish moral autonomy 
from personal autonomy. In other words, they differentiate behaviour in which we act on 
our own moral sense from behaviour in which we satisty desires that are non-moral, and 
they want to describe both types ofbebaviour using the language of autonomy. 
Furthermore, why would trusting ourselves badly diminish our autonomy? [t is 
generally understood in autonomy theory, both in bioethics and moral philosophy, that 
we can make bad choices and still maintain autonomy. Can we not trust the wrong 
decisions, then,. and still be autonomous? Such issues arise in chapter 5, where [ explain 
the role of self-trust in autonomous decision-making,. drawing on patients' accounts of 
their own experiences with infertility treatment. [also develop a role for self-distrust in 
autonomous behaviour, and moreover. I argue that the relations among self-trust, self-
distrust, and autonomy have implications for how we think about autonomy. In a 
feminist theory of those relations, autonomy must be conceived differently from how it is 
traditionally conceived in bioethics and moral phtlosophy. 
What all of these theories mean for the ethical treatment of patients such as Lee is 
the topic of chapter 6. What should health care providers do to ensure that they are not 
inhtbiting patients from trusting themselves well? Furthermore, where the barriers to 
patient se~trust are rooted in oppression,. what can providers do to try to minimjze their 
negative effects? Lastly,. are any broad changes necessary to the way reproductive 
medicine is conc~ changes that would allow for greaterse~trust among 
8 
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patients? I consider those questions in light of various cases involving prenatal 
diagnosis~ and in light of the cases from previous chapters. I recommen~ overalI~ that 
reproductive medicine be more woman-centrecL where "woman" is respected and 
understood in much of her complexity. When pregnant or during infertility treatmen~ 
she has important needs that are not merely physical; not uncommonly, she has suffered 
some of the severe effects of sexist oppression, including sexual abuse; an~ moreover, 
she often possesses valuable knowledge about her own body. Were respect and attention 
given to such factors~ patients would be less vulnerable to harm in reproductive health 
care settings because they would be in a better position to trust themselves. 
Notes 
1. [am using the pseudonym of "Lee" to protect the privacy of this patien~ with whom I 
have been in personal contact. Lee and I connected at a time when she was searching for 
information as a way of understanding her experience and I was researching this thesis. 
She shared her ordeal with me and her letters to her physicians~ and for that I am truly 
honoured and grateful. I look forward to working with her in the future on a project we 
have devised together about the powerlessness and objectification of women in modem 
infertility treatment 
In her professional capacity as a counsellor~ Lee has met other women who 
suffered what she went through in the same infertility program.. Thus, she knows that her 
experience is not unique. The quotation I give below from another former patient of the 
program is from one of Lee's letters~ as are all of the other quotations in this introduction. 
2. John is a pseudonym for the other physician to whom she wrote. 
3. This case and the others that occur throughout the thesis are collected by chapter and 
patient or subject name in. the Appendix-
4. Often, the term "reproductive autonomy" is used in the literature to refer to peoples 
civil hbertarian rights to access to abortion or reproductive technologies. I am using the 
9 
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term more broadly to include all choices that concern the reproductive aspects of our 
lives. For example, the ethical issues I discuss about Lees case have to do with her lack 
of reproductive autonomy, as I define that term.. 
lO 
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Clrapter 2 
Prototypical Features of Trust Relations: What We Trust iD Othen 
1. Introduction 
My aim in this chapter is to develop a theory of trust that can be used to 
understand the nature of self-trust An obstacle to this strategy, the strategy of clarifYing 
the concept of trust first and then extending it to a self-regarding attitude, is that we1 
normally think of trust as relational, in the sense that it occurs between distinct entities in 
a relationship. Clearly, self-trust is not relational in that sense. Recently, Trudy Govier 
(l993, 1998) and Keith Lehrer(1997) have done some philosophical work on self-trust, 
but neither of them sufficiently address the question of whether the extension of the 
concept of trust to a self-regarding attitude is even coherent. Is "'self-trust" a meaningful 
concept given that trust, as we primarily understand ~ occurs within relationships? One 
theory of concepts that explains how it could be meaningful is prototype theory, which 
Mark Johnson defends as a plaUSIble theory of moral concepts in Moral Imagination 
(1993). I argue in this chapter that prototype theory is helpful in illuminating how it is 
that we could conceive of self-trust given the way that we conceive of trust.. 2 
On the prototype model of concepts, self-trust is a non-prototypical variant of our 
prototypes for trust, all of which r argue are instances of interpersonal trust.. On 
Johnsou.'s model,. the prototypes of a moral phenomeno~ such as ~ form the structure 
11 
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of our concept for that phenomenon.. Before we can. understand any variations on the 
prototypes~ we need to understand the prototypes themselves. Hence,. to understand the 
nature of self-~ we need to comprehend the prototypical sense of trust first. In this 
chapter~ I outline Johnson's theory and illustrate some of the instances of interpersonal 
trust that form the structure of our concept of trust Johnson explains that there are 
important or salient features of the prototypical instances of a particular phenomenon 
that shape our understanding of those instances as prototypes of that phenomenon. [ 
discuss many of the salient features of prototypical trust relations~ drawing on the 
theories ofKaren Jones (1996) and Annette Baier (1995) about what makes an 
interpersonal relation a trust relation. 1 modify their theories and defend an original list 
of the important features of trust that concern what it is that we trust in others.3 At the 
end of the chapter~ 1 also discuss briefly the important features of distrust and the issue of 
whether trust and distrust admit of degrees. 
While identifYing the key features of trusting attitudes, 1 distinguish a trust 
relation from another type of relation with others, namely reliance. Similarly. in the next 
chapter~ I distinguish between the self-regarding attitudes of self-trust and self-reliance 
(and also between self-trust and self-confidence, and self-trust and self-respect). The 
claims 1 make in this chapter about the differences between trust and reliance are 
motivated by noticeable and morally significant differences between instances of those 
different phenomena. 1 demonstrate how those attitudes differ from one another by 
altering illustrations of prototypical instances of trust such that they illustrate something 
noticeably diff~ something I believe we wouldcaII "reliance." 
12 
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2. Understanding Moral Concepts: Johnson's Use of Prototype Theory4 
According to Johnson's description of how prototype theory applies to moral 
concepts .. we can extend our use of a moral concept to phenomena that do not have all of 
the characteristics we normally associate with that concept Self-trust is such a 
phenomenon: it is missing the characteristic of interpersonal relationality that we 
normally associate with trust. However. for it to be appropriate to use the term "trust" to 
descnoe that self-regarding attitude .. the attitude must share a number of the 
characteristics of trust 
In Moral Imagination .. Johnson argues against the traditional view in analytical 
philosophy that what forms the structure of our moral concepts is a stable list of 
necessary and sufficient conditions. On the traditional model. the list of conditions is 
meant to act as a guide to our application of a moral concept; we use the concept 
appropriately only when we apply it to situations where all of the relevant conditions are 
present. Those conditions are necessary in the sense that they represent inherent features 
of the moral phenomena to which our concepts refer. So .. for example .. if relationality is 
a necessary condition of trust. then it must be an inherent feature of trust, which means 
that trust is never non-relational. Johnson denies that our moral concepts are structured 
in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions and that our use of them is limited to 
cases that satisfY a set of strict criteria. He defends instead a theory of moral concepts in 
which they have a "prototype structure" and an application beyond standarcl prototypical 
13 
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To say that moral concepts are structured by prototypes is to say that we identify 
them with certain prototypical instances, which are "clear, unprobIematic cases" to which 
the concept applies and which are central to our understanding of that concept (Johnson 
1993, 80). Johnson uses the example of the conceptual category "bird": for some of us, 
the member "robin" is "cognitively more central to our understanding of [that] category" 
than other members (1993, 7&). The instances which are "cognitively more centraI," or 
prototypical, vary depending on the person's physical and social environment. S For 
example, the kind of bird that is perhaps more central to a New Zealander's 
understanding of bird is a kiwi rather than a robin. 
The same person's prototypes can also gradually shift as that person comes to 
inhabit new physical and social environments. For example, someone who had never 
before been exposed to a social environment where people ascnbe moral worth to 
animals and who becomes immersed in a sub-culture of vegans and animal rights 
activists may experience a gradual change in her prototypes for certain moral concepts, 
such as rights.6 It may become as natural for her, in other words, to associate rights with 
animals as it is with humans. However, her prototypes for rights could not vary 
dramatically from the rights prototypes of members of her dominant culture if she is to 
continue to communicate about rights in that culture. The variances among prototypes 
for people living in the same culture cannot be extreme if they continue to be able to 
understand one another. Since prototypes can vary only slightly among members of the 
same cultural group, we can therefore speak generally about the prototypes for a 
phenomenon within a given culture. 
14 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The idea that our concepts are structured by prototypes rather than by a list of 
strict criteria is compelling. To use an example in the moral realm, we do not 
contemplate what all of the necessary and sufficient conditions are for murder when we 
think of the concept "murder"; rather, we think of prototypical instances, which for those 
of us who are continually exposed to American culture, probably resemble the kinds of 
cold-blooded murders we see in Hollywood suspense films. 
When we are faced with problematic, non-prototypical cases, we try to 
imaginatively extend our moral concepts to them. We assess whether those cases are 
sufficiently similar to the prototypical cases that the relevant concepts should apply to 
them as well. Examples of non-prototypical instances of murder might include cases of 
killing under duress, or ofkiIIing beings whose moral status is questionable to us (e.g., 
some animals). Whether "murder" is really an appropriate description of such cases will 
depend on their degree of similarity to our prototypes for murder. But to be able to make 
that kind of comparison, there must be some features of the prototypes that are especially 
important or salient to us. We could not make judgments about the similarities and 
differences between cases without a sense of which similarities and differences are 
relevant, and we would lack that sense if we did not prioritize the features of prototypes. 
The salient feature of our prototypes for murder, relevant specifically to whether Icilling 
under duress is murder, is the feature of the voluntariness of the murderer. The feature 
relevant to the killing of an animal, such as a seal, is the feature of the moral status of the 
victim. 
Jobnson argues that we do prioritize the features of prototypes in terms of their 
IS 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
importance or salience; however,. we do not treat the salient features as necessary and 
sufficient conditions,. nor as inherent features of the external things to which our 
concepts apply. ThUS,. it is possible,. for example,. that a murder might occur where the 
murderer acts under duress. The salient features guide us in the imaginative extension of 
our concepts,. but they do not restrict their extension in the way that they would if they 
were necessary and sufficient conditions,. and they are not fixed in" the way that they 
would be if they were inherent features.7 Our concepts are more malleable than theories 
about necessary and sufficient conditions make them out to be. 
But are concepts so malleable that none of their important features serves even as 
a necessary condition for the use of those concepts? Johnson's theory is that none of the 
important features of our moral concepts is necessary and sufficient; however. his theory 
does not preclude that some features may be necessary. Some must be necessary. for at 
least some concepts,. since an event would not count as murder,. for example,. unless 
someone died,. and a creature would not be a bird if it did not have wings (whether they 
be vestigial or not). However. we miss the point of prototype theory if we focus on the 
idea that some of the features of our prototypes might be necessary. What is interesting 
about that theory is the claim that when we apply a concept to a particular phenomenon,. 
we do not reason from a set of necessary (andlor sufficient) conditions; rather we move 
from certain prototypical instances to that phenomenon. The move is guided by salient 
features of the prototypes,. but it does not occur simply by reasoning from those features. 
There are prototypes for our concept "trustlt and features of those prototypes that 
are salient to us. It is doubtful that we have a single trust prototype as opposed to a 
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cluster of prototypes made up of relations in our lives in which trust is clearly a factor. 
Johnson recognizes that for many concepts, there will be more than one "clear case~" and 
hence more than one prototype (see, for example, 1993, 80). For example, there is 
probably a cluster of prototypes for our concept "animar' that includes instances of 
domesticated and Wlld animals, of mammals and reptiles, etcetera. When we think of 
the concept "animal," we do not think of only one animal. but of a number of different 
creatures that we clearly recognize as animals. In this chapter, I identify some of the 
kinds of trust relations that generally form the cluster of trust prototypes in Westem 
culture, and then identify the important features of those relations. In chapter 3, [ 
detennine whether there is some kind of self-regarding attitude that shares enough of the 
important features of trust that we would call that attitude "self-trust." 
3. Important Features of Trust Prototypes 
[ want to propose that, generally, our cluster of trust prototypes includes three 
types of relations, all of which are instances of interpersonal trust. We interpret trust as 
something that occurs between distinct entities in relationship, but our use of that 
concept is not limited to relationships between persons. However, in contemplating 
whether we should be extending the use of that concept beyond interpersonal relations to 
relations with governments,. for-example, or with animals, we often assess whether those 
relations are sufficiently similar to interpersonal trust relations. To evaluate whether we 
can trust our do& for example, we decide whether there are features of our attitude 
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towards our dog that closely resemble features of the trusting attitudes we have toward 
other people~ such as our best (human) friend.' Certain interpersonal relations, including 
close friendships between perso~ are exemplars for us of trust relations. They form our 
trust prototypes and include the following: the child-parent relation, the relation between 
intimate adults, and the professionai-client relation. Characteristically~ those relations 
involve certain kinds of dependency that are indicative of trust (unlike, for example, the 
relation between strangers). Let me make that point more persuasive using short 
vignettes that highlight the kinds of dependency that can occur in those relations. 
a. Anna is a 9-year-old girl who depends on her father, Stefan, to care for 
her and to explain things about the world to her. For example, when she 
does not understand what her class is learning in school, she relies on 
Stefan to help her. If she does something wron~ she expects him to be 
able to explain why. AnIurs father speaks with authority on lots of 
different issues, and she always assumes that what he says is insightful. 
b. Marie and Josie are lovers and best friends. Above all~ they depend on 
one another to be loyal and honest, as well as emotionally supportive. 
Both of them believe strongly in the importance of loyalty and honesty in 
a relationship and that allows them to be optimistic that they will not be 
disloyal or dishonest with one another. They depend on one another to be 
honest in particular about their own feelings, and to act in ways that are 
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appropriate given their reelings. Furthermore,. they rely on one another to 
be understanding about the others feelings, especially when the other is 
under severe stress,. such as when Marie is fighting with her boss at work,. 
or when Josie has a difficult paper to write for graduate school 
c. For over eight years, T odd has had the same family physician,. Dr. 
Chen. He depends on Dr. Chen to provide him with good medical advice 
and to perform medical procedures competently. He has gone to Dr. Chen 
for so long not only because he feels that he can rely on his judgment and 
expertise, but also because Dr. Chen provides him with a lot of 
information about the potential harms and benefits of different procedures 
and treatments. [t is important to Todd that he have that information so 
that he can make informed choices about his own health care. 
In each of these vignettes,. at least one party in the relationship is depending on the other 
in a way that suggests that they have a bond of trust Anna is trusting Stefarrs judgment 
and his concern for her well-being; Josie and Marie are trusting one another to be loyal, 
hon~ and emotionally supportive; and Todd is trusting Dr. Chen to be a good 
physician. These are clear and unproblematic cases of trust:. that is, cases where most of 
us would not have any difficulty using the concept of trust They are also instances of 
types of relationships that are common in our lives,. and that,. characteristically,. have trust 
as a central component.. 
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The vignettes are not meant to be exemplars of what the different parties to such 
relationships should be able to trust in one another. Different peoples' prototypes or 
paradigms for trust will differ depending on what they believe to be important aspects of 
interpersonal relations. where what is important for them will depend., in part, on their 
past experience in trusting others. For example. if I had been betrayed by a dishonest 
partner in the past, then honesty in any new intimate relationship may be particularly 
important for me. I want to use the vignettes to illustrate only the general features of the 
attitudes of the dependent parties that explain why their relationships are trust 
relationships. There must be something in common among those attitudes for the 
vignettes to be prototypical of trust and., hence. to form a cluster of trust prototypes. 
Trust theories in moral philosophy provide some guidance on what are the 
common and important features of trust prototypes. Virtually all of those theories focus 
on interpersonal trust I seek guidance in this chapter from the theories that I find the 
most persuasive. which are those ofKaren Jones (1996) and Annette Baier (1995). Jones 
and Baier agree that there are two central components to trust relations: optimism about 
the competence of the trusted in the domain in which we trust her. and optimism about 
her goodwill within that domain. Jones adds the component that we expect the trusted 
other to be "directly and favourably moved by the thought that we are counting on her" 
(1996.4). I analyse the theories of Jones and Baier and make substantial revisions to 
their lists of the important features of trusting attitudes. The list I propose is the 
following: 1) optimism about the competence of the trusted in the domain in which we 
trust her. 2) optimism about her moral integrity in that domain, 3) an expectation that 
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what she stands for in the domain is similar to what we stand for, such that she is 
committed to doing what we are counting on her to do, and 4) an expectation that her 
perception of the kind of relationship we have with one another is similar to our own 
perception of it. I shall descnbe each of these features separately and defend their 
importance within our conception of trust. 
3.1 The Competence of the Trusted 
Baier and Jones agree that a key component of trust is optimism about the 
competence of the trusted person within a particular domain. In this section, I explain 
why that feature is important within prototypical trust relations. I make the distinction 
between kinds of trust where we depend on someone to be competent to do something 
for us, or to have specific concern for us, and trust where we simply rely on someone to 
be competent in a certain area. I call the former "trust with specific concern" and the 
latter "trust without specific concern." Normally with both kinds of~ we rely on the 
other to have domain-specific skills rather than rely on him to be competent at 
everything. I argue that one "skill" that the trusters in prototypical trust relations 
typically depend on the trusted others to have is moral understanding. 
The dependent party of the relationship in each of the vignettes is optimistic that 
the other possesses some kind of competency. For example, one thing Anna is optimistic 
about in terms of her father's competence is his ability to make sound judgments about 
what is morally right and wrong. Josie and Marie are each optimistic that the other is 
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competent to provide emotional support and to understand what it takes to be a loyal and 
honest partner. And, lastly, Todd is optimistic that Dr. Chen is competent as a family 
physician. Todd is expecting Dr. Chen to be competent to perform the medical 
procedures that are a part of his practice, and to give sound medical advice as well as 
detailed information about different health care options. 
If the optimism about the other's competence in prototypical trust relations were 
to fade away, then so would the trust For example, ifTodd were to hear that a number 
of Dr. Chen's former patients were suing him for malpractice and Todd began to 
seriously doubt Dr. Chen's competence as a physician, then Todd's trust in him would 
diminish, if not disappear altogether. IfMarie were no longer optimistic that Josie 
understands what it means to be faithful to Mane, then much of her trust in Josie would 
disappear. 
We can trust without expecting others to do something for us, but even there, we 
are optimistic about their competence. Most of the characters in the vignettes are 
trusting another person to promote their interests in some way, or to have some specific 
concern for them. An example of trust without specific concern is trust that another will 
be conscientious at her work, even though whether she is conscientious or not will have 
no impact on us. Part of the trust that Anna has in her father is trust of that sort; she 
trusts him to make considered and insightful comments about a range of issues, that is 
not necessarily limited to issues relating to Anna.'s well-being. Often trust that does not 
demand specific concern occurs outside of a personal relationship. For example, r once 
trusted Mother Teresa to make truthful statements to others, but r had no personal 
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relationship with Mother Teresa. In the absence of a relationship,. trust of that sort is 
likely non-prototypical,. but where it occurs inside of a personal relationship,. it can be 
prototypical. While trust without specific concern does not necessarily involve optimism 
about the competence of others to do something for us,. it does involves optimism that 
they are competent to do sometbing(e.g.,. in the case ofMotherTeresa, to know what 
honesty amounts to). 
It is not important in determining whether there is trust in a relationship that the 
trusted person is in fact competent [f Stefan were not competent to make judgments in 
many of the areas in which he assumed some epistemic authority, but Anna continued to 
believe that he possessed that competence, she would still be trusting her father. Her 
trust would simply be misplaced. It would not be misplaced because Anna should have 
known that her father did not have that competence. It is not necessary in trusting that 
someone is competent in a certain area that we understand what that person has to do to 
be displaying that competence. Particularly in trusting professional people,. such as 
plumbers,. architects,. or physicians, we usually have very little understanding of their area 
of expertise. Usually we know that they are certified experts in their field, but we do not 
know wbat makes them experts. Ignorance about what determines whether the trusted 
one is competent is a feature of many trust relations (Gambetta 1988; Baier 1995,. 117,. 
(86),. and it makes the trusting person vulnerable to deception in the fonn of concealed 
incompetence. 
Optimism about the competence of the other in prototypical trust relations is 
usually domain specific.'} Most of the trusting characters in the vignettes are trusting the 
23 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
other to be competent in specific domains. For example,. Todd is trusting Dr. Chen to 
have expertise in the domain of medicine,. while Josie and Marie are trusting one another 
to be competent about certain aspects of intimate relationships. We tend to think of trust 
between lovers and between a child and a parent as being more comprehensive than trust 
in other types of relationships. Often, we assume that it extends to the entire well-being 
of the trusting person. StilI, it is usually not so comprehensive that the one trusting is 
optimistic that the other is competent at everything. I may trust my mother to be 
generous and caring, but not trust her to be competent to advise me about my career or to 
be a competent canoeist. Even Anna, at her age, may recognize that she cannot trust her 
father to be good at everything. She may have noticed that he has some foibles, such as 
arriving late for appointments or losing things frequently, which make him untrustworthy 
in some domains. 
StIll, one might argue, it is poSSIble to just trust, without any consideration for 
domain. An example would be a child who does not recognize that there are domains in 
which his parents are falhble. I seem to exclude such instances of trust by descnbing 
trust as a three-place relation, of A trusting B to do C in a particular domain. However, 
that logic of trusting can accommodate cases where we say that a person is just trusting. 
There, what the person is trusting the other to do drops out of the picture not because the 
logic of his trust is unique, but because there are so many domains in which he trusts the 
other that it is too cumbersome to list them all. He may, in filet, trust the other in every 
domain (in which case his trust would surely be misplaced) or, alternatively, trust her in a 
range of domains, the boundaries of which may be unclear. 
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As I shall argue~ all three representations of trust in the vignettes involve the 
domain of moral understanding. Knowing what is morally required in different 
situations is one dimension of moral competence: the epistemic dimension. Another 
dimension is acting on what is morally required, that is, being morally virtuous. The 
latter overlaps with the feature of trust relations that I discuss below: optimism about the 
moral integrity of the trusted. They both concern the motivation of trusted others. 
whereas the epistemic side of moral competence concerns only the ability of trusted 
others to understand and to do what is required of them. 
One might wonder what the relevant competency is in intimate trust relations or 
in friendships. As Jones writes. it is "a kind of moral competence. We expect a friend to 
understand loyalty, kindness, and generosity, and what they call for in various situationslt 
(her emphasis; 1996, 7). However, that statement needs to be qualified. For one tbin~ 
in trusting a friend, we can expect her to understand more than just what it takes to be 
moral in her relationship with us. For example, Josie expects Marie to have some 
understanding of the stress she is under as a student, which is a type of nonmoral 
understanding. Secondly, we can trust a friend without trusting her to be loyal or 
generous. Some friends we trust to be generous and caring; others we trust to be 
insightful and loyal; etcetera. 
Like trust in intimate relations, trust in parent-cbiId relations extends into the 
domain of the moral but is not confined to that domain. Anna relies on her father to 
make competent judgments on many different issues~ whether they be moral or 
nonmoraI. One specific kind of moral competence that she probably expects from him is 
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the competence to understand the importance of not lying to her or misleading her about 
what he actually knows. In more sophisticated terms, she is relying on him to appreciate 
the importance of making respoDSlble claims to knowledge. Other areas where children 
tend to trust their parents to have some moral understanding are the areas of promise-
keeping, of being kind, and of being fair. 
We are also optimistic that the professionals whom we trust have at least some 
moral understanding. We expect them to understand the moral importance of honouring 
a commitment to perform some kind of service to us, if that is what we are trusting them 
to do. However, from many of them, we expect greater moral understanding than that 
For example, Todd is representative of a growing segment of West em society that trusts 
physicians to understand the need to respect patient autonomy (along with related issues, 
such as what counts as justified and unjustified paternalism, and the responstbility of 
physicians to disclose information to their patients). It is not enough that health care 
practitioners have the necessary technical skills and scientific knowledge to be 
competent practitioners. As many of us now presume, they also need to understand the 
moral significance of attending to the patient's individual concerns and wishes, 
particularly in situations where they must use their ownjudgment in deciding how to care 
for patients. 10 However, even patients who do not assume that physicians should attend 
to their individual concerns, or should respect their autonomy, still trust their physician 
to have some understanding of the moral importance of acting in their best interests. 
Thus~ in all of the prototypical trust relations I have identified, the one trusting 
relies on the trusted to have some moral understanding, where that feature is part of the 
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more general feature of optimism about the competence of trusted others to do what we 
are trusting them to do. Normally that general feature focuses on specific kinds of 
competencies, and hence, our trust in others is normally domain-specific. Even trust that 
does not involve specific concern tends to focus on specific competencies. For example, 
my trust in Mother Teresa extended to her knowledge of the moral importance of being 
truthful and caring, in particular for people in desperate circumstances; however, it did 
not extend to her knowledge of the moral dimensions of abortion. 
3.2 The Motivation of the Trusted 
We want trusted others not only to have the ability to do what we are trusting 
them to do, but also to have the motivation to do it. Where there is some confusion in 
modem trust theory is in sorting out the kind of motivation that we expect from trusted 
others. According to the majority of theorists, including Baier and Jones, the relevant 
motivation is "goodwIll"; however, not ail trust theorists agree (e.g., Holton 1994) 11 and 
some fall to give a clear answer at all to that question (e.g.. Govier 1998).12 It is 
important not to be ambiguous in answering it, since part of what makes trust unique 
from other kinds of attitudes, especially mere reliance, is the sort of motivation we 
expect from those whom we trust I argue that what we expect is moral integrity, where I 
interpret integrity in light of recent phIlosophical advances in theorizing about integrity. 
Those advances, made by philosophers Cheshire Calhoun (1995) and Margaret Urban 
Walker(1998), help us, in my view, to better conceptualize trust 
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But it cannot only be moral integrity that we demand from trusted others. What 
moral integrity involves, as CaIhoun explains~ is consistently doing what "one takes 
oneself to have the most moral reason to do" (1995, 249). If what another person's view 
of what he has the most moral reason to do frequently differs from what I would take 
myself to have the most moral reason to do in simIlar situations, then I probably will not 
trust him. [argue that trusting involves an expectation that there is some similarity 
between what we and the trusted other stand for, morally speaking, in the domain in 
which we trust her. 
I argue. then, that our attitude toward the motivation of trusted others concerns 
both their moral integrity and what they stand for. I add that it sometimes also concerns 
their perception of their relationship with us. Sometimes for us to be optimistic that 
another person will be motivated to honour our trust. we have to expect that she 
perceives her relationship with us similarly to the way in which we perceive it 
3.2.1 Trust and Moral Integrity 
Let me begin by explaining why the relevant motivation in trust relations is moral 
integrity rather than goodwill. Baier and Jones interpret goodwill loosely to mean caring 
about the good of others, or having some concern for their welfare (see, e.g., Baier 1995, 
1O~ 136; Jones 1996, 7). Both are imprecise about what that concern amounts to: is it 
"kindly or benevolent feeling," which is the vernacular sense of goodwill? Is it informed 
necessarily by considered judgments about the others welfare? If so, are those 
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judgments moral judgments? I evaluate each of those ways of defining goodwill in terms 
of how well they resemble the sort of motivation we expect from trusted others. [f what 
Baier and Jones mean by "goodwill" is a kind of mo~ or j~ concern for others, then 
their view is not far off from my own that what we trust in others is moral integrity. 
Colloquially, we use the term "goodwill" to mean kindly feeling for others. For 
kindly feeling to be what we trust in others, it must be enduring to some degree, for we 
always expect the concern of trusted others to endure at least over the period of time in 
which we trust them. Could it be true, then, that what we trust in others is reliable kindly 
feeling? I give two reasons why not we can trust without expecting others to have kindly 
feelings for us; and trust can be betrayed when the trusted other is motivated by kindly 
feelings but does not do the right thing in the circumstances. 
We can trust others without being optimistic about their kindly feelings, 
especially when we trust them without expecting them to have specific concern for us. 
Whether they have that concern is irrelevant to our trust in them when our trust does not 
require that they do anything for us. But optimism about kindly feelings may not even be 
a feature of some instances of trust that do demand specific concern. For example, it is 
conceivable that a patient could trust a physician to be motivated by a commitment to 
provide her with good health care without assuming that the physician has kindly feelings 
for her. Particularly in trust relations between patients and specialists, such as surgeons, 
kindly feelings need not be a feature of those relations. 
But where someone did have kindly feelings toward us that were reliable, would 
knowing that not be a good reason to trusttbat person? [fDr. Chen,. for example, reliably 
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expressed kindly feelings toward Todd, could Todd not trust Dr. Chen even without 
knowing whether he is committed to promoting the welfare ofbis patients? The problem 
there is that Dr. Chen could be motivated by those feelings and still betray T odd's trust. 
Say that not only does Todd trust Dr. Chen to respect his autonomy~ but Dr. Chen is also 
committed to respecting Todcfs autonomy (which requires that he disclose information to 
Todd about his health status and his health care options). If Dr. Chen were to develop 
reliable and kindly feelings toward Tod~ and was motivated because of those feelings to 
be dishonest with him about his health status, then he would be betraying Todd's trust. 
There, he would be failing to inform Todd of any potentially serious health problems not 
because he thinks it is his moral duty to prevent T odd from experiencing distress (Dr. 
Chen is committed to promoting patient autonomy), but because he has a strong desire 
not to cause Todd any distress. In that case,. Dr. Chen would be acting on kindly feelings 
without doing what Todd is trusting him to do. Thus, Todd's trust in him could not be 
grounded in kindly feelings. 
Trust is usually incompatible with serious forms of deception unless deception is 
necessary to shield the trusting person from severe harm. IfT odd became clinically 
depressed and suicidal, then it might be compatible with his trust in Dr. Chen for Dr. 
Chen to withhold information from him about a serious illness, at least temporarily. 
However, even when it is not necessary to deceive others to protect their welfare,. kindly 
feelings can encourage deception if those feelings are strong enough. What we want, 
ultimately, from trusted others is not kindly feelings,. but a commitment to doing what is 
right in the circumstances. In the scenario above,. the righttbing for Dr. Chen to do,. both 
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from his perspective and from Todd's. is to disclose information to Todd about his health 
status, since disclosing it is respectful ofhis autonomy. 
But is it not a bit overblown to say that what we want in trusted others is for them 
to '400 the right thing"? [t may be that we just want them to make considered judgments 
in determining how to best serve our interests, rather than have their kindly feelings 
motivate them in ways that might subvert our interests. Thus, we still might trust their 
'4goodwiII~" but only if it is informed by their judgment. 0 That idea is compelling, yet 
there is one aspect of our view toward the motivation of trusted others that it does not 
adequately clarifY. Consider a situation where someone we trust uses his considered 
judgment to evaluate our interests, but ignores his respoDSlbilities to others in the 
process. For example~ what if Dr. Chen were good at respecting Todd's autonomy. but at 
the same time, he gave preferential treatment to Todd, even over patients who were 
suffering greatly and had arrived at Dr. Chen's office first? Most people in T odd's place 
would be appalled; and they would claim that that is not what they were trusting the 
other to do. Presumably. then, [ have misconstrued Todd's interests by implying that Dr. 
Chen could satisfY them by simply respecting Todd's autonomy. Assuming that Todd is 
a decent guy, it cannot be in his interests to have others suffer for his own sake. But even 
ifhe were not a decent guy, it would not be in his interests to see his physician treating 
his patients unfairly; Todd may be disturbed by such treatm~ if only because it 
suggests to him that one day Dr. Chen might treat him unfairly. Either way, what Todd is 
trusting Dr. Chen to do is the right thing. He is trusting him to be motivated by 
judgments that are not merely consi~ but that are moral. 
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The above objections to the idea that we want trusted others to be motivated by 
goodwill, interpreted as kindly feeling or considered judgment, reveal that what we really 
want them to be motivated by is moral integrity. We want them to have an enduring 
commitment to acting in a morally respectful way toward us and we want their actions to 
be in accordance with that commitment.14 Having integrity means that your actions are 
"integrated" with what you stand for~ and having moral integrity means that they are 
integrated with what you stand for morally speaking (CaIhoun 1995). When Dr. Chen 
fails to disclose important information to T odd about his health status, he compromises 
his own moral integrity, and in doing so, he betrays Todd's trust. 
[ shall defend the view that optimism about the moral integrity of trusted others is 
a key feature of trust relations by responding to the following objections. 1) Having that 
optimism suggests that we require trusted others to be perfect moral agents, which is 
unrealistic. 2) [t implies that we expect them not to be motivated by feelings of affection 
at all, which seems untrue of many trust relations. 3) The desire to maintain moral 
integrity sounds too self-centred for what we expect of trusted others, especially when 
what we expect of them is specific concern for us. 4) And lastly, moral integrity is too 
sophisticated a concept to be what children trust in their parents or in other adults; 
however, their trust is a paradigm of trusting. 
The first objection, th~ is that relying on trusted others to have moral integrity 
implies that we are expecting them to act as perfect moral agents who never bow to 
temptation or pressures from others; and that must be too much for what we expect of 
trusted others. But that objection assumes,. without good reason, that the only people 
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who have integrity are those who act on what they stand for without fail As Margaret 
Urban Walker argues, however, we also descnbe people as having integrity if they "own 
up to and clean up messes" (1998, 118}-that is, if they take respoDSlbility for failing to 
fuIfiII a commitment to us because they were under too much pressure from others or 
because they experienced some momentary weakness of will. As long as they make 
amends for whatever problems they caused, we would still say that they bad integrity. 
Walker defines integrity "as a kind of reliable accountability" (1998, 106); it concerns 
how reliable we are in living up to important commitments, but also whether we are 
willing to be accountable for failing to meet our commitments on some occasions. 
But are people who faH to meet their commitments yet are still accountable for 
their actions also trustworthy? That might depend on how often they neglect their 
respoDSlbilities and create "messes" for others. Usually we do not conclude after 
someone fails to meet a single commitment that she is untrustworthy, unless, perhaps, the 
relevant commitment is extremely important. However, if someone regularly fails to 
honour her commitments, due to temptation, say, or the pressures of everyday life, then 
we would say she is untrustworthy, even if she did clean up after herself We would also 
say, though, that she lacks integrity. A person with integrity takes her moral 
commitments seriously, which means that she does not bow to temptation regularly, nor 
does she regularly make commitments to others that she knows she cannot keep. 
Although it is inconsistent with having integrity that one regularly bows to 
temptation, (i.e., the desire to do something morally forbidden), it is not inconsistent with 
it that one regularly acts on one's desires, as long as one's desires are compatible with a 
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commitment to doing what is right. If acting with integrity meant acting solely from that 
commitment, then it would not be what many people trust in one another. For example, 
intimate partners~ such as Josie and Mari~ usually trust that the other will act out of 
feelings of affection rather than out of moral duty. Yet, it is consistent with a person's 
having moral integrity that she often acts from feelings of affection, as long as her 
actions are regulated by a commitment to doing what is right. The idea of that 
commitment playing a regulative fimction-limiting the sorts of feelings on which we can 
act-comes from Barbara Herman (1981). Hennan distinguishes between secondary 
motives~ which restrict how we can act, and primary motives, which provide us with the 
motivation to act 15 The commitment of a person with integrity to act morally serves as a 
secondary motive, regulating her conduct, when it permits her to do what she desires to 
do. When what she desires to do is something immoral, her commitment to doing what 
is right takes over as her primary motive and prevents her from acting on that desire. It is 
only when that commitment serves as her primary motive that she is forced to act against 
her immediate desires~ or feelings of affection. At other times~ she can act wholly on 
those desires or affections and still have moral integrity. 
Still, one might object to the thesis that we trust others to be motivated by a 
desire to maintain integrity because~ especially if one accepts traditional philosophical 
accounts of integrity, that view may sound as though we are expecting trusted others to 
be concerned primarily for themselves. However, we do not expect them to be self-
centred, especially those whom we trust to have specific concern for us. Traditional 
theories of integrity,. such as those ofBemard WilIiams (1981) and Gabriele Taylor 
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(1985), descnbe integrity as a virtue of an agent who remains committed to life projects 
or to whatever values she endorses despite the consequences that might have for others. 
Those theories suggest, in other wor~ that integrity is a personal virtue of an agent who 
is able to maintain an integrated self. 16 However, as Calhoun explains, guarding our 
integrity involves more than just guarding our selves from disintegration. She argues that 
integrity must be a social virtue as well as a personal one because a person with integrity 
is someone who "stands for something," and no one stands for anything only for 
themselves. They do it "for, and before, all deliberators who share the goal of 
determining what is worth doing" (Calhoun 1995, 257). Calhoun explains that in taking 
a stand, we offer to others our best judgment about how we and they should live and be 
treated within our society. 
However, standing for something must involve more than just offering our best 
judgment; and so must integrity, one would ~ if it is to count as a social virtue. To 
fully support her claim about the social nature of integrity, Calhoun needs to emphasize 
that in taking a stand, we take responsibility for ensuring that what we stand for is 
preserved or established. That kind of responsibility is "forward-loolcing,'t to use a term 
of Claudia Card's (1996, 25), whereas "reliable accountability" is often merely backward-
looking.17 Since integrity involves respoDSlbilities that move in either direction, a person 
with integrity cannot be self-indulgent or merely sel£:protective. 
The view that integrity involves forward and backward-looking responstbilities 
allows us to make sense of how a child could trust in anothers moral integrity. One 
might assume that especially forcbildrenyoungerthan Anna (say 5 or6 year-olds), 
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moral integrity could not be what they trust in their parents. Since child-parent 
relationships are clearly among the list of trust paradigms, it may seem that I have it 
wrong about what the relevant motivation is in trust relationships. However, to be 
trusting of another's moral integrity. one does not need a sophisticated understanding of 
the concept of integrity. If children trust that their parents will care for them and will 
make things right when things go wron& then they are trusting their parents to fuIfiIl 
forward and backward-looking responsibilities, and, therefore, they are trusting their 
moral integrity. 
What is most important to us in trusting the moral integrity of others is that they 
take their moral commitments seriously within the domain in which we trust them. For 
example, whether my plumber acts with moral integrity in the domain of intimate 
relationships is scarcely relevant to whether he is trustworthy in the domain of his 
profession. If I discovered that he cheats on his partner frequently, and concluded that I 
could never trust him in an intimate relationship. I could still trust him as my plumber-
that is, trust that he will act with integrity in conducting his business as a plumber. 18 
Nonetheless, as Govier points out, distrust in relationships "often spreads from one 
context to others" (1998, 147). We often perceive evidence of untrustworthiness in one 
domain as potential evidence of further untrustworthiness in other domains. Such 
evidence might cause us to question the moral character of the trusted person by 
revealing a propensity on his part for moral lapses. StilI, we might suspect that 
propensity to be isolated to specific domains, and thus, continue to trust that person 
outside of those domains. 
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Those who act with integrity act on what they take to be the best moral reasons 
for everyone to act; however,. they do not necessarily act on reasons that are morally 
correct. Calhoun explains that "integrity hinges on acting on one's own views,. not the 
right views (as those might be determined independently of the agent's own opinion)" 
(1995,250). As long as our own views express what we take to be morally correct, and 
we act in accordance with them, then we have moral integrity. Even if our own views 
violate some objective standard of the truth of different moral values, we could still have 
moral integrity. 
3.1.1 What the Trusted Other Stands for 
It cannot just be moral integrity that we expect from trusted others, for we care 
about what they stand for, not just about whether they will act on what they stand for. 19 
For example, Todd does not trust Dr. Cben simply to act on whatever values Dr. Cben 
endorses as the right values. Todd expects him to endorse specifically the value of 
respect for patient autonomy. Similarly, in trusting Josie, Marie does not only care about 
whether Josie intends to live up to her commitment to Marie; she also cares about how 
Josie conceives of that commitment She cares about whether Josie shares with her a 
commitment to being emotionally supportive, loyal, and honest in intimate relationships. 
IfMarie did not know or suspect that ofJosie, then she would not trust her as her lover. 
fn this section, I argue that an important feature of prototypical trust relations is the 
expectation that what the trusted person stands for, morally speakin& is similar enough 
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to what we stand for (as far as we know what that is) that we can count on her 
commitment to doing what we trust her to do. 
To trust others~ usually we need some sense of what they stand for so that we can 
know whether they are likely to act in the way that we would expect them to if we were 
to trust them. The way that we would expect them to act depends on what we perceive to 
be morally acceptable ways to act. For example, what Josie expects from any partner she 
trusts is loyalty and honesty because that is what she believes is important in intimate 
relationships. To say that she simply expects "loyalty and honesty," however, is a bit 
vague since she might not trust a lover who defines loyalty as avoiding all conversations 
with people to whom she might be sexually attracted One needs to know enough about 
how the trusted other conceives of her moral commitments that one can expect her to 
behave in a certain way. Since we usually trust others to behave in certain ways only 
within particular domains, what is most important is that we know where the trusted 
other stands in the domain in which we trust her. 
Is it realistic, though, to claim that, before we can trust in others, we need to have 
some idea of what they stand for? Do we not sometimes trust without knowing ahead of 
time that others are committed to acting in the ways that we would want them to in the 
relevant domain? What about when we accept the help of a stranger when our groceries 
have fallen all over the street? Some of us seem to be able to trust people in such 
situations without being aware of what they stand for. However, would we actually trust 
the stranger if we assumed that he would probably steal our groceries or would beat us 
over the head while we are bending down. to pick them up? No. But how could we 
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assume anything about where his moral commitments lie ifwe have never met him 
before? We could do so on the grounds that it is reasonable to assume that other 
members of our society share at least some values in common with us. If we could not 
assume that-either because we knew that our values were very different than theirs or 
because we were a recent immigrant to this country and were uncertain which values 
people held in common here-then we would have a lot of difficulty trusting others. 
What if someone does not know what she should expect from others. not because 
of cultural difference, but because she is uncertain about what she stands for? What 
about ymmg Anna. who might stand for some things. but not enough things that she 
knows what she should expect from others in many contexts? Would it be possible for 
her to be trustin& then, in those contexts? Without knowing what she should expect, 
presumably she would not be able to figure out whether she should trust others given 
what they stand for. However. if she admired what they stood for generally speakin& she 
could trust them, even without having any specific expectations regarding their 
behaviour. Anna could trust her father in that way if she admired him (which she seems 
to do). By "admiration," I mean simply looking up to the other. which is something a 
child could do who is even younger than Anna. Small children tend to look up to their 
parents and rely on them to be caring. What they are expressing is akin to admiration for 
their parent's values. 
Furthermore, an adult who is uncertain in a particular context about what values 
she should hold could trust someone else whose judgment she admires. A pregnant 
woman who admires her obstetrician's judgment, for example,. could trust him to decide 
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what is best for her with respect to prenatal diagnosis even if she had no idea what her 
own values about that option should be.2O There, she would be trusting her obstetrician, 
not because what they both stand for is relevantly similar, but because what he stands for 
is presumably consistent with what she would hope to stand for in that context 
One might object that in the cases I have just given, admiration for the other's 
value judgment is a consequence of trusting, as opposed to something that makes the 
trust possible. The child admires her parenfs judgment and the patient admires her 
physicians because there is trust in their relationships. However, there is no reason to 
assume that admiration could not precede trust or that trust and admiration could not 
develop simultaneously and exist in equal degrees. What I have called "admiration" may 
grow or diminish alongside of trust in a chIld's relationship with her parent, for example. 
Thus, having an expectation about and/or admiration for what people we trust 
stand for, morally speaking, is a prototypical feature of trust One could add that our 
trust tends to grow or diminish as our knowledge of what others stand for increases. 
Furthermore. the amount of evidence we need about how simIlar their values are to our 
own will likely depend on what is at stake for us by trusting them. For example, there is 
more at stake in trusting a lover to move in with us than there is in trusting a [over to stay 
overnight twice a week. Presumably, we would want to know more about the values of 
the [over in the first case than we would in the second before we would trust that person. 
What ifwe could guarantee somehow that our lover's values were the same as 
ours without relying on her moral integrity? Could we n~ then, trust our lover? In other 
words,. what about abusive situations where someone manipulates another into holding 
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distorted views about love and loyalty? For example, Made could coerce Josie into 
believing that loyalty to Marie should involve never speaking to other women, which 
allowed Marie to rely on Josie to be committed to loyalty of that sort in their 
relationship. There, she would not be relying on Josie to act on what she stood for (Le., 
act with moral integrity); rather, she would be relying on her to act on what Marie herself 
stood for. If that were the case, would we still want to say that Marie is trusting Josie to 
be "loyal"? 
3.1.3 Trust as Opposed to Mere Reliance 
[ argue, following Baier. that when we expect others to act in a certain way only 
because they have been coerced or because they have a disposition to so act, then we are 
merely relying on them, rather than trusting them.21 Reliance is an attitude toward 
another person's competence, where as long as that person is motivated to do what they 
are competent to do, it is irrelevant to us what kind of motivation they have for acting.22 
Thus, reliance is compatIble with sleazy motives (e.g., hostility. hatred), with motives 
that are morally indifferent (e.& habit), or with positive motives, including that of moral 
integrity. Thus, I assume, as does Baier, that trust is a form of reliance. What [ call cases 
of "mere reliance" are cases where we are optimistic that the other will act from a motive 
otherthan moral integrity. For example, I might be optimistic that my surgeon will 
perform my surgery competently not because I feel that he has any moral integrity but 
because I know that he does not want to get sued. There, the language of trust seems out 
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of place. It is not out of place because I would necessarily behave any differently with 
the surgeon who fears social sanctioning, as opposed to the surgeon who acts with moral 
integrity. I might be willing to put my life in the hands of either surgeon as long as they 
were equally competent as surgeons. 
What is the difference~ the~ between such cases? According to Richard Holto~ 
we are not trusting others when we expect them to act out of selfishness or out of duress 
because we would not feel betrayed if they were to fail to do what we were relying on 
them to do, whereas we would feel betrayed if we bad been trusting them to do it (1994, 
65,66). The feeling of betrayal is the expected emotional response to broken trust (Baier 
1995,99), but when we rely on someone to act in certain ways because of external 
factors influencing her behaviour or because of her reliable dispositions, we do not feel 
betrayed if she acts any differently. For Holto~ what is unique about trust, compared to 
mere reliance, is that when we trust, we adopt a stance in relation to the other that 
involves a readiness to feel betrayal. 
However, I disagree with Holton that a stance of readiness for the possibility of 
betrayal is what alone distinguishes trust from mere reliance. The response of betrayal is 
a negative moral assessment of behaviour, relevant specifically to when a person fails to 
honour a commitment that we bad been trusting her to meet If she does not do what we 
were trusting her to do through no fault of her own, then we would not say that she has 
betrayed us. Since betrayal has a moral element to ~ it is an appropriate response only 
to the behaviour of someone whom we were trusting to act morally. Thus, what makes 
trust different from reliance is not merely, or even ultimately, that the emotional response 
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of betrayal is unique to broken trust. Trust and mere reliance are distinct because we 
expect trusted others, unlike those on whom we merely rely, to be motivated by a moral 
commitment. 
We can be unaware that someone intends to act out of sleazy motives and still be 
trusting her, rather than merely relying on her. Our trust would simply be misplaced 
Where the trusted one lacks integrity and relies, as Baier writes, on the "successful cover-
up of breaches of trust't to keep the trust relation going, there is trust in the relation but it 
is "morally rotten" (1995, 123).23 Not all trust theorists agree on that point, however. 
Both Jones and Judith Baker (1996) suggest that trust requires not merely optimism that 
the trusted person will be concerned for our welfare, but actual concern on her part for 
our welfare. Jones argues that when the trusted person relies on the concealment of 
breaches of trust, the trusting person's relation to her is one of reliance, but not trust 
(1996, 19). Similarly, Baker claims that trust, like friendship, is a relation that one party 
can destroy by being deceitful even if the other party is not aware of her deceit (1996). 
Jones and Baker are focusing here on a specific way in which we use the term "trust." 
We often say that trust is missing from a relationship when one party is deceiving the 
other successfully. But do we really mean that there is no trust left of any kind in the 
relationship? Surely we would still say that the duped party is trusting the other party. 
There is such a category as misplaced t:rust and because lones and Baker do not make 
room for it their theories are unconvincing.24 
One could also trust and be wrong about there being similarities between what 
the trusted other stands for and what one's self stands for, or would hope to stand for. In 
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order for trust to thrive~ it is important only that one~s expectation about those 
similarities persists" and moreover~ that one remains optimistic about the moral integrity 
and competence of the trusted one. 
3.2.4 The Trusted Person's Perception of our Relationship 
There is one further feature of our attitude toward the motivation of trusted 
others~ a feature relevant specifically to certain kinds of trust relations" and that is that we 
expect trusted others to perceive the kind of relationship we have with one another 
similarly to the way in which we perceive it If they conceive of our relationship 
differently than we do" then they may not welcome our trust. Adding that featme takes 
care of the problem of unwelcome trust,. and it concerns our attitude specifically toward 
whether, as opposed to how" trusted others will be motivated to act 
Jones discusses the problem of unwelcome trust in "Trust As an Affective 
Attitude" (1996). Partly in order to solve it, she adds to her theory that trust involves the 
"expectation that the one trusted will be ... favourably moved by the thought that we are 
counting on her" (1996,4).25 Adding that expectation to account for unwelcome trust is 
redundant, I suggest,. once we acknowledge the expectation about the trusted person's 
perception of our relationship. Moreover, adding it excludes,. as I argue~ the real 
poSSIbility that we could have trust that is not necessarily unwelcome" but where the 
trusted other is not moved by the thought that we are counting on her. 
When trust is unwelcome" according to Jones" trusted others are not objecting to 
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our optimism about their competence or about their goodwill. Nor would they be 
objecting to our positive attitude toward their moral integrity, or about the fact that we 
admire what they stand for. What they object to, specifically, is our expectation that they 
do something for us. Jones interprets that as an objection to the expectation that they be 
favourably moved by the thought that we are counting on them. However, adding that 
expectation as a feature of all trust relations is problematic because we do not always 
count on trusted others to do something for us. Moreover, even when we do rely on them 
to have specific concern for us, we might not expect them. to acknowledge our trust and 
to be favourably moved by it. On my theory of trust as optimism about another's moral 
integrity, one could merely expect the other to be moved by his moral commitments, 
rather than by the thought that we are counting on him. 
Thus, the problem of unwelcome trust is only relevant, potentially, to cases where 
we are trusting others to have specific concern for us. Let us consider that kind of trust 
in more dewl. How does optimism about moral integrity translate into an expectation, 
in some cases but not others, that the trusted one will behave in a certain way toward us? 
[t does if the moral commitments on which we are expecting her to act require her to 
promote or respect our interests. While some moral commitments demand that we 
respect the interests of everyone (e.g., our duty not to commit murder), others require 
only that we behave in a certain way toward people with whom we have a special sort of 
relationship. Although I may have a duty to be honest on some level with everyone, for 
example. I am not morally required to be as honest about my feelings with everyone as I 
might be in an intimate relationship. Similarly, I am not morally obligated to be as 
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concerned for the welfare of others as I ought to be for my own family members and 
close friends. The moral commitments relevant to the trust in prototypical relations tend 
to be commitments of the sort that require us to behave in certain ways only toward 
people with whom we are in certain kinds of relationships. Often what we trust in 
parents, lovers, and professional people is that they do something for us that they would 
not do for just anyone. That is, we trust them to act on commitments that are 
"relationship-specific. " 
Where unwelcome trust is a problem specifically is when we expect others to 
have what I shall call special concern for us. Where we trust others to have specific 
concern that they are committed to having toward everyone, unwelcome trust should not 
be an issue. However, if we trust them to have special concern-that is, trust them to do 
only what they are committed to doing in certain kinds of relationships, then our trust 
could be unwelcome. It would be unwelcome if we were expecting the trusted person to 
interpret the relationship she has with us differently from the way in which she interprets 
it. For example, if a student trusts his teacher to be emotionally supportive in the way 
that a parent would, but the teacher does not think of (and does not want to think ot) her 
relationship with the student as a kind of parent-cfnld relationship, then the student's trust 
would be unwanted. By trusting his teacher in that way, however, the student must be 
expecting her to think of their relationship as more like a parent-chiId relationship than a 
teacher-student relationship. Without that expectation, he could not be optimistic that 
she would be emotionally supportive in the way that she would with her own child. 
Thus, to deal with the problem of unwelcome trust, it is important to recognize 
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that an important feature of trust relations that involve special concern is an expectation 
that the trusted one perceives her relationship with the truster similarly to the way in 
which he perceives it. He wants her~ specifically~ to conceive of their relationship as the 
kind that requires her to act on the relevant commitment. That feature is not present in 
all trust relations, but it is a feature of the prototypical relations I have illustrated in this 
chapter. 
4. Degrees of Distrust and Trust 
Before concluding this chapter, let me discuss briefly the main features of distrust 
and the issue of whether we distrust and trust others in degrees. I shall argue, following 
Iones, that we are distrustful not when we merely fail to be optimistic about the 
competence or motivation of others, but when we are pessimistic about their competence 
or motivation. Since pessimism and optimism admit of degrees~ we can have degrees of 
trust and distrust in others. 
In deciding whether to trust othe~ we have two main concerns: whether they are 
competent to do what we would be trusting them to do and how they would be motivated 
to do it. We want them to be motivated by moral integrity, assuming that for them to act 
with integrity would mean that they fufill certain moral commitments, which mayor may 
not require them to have some specific concern for us. We do not trust others unless our 
attitude toward their competence and moral integrity is an attitude of optimism. 
But a lack of optimism about someone's competence andfor moral integrity does 
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not signal di~ necessarily. Consdier an example of someone asking me whether he 
can borrow my truck. I might fail to be optimistic about his ability to drive the truck 
without distrusting him to drive it if I am simply unaware of whether he is competent to 
do so. I also might not be optimistic that he would be careful with my truck and return it 
to me when he says that he wiIl, but not go so far as to distrust him. I simply may not 
know him well enough to know how he would be motivated to act ifhe were to borrow 
my truck. 
To be distrusting of others,. we need to be pessimistic about their competence 
andlor about whether they will be motivated in the right way (Jones 1996,. 7). Pessimism 
about one or the other-competence or motivation-produces distrust in situations where 
one might have been trusting. As Jones writes,. pessimism and optimism are "contraries 
but not contradictories; between them lies a neutral space" (1996,. 16). Distrust does not 
occupy that space. It is a response not of indifference or agnosticism,. but rather of 
pessimism toward the trustworthiness of another in a particular domain. 
Since we can be pessimistic or optimistic about the competence and motivation 
of others to varying degrees,. we must be able to distrust or trust them to varying degrees. 
Alongside total optimism and total pessimism lies more than neutral space; there is also 
space filled with different degrees of optimism and pessimism. 26 We may only be 
somewhat optimistic,. for example,. that the stranger who helps us to pick up our groceries 
will act on a commitment not to harm us. In the absence of good evidence that he will 
act in that way,. we may only trust him partially. 
Our attitude toward the trustworthiness of the stranger may be best descnbed as 
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partial optimism and partial pessim.istIL If we did not trust him completely, our 
behaviour around him would be somewhat guarded, suggesting not only that we feel 
somewhat optimistic about his motives, but also that we feel somewhat pessimistic about 
them. One can be hopeful and yet at the same time slightly cynical about the 
trustworthiness of others. Someone who is generally distrustful of lawyers would feel 
that way, for example, if she were forced to consult a lawyer and decided to try to be 
optimistic about her lawyers moral character. Her attitude towards her lawyer would be 
an attitude of qualified trust and distrust. 
Trust and/or distrust of varying degrees do not exhaust all of the attitudes we can 
have toward the trustworthiness of others. Another attitude, one Baier (1995) discusses, 
is "anti-trust," where we actively or wiIlfully resist adopting an attitude of trust toward 
others. Anti-trust can be a political stance directed toward members of privileged groups 
who tend to exploit members of one's own social group, in part, by encouraging their 
trust and then abusing it. Anti-trust is an important topic, but since it bears little 
relevance to self-trust, I do not discuss it in depth in this thesis. rr 
s. Conclusion 
I have descnbed four important features of prototypical trust relations that 
concern what we trust in others. One of those features is relevant specifically to the trust 
that occurs in those relations where the truster expects the trusted person to have "special 
concern" for her. Thatfeatme is the last of the following features of a trusting attitude: 
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optimism about the competence of the trusted in the domain in which we trust him; 
optimism about his moral integrity in that domain; an expectation that what he stands for 
is relevantly similar to what we stand for, or would hope to stand for; and an expectation 
that he perceives the kind of relationship he has with us similarly to the way in which we 
perceive it Those features are common among the attitudes of the trusting parties to the 
relationships that form our prototypes for trust A further prototypical feature which I 
identified in this chapter is that trust occurs between two persons in relationship. Our 
trust prototypes are all alike in being instances of interpersonal trust 
The question now is whether there is a selt:regarding attitude that sufficiently 
resembles our trust prototypes that we would call it "self.trust» Is there such an attitude, 
one that shares enough of the prototypical features of trust to qualify as a non-
prototypical variant of trust? In chapter 3, I argue that there is, and I develop an account 
of that selt:regarding attitude. 
Notes 
I. I assume that the Itwelt applies only to those of us in Western cultme~ and that the way 
"welt understand trust reflects the dominant uses of that term in Itour" culture. There may 
be subcultures in Western society that interpret the concept of trust differently; and how 
it is interpreted in Western culture may overlap significantly with how it is understood in 
other cultures. However~ I shall not explore those poSSIbilities here. I focus on common 
understandings in the dominant culture, without precluding alternative uses. 
2. Prototype theory is not an uncontroversial theory of concepts (~ e.g.,. Griffiths 1997, 
176-179),. but it does seem to cohere with a populartheoty of moral and emotional 
learning, which I support in cbapter 4, as a theory of how we learn to trust. In that 
50 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
cbapter~ I defend the view that trust is an emotional attitude,. and as such, it is a learned 
and habitual response to certain types of situations. We learn how to give appropriate 
emotional responses through association with what RonaId de Sousa calls "paradigm 
scenarios" (1987). Along with teaching us how to have the appropriate emotions~ the 
scenarios demonstrate the use of our emotion concepts. If we learn through paradigm 
scenarios how to use the concept of trust, then it makes sense that the concept itself 
would be structured by something similar to prototypes. 
3. In chapter 4, I descnbe an important feature of trust that does not concern what we 
trust in others. namely. our vulnerability while trusting. 
4. Johnson did not invent prototype theory. but he did invent the theory about how it 
applies to moral concepts. Prototype theory was developed by cognitive scientists, in 
particular Eleanor Rosch and colleagues (see Johnson 1993,261, fin. 2). 
5. That is something that Johnson does not emphasize enough. For example, he does not 
explain with the bird example that the prototype "robin" is culturally specific. 
6. It is crucial that our prototypes for some moral concepts are adaptable to our 
environment because of the instrumental nature of some moral phenomena, such as 
trusting. The reliability of our trusting attitudes may shift as our circumstances change, 
in which case we may need to refine our prototypes. Trust prototypes are not static and 
neither are paradigm scenarios for trust, as I explain in chapter 4. 
7. The explanation Johnson gives for how we pick out the important features of the 
prototypes and why those features are not inherent features is too complicated to outline 
here (see 91-98). Roughly, he gives what resembles an evolutionary reason for why some 
features are important to us. They are features that we need to focus on if we are to get 
by in the world successfully. In other words. rather than being essential features of 
moral phenomena, they are instrumentaIly significant features given the nature of our 
interactions with our social and physical environments (Johnson 1993.93). 
8. Still. for some people. it may be easier or more natural to trust a dog than to trust any 
human. For example, a child who has been neglected or physically abused may find it 
easier to trust dogs before people. 
9. See, for example, Jones (1996, 19). Blier is able to explain this aspect of our trust 
relations by descnbing trust using the "model of entrusting" (1995, 101). She argues that 
when trusting others, we entrust them with. the care of something we value, which means 
that we must be trusting them in a specific domain (ie., the domain of caring for things 
of that sort). Since the entrusting model would probably not fit many instances of self-
trust (often, with self-trust, we are not entrusting ourselves with something)~ I sbaIl not 
explore that model here. 
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10. Some theorists have argued that the use of discretion is common in medical practice 
(see Whitbeck 2499),. because often there is no set procedure for practitioners to follow. 
(And,. hence, some claim that medicine is an art, rather than a science; see, e.g.,. Elliott 
1998). Patients trust that where practitioners are not constrained by strict standards of 
care that their actions are guided by a moral understanding of what is in their patient's 
best interests and/or by an understanding of their patienfs individual interests and 
concerns. 
11. See section 32.3,. on "Trust as opposed to Mere Reliance," for a discussion of 
Holton's position. 
12. Goviers boo~ Dilemmas of Trust (1998), is confusing on the topic of the motivation 
of trusted others. For example, Govier writes that when we trust someone, "we believe 
in his or her basic integrity; we are willing to rely on him or her,." (91) and that when we 
trust ourselves, we have a firm belief in our "own good character and good sense" (95), 
or at least a "positive sense of our own motivation" (99). So do we want the trusted one 
to act with integrity, then, with good sense, with any kind of positive motivation, or with 
any motivation compatible with relying on someone? 
13. There is some evidence in Bafers work that she would accept such an interpretation 
of goodwilL In The Tanner Lectures, she discusses the importance of using our judgment 
in expressing our goodwm; "for,. as Aristotle emphasized,. judgment must continually be 
used when we aim at contnbuting to someone's well-being" (1992, 118). 
14. Still, as I explain below, the actions of trusted others can be motivated wholly by 
kindly feelings or feelings of affection, as long as those feelings are in accordance with 
the commitment to doing what is right. 
15. Marcia Baron borrows the primary/secondary motive distinction from Herman and 
argues that the Kantian good will is structured in such a way that the agenfs sense of duty 
often plays a regulative function, as the agent's secondary motive (1995, 129). In 
borrowing that distinction myself from Kantian theorists (Le.,. Baron and Herman), my 
intention is not to suggest that the "commitment to act morally" that regulates the actions 
of a person with moral integrity is equivalent,. necessarily, to a Kantian sense of duty. It 
could just as easily be equivalent to an Aristotelian sense of virtue, or, presumably. to a 
care ethicist's sense of moral responsibility. 
16. What it means to have an integrated self on these theories differs. CaIhoun explains 
how it differs among the theories ofBemard Williams, Gabriele Taylor,. Lynne McFaIl,. 
and Jeffiey Blustein (236-252). 
17. It is backward-looking in the sense that we are assuming respoDSlbiIity for our causal 
role in creating a certain state of affiUrs. For a more detailed account of the distinction 
between forward and backward-looking responsibilities~ see Card (1998~ especially 25-
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29). 
18. In proposing that integrity could be domain-specific, I am not denying that it 
concerns the integration of our selves. I am simply denying that a person with integrity 
has to be integrated in every domain of his life. I find the view that integrity involves 
complete integration too strict. Still, I would accept that someone who takes his 
commitments seriously only in one dom~ particularly one that is relatively minor 
compared to the domains in which he usually maneouvres, is someone whom it would be 
inappropriate to say has integrity. 
19. My inspiration for including this feature comes from Eva Hoffinan's autobiography. 
Lost in Translation: A Lift in a New Language (1989),. where she illustrates the 
importance ofbaving some idea ofwbat the trusted other stands for. Hoffinan emigrated 
from Poland to Canada when she was thirteen years old, and later lived in the United 
States. She focuses in her book on the difficulty she had in expressing her thoughts and 
feelings in a new language and in interpreting the thoughts and feelings of others who 
lived in a different language and culture. Her inability to understand well the feelings 
and thoughts of North Americans made it especially difficult for her to establish trusting 
relationships with them: 
What do they think, feel, hold dear? rts harder for an outsider to make 
these distinctions anyway, and particularly important to make them-for 
its only when you can identify where a person stands that you can 
establish genuine trust (196). 
20. I do not pretend that it is a typical scenario where a woman allows her physician to 
decide for her because she admires what he stands for. A number of women in prenatal 
care may agree to what their physicians recommend because it seems easier to agree than 
disagree. In other words, agreeing is the path of least resistance. 
21. Saier writes that when one relies on someone'"s "dependable habits, or only on their 
dependably exfubited fear, anger, or other motives compatIble with ill will toward one," 
one is not trusting, but merely relying on them (1995,98,99). 
22. I am drawing here on interpersonal prototypes for reliance. We also may have 
reliance prototypes that are non-interpersonal, which we use when we conceive of 
ourselves as relying on a theory, for example, or as relying on the weather. 
23. Baier also thinks that trust can be morally rotten if the "truster relies on his threat 
advantage to keep the trust relation going" (1995, 123). However, as I argued above, if 
someone manipulates another person into doing what he is relying on her to do, then he 
is simply relying upon her, not trusting her. 
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24. One reason why one would not want to negate that category is tha~ without it we 
would not be able to explain the fact that some forms of uncooperative sociaI behaviour 
such as n[ eJxploitation and conspiracy ... thrive better in an atmosphere of trust" (Baier 
1995,95). One method for ensuring the continuation of the oppression of a particular 
social group is to ensure that its members are convinced of the trustworthiness of their 
oppressors. The trust that they are encouraged to have makes them vulnerable to further 
oppression. 
25. She also adds that feature in order to solve another problem, which is that we can 
rely on someone to be benevolent and competent without trusting her; we only trust her. 
according to Jones. once we expect her to be moved by the thought that we are counting 
on her (1996. lo). Below. I disagree with Jones on that point. 
26. Whatever geographical metaphor we use to represent the connections among 
attitudes of optimism, pessimism, and indifference. it must allow for combinations of 
partial optimism and partial pessimism. The metaphor of a continUUlD, with total 
optimism and total pessimism at either end, wnI not do because it is too linear. 
27. Where it might have some relevance to self-trust is in the following sort of case: a 
privileged white male dehberately fails to trust himself to think intelligently about issues 
of race and gender. 
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Clulpter3 
What We Trust or Distrust about Ounelves 
1. Introduction 
A number of philosophers have discussed or mentioned self-trust in their work, 
including Keith Lehrer (1997), Trudy Govier (1998), and Allan Gibbard (1990). None of 
them have taken seriously the worry that self-trust might not exist because trust might be 
purely relational, in the sense that it never occurs outside of a relationship between two 
distinct entities. Part of my aim in this chapter is to take that worry seriously. r argue 
that there is such a thing as trusting oneself. 
In the previous chapter, r interpreted the concept of trust using prototype theory 
and argued that interpersonal relationality is an important feature of that concept because 
all of our prototypes for trust are instances of interpersonal t:rusL 1 But according to 
prototype theory, conceptual categories can allow for phenomena that do not share the 
same features as the prototypes for those categories. Hence, there could be trust even 
where there are not two persons in relationship. I argue that although the attitude toward 
the self to which "self-trust" refers is not identical to the attitude of the truster in 
prototypical trust relations, it does share most of the important features of that attitude. 
I identified the important features of trusting attitudes in chapter 2, and also 
discussed some important fealwes of distrusting attitudes. I argued that trust in 
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prototypical relations is an attitude of optimism about the competence and moral 
integrity of others in certain domains, and involves expectations about what they stand 
for in those domains and how they perceive their relationship with us. Since a 
phenomenon could be missing some of the prototypical features of trust and still be a 
"trust" phenomenon, distrust cannot simply be the absence of one of those features. 
Rather~ it differs from trust in that the distrusting person feels pessimism, rather than 
optimi~ about either the competence or the motivation, or both the competence and 
motivation of another person. In other words, he is pessimistic that he could trust that 
person to be competent to do what he would be trusting her to do and/or he is pessimistic 
that she would be motivated in the right way to do it 
In this chapter, I illustrate what self-trusting and seif-distrusting attitudes are 
using autobiographical sketches of three women's experiences with miscarriage. I 
propose that the terms "self-trust" and "self-distrust" are helpful in explaining some of the 
different responses these women had to what went on in the time surrounding their 
miscarriage. It is common after miscarriage that women feel pessimistic about their 
competence in a number of areas, such as in knowing what it takes to act responsibly 
during pregnancy, in undemanding and expressing their own emotions, and in carrying a 
pregnancy to term. All of the different ways that a woman who has miscarried can lose 
appreciation for her own competence are lumped together in some of the literature on 
miscarriage as low "'self-confidence. ,,2 I argue that "self-distrust" is different from a lack 
of self-confidence and descn"bes more accurately some of the pessimistic self-regarding 
attitudes that the women whose stories I use developed after their miscarriage. 
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Moreover, I explain how those attitudes were influenced by ideological norms in their 
society, and in later chapters,. descnbe in more detaIl how an agents socio-political 
environment can undermine her seIf:trust. The importance of noticing that some of the 
women's attitudes are instances of seIf:trust or seIf-distrust rather than instances of self-
confidence lies in the unique role that self-trust plays in autonomous decision-making. 
By noticing how their socio-political environment influences those attitudes, we become 
aware of some of the ways in which that environment can have an impact on autonomy. 
The scope of this chapter is limited to two main issues: I) whether the terms 
"seIf:trust" and "self-distrust" have some application to people's lives; and 2) what it is 
about the self that people trust or distrust. What exactly does what we trust or distrust in 
ourselves have in common with what we trust or distrust in others? Which 
characteristics of the self do we trust or distrust when we are seIf:trusting or self-
distrusting? Those questions are different from questions about what might constitute 
grounds for thinking that we can trust ourselves or not in a particular domain. The latter 
concern our justification for assuming that the characteristics that make us trustworthy to 
ourselves are present or absent,. but exploring that issue would take us beyond the topic 
of what those characteristics are in the first place. I discuss the issue of justification in 
chapter 4. 
Questions about what we trust or distrust in ourselves are also separate from 
questions about what kinds of mental attitudes se(t:.trust and distrust are. I reserve 
discussion of that topic also for chapter 4. where I argue that they are emotional attitudes. 
characterized by patterns of salience (de Sousa 1987,. Jones 1996),. as wen as patterns of 
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behaviour (Campbell 1997). There~ I distinguish a self-trusting attitude from a belief 
about one's own trustworthiness; and I develop a theory of what I call the "skill" of 
trusting well or self-trusting well. That skill can be nurtured or lost depending on the 
agent's social environment and it is essential for autonomous decision-making, as I shall 
argue in chapter 5. 
1. Three Women's Accounts of Miscarriage 
In this sectio~ [ give excerpts from three women's accounts of their miscarriages 
and highlight the aspects of their accounts that reveal how they felt toward themselves 
before and after the miscarriage. Below~ [ argue that some (but not all) of the self-
regarding attitudes they express are instances of self-trust and self-distrust. Two of the 
stories are from Hidden Loss: Miscarriage & Ectopic Pregnancy (Hey et al1996), and 
the other is from the documentary ~ ''Unsung Lullabies" (Leaney & Silver 1995), in 
which a number of women and men explain the emotional impact of miscarriage on their 
lives. 
CaseI 
Janet miscarried her first child at seven and a half weeks gestation. 
In order to conceive the child, she had "charted and monitored [her] cycle 
with great care until the exact moment" that she knew she could get 
pregnant. Because she had used a natural method of contraception in the 
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past she was already very familiar with her cycle. When she got 
pre~ her charts showed it, and her GP accepted her charts as evidence 
(Hey et al1996~ 42). 
Here is an excerpt from what Janet writes about the miscarriage: 
''Every moming the bleeding stopped and every afternoon it started and on 
the Wednesday we went back to our doctor. He felt, palpat~ and 
prodded and questioned that I bad ever been pregnant at all: 'You told me 
you were pregnant and I believed yoa' And L knowing that I had been 
pregnant, started to doubt myself and my knowledge of my body. I felt 
concerned for the doctor~ that he felt he had made a mistake~ and it was 
my fault. You are very willing to believe that everything is your fault. •.. I 
was afraid that the whole episode had just been hysteri~ and he (the GP) 
was thinking 'neurotic wom.ad .'. [she then explains that she had an 
ultrasound which confirmed that she had been pregnant! ... I had known 
that I was pregnant, and I had doubted it, doubted me~ doubted this little 
babys existence because some forms of knowledge are seen as more valid 
than others" (Hey et al1996, 44~ 45). 
It is common for women in Hidden Loss to say that they had known they were pregnant 
but their doctors doubted it. Pregnancy tests early in the first trimester can be 
unreliable!; Janet bad two of them before heruItrasound and both were negative. Her 
doctor assumed that she was having a late menstrual period 
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The attitudes toward herself that Janet expresses in her story have to do with her 
knowledge of her pregnant state. Before her physician questioned that knowledge, she 
was certain that she possessed it; she mentions "knowing I had been pregnan~" and "my 
knowledge of my body." In claiming that knowledge, she was assuming some expertise 
on her part in recognizing changes in her body, particularly changes that occur in 
pregnancy. When her physician denied that she had ever been pregnant she began to 
doubt the reliability of her knowledge claim. She did that for two reasons. One was that 
she may have been wrong to assume that she had the expertise to make that claim in the 
first place; as she said, she "started to doubt ... [her1 knowledge of [her1 body." That 
doubt arose because her physician contradicted her and she assumed that his expertise 
was greater than hers. That assumption was influenced, as Janet herself reveals, by an 
ideological norm favouring knowledge that is grounded in technical scientific evidence 
rather than in non-technical evidence that cannot always be verified using standard 
scientific methods (the former are the "forms of knowledge [that} are seen as more valid 
than others"). For a while, Janet accepted that her physician had greater expertise than 
her because he was trained to access evidence of pregnancy that is technical, whereas her 
expertise was largely informed by experiential evidence. Although she did have some 
technical evidence, drawn from her basal temperature charts, much of the information on 
which she relied came from her own bodily experience. 
lanet also questioned her claim to be pregnant because she wondered whether it 
could have been motivated by "hysteria." That is, perhaps it was prompted by an. 
obsession she had with wanting to be pre~ and because of that obsessioll,o she had 
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deceived herself about whether the evidence poin~ in fa~ to a pregnancy. As soon as 
she suspected that her claim was false, Janet began to feel guilty because she bad 
persuaded her doctor to believe that she was pregnant and had therefore, caused him, 
perhaps, to make a mistake. Her guilt arose, then, because she knew that someone else, 
namely her physician, had been relying on her to give him accurate information. 
Janet did not feel guilty because she had known when she made the claim to be 
pregnant that it might be false, but had encouraged her physician to believe it anyway. 
There is no indication in her story of a conscious intention to deceive, but every 
indication that she had truly believed she was pregnant and that there was sufficient 
evidence to support her claim. In other words, she thought that she was making a 
responsible claim to knowledge, that is, a claim motivated by an honest and rigorous 
assessment of the evidence . .J Sbe felt gwlty not because she had known all along that her 
intentions were suspect, but because she later worried that that was the case. 
Below, [ argue that Janet trusted her judgment that she was pregnant before her 
physician questioned that she was; and, after he questioned it, she distrusted that 
judgment. I explain how her attitudes toward her own expertise, or judgment, are similar 
to the attitudes of trust and distrust in the expertise of other persons. 
ease 2 
In her second pregnancy~ SheiIa had a miscvriage at eleven weeks 
gestation. Sbe writes that at the first sign of trouble, "I knew immediately 
that I would lose the baby. It was the first moment after the full-term 
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pregnancy and 11 weeks of the present pregnancy that I felt scared that 
something could go~ and in filet now was going, wrong. The posSIbility of 
problems had never before occurred to me. I knew things could go wrong 
in pregnancy but I felt I was the <sic> one of the lucky ones who would 
sail through it with very little alteration from the norm .... I was totally 
shattered. I was someone whose life revolved around bodily activity. I 
had worked hard to gain control in body actio~ to be aware of how my 
body moved and reacted to stimuli. I was fit and healthy. Now I felt I had 
lost all control of my body. I kept bleeding and there was nothing I could 
do about it. It was the first feelings of guilt (feelings that were to remain 
with me for a long time )-that I of all people should be experiencing 
something other than a normal pregnancy. 'Pregnancy is not an illness'; 
you should be able to continue as before with slight limitations. 4 who 
enjoyed fitness and activity, was now faced with temble guilt. Had I 
brought on this miscarriage myselfl Oh, why had. I been so selfish to go 
away the weekened <sic> before? I bad felt the need for a break so had 
naturally gone to the mountains. I must have overstrained myself-it was 
my fault. If only ... If (Hey et alI996, 21). 
I want to highlight three different positive attitudes SheiIa had about her own abilities 
that were destroyed as a result of her miscarriage. One is about her ability to Ifsail 
throughlf her pregnancy without experiencing any problems, another concerns her ability 
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to control her "body actio~" and a third is about her ability to act respoDSlbly during 
pregnancy. 
SheiIa was so optimistic that she would experience a "normallt pregnancy that she 
did not even consider the possibility that she would not. She knew that problems could 
occur in pregnancy, but did not appreciate that they could occur in her pregnancy. She 
ignored that possibility and assumed that she would be "one of the lucky ones." That sort 
of attitude is understandable given the cultural messages that women tend to receive 
about pregnancy in Western society. As the writers of Hidden Loss point o~ "[t]he 
literature ...• our mothers. and shared collective common sense make it seem that having 
a baby as the result of being pregnant is as automatically guaranteed as rain in June" 
(1996, 127). However. in reality. miscarriages occur in over 50% of all conceptions. S 
There are a number of reasons why our society tends to ignore the high rate of 
miscarriages.6 One concerns the cultural construction of femininity as a characteristic of 
childbearing women. Painting a rosy picture of childbearin& or at least avoiding 
discussion about what often goes wrong in pregnancy. may be crucial for persuading 
women to accept the social role of chiIdbearer. Since the female gender is defined in 
terms of that role, women who miscany are "failures as wome~" which also might 
explain why many people around them do not want to acknowledge their miscarriage, 
and why the women themselves might not want to acknowledge it publicly. 
People may avoid discussing a woIIUUts miscarriage not only because they 
suspect that it is an embarassing topic for her. but also because the event of her 
miscarriage may not have any emotional significance for them. It could even lack 
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emotional urgency for the woman who miscarri~ especially if she never knew that she 
was pregnant. However, often the woman is the only one for whom the miscarriage was 
(and continues to be) profoundly emotionally significant. If she miscarried before she 
was "showing,,,7 she may have been the only person to have fully acknowledged the 
fetus's existence and to have developed an emotional connection with it. For those who 
never established such a connection or who did not even know that she was pregnant, the 
fetus's death will likely hold little, if any significance. Still, one might think that others 
could sympathize with the woman if they knew what emotional impact a miscarriage can 
have on women. But how are they to know that, given how women's experiences of 
miscarriage tend to be ignored in our society? 
SheiIa was unprepared for the posSIbility that she would miscarry and was also 
unprepared to deal with what went on in her body during the miscarriage. She responded 
with shock to her miscarriage because she had been confident that she could sail through 
a pregnancy. That confidence was shattered as a result of her miscarriage. She was 
unprepared for how her body reacted during the miscarriage because she had learned that 
by maintaining a high level of fitness, she could control how her "body moved and 
reacted to stimuli." She lost that control during the miscarriage. As she said, ''I kept 
bleeding and there was nothing I could do about it"; ''I bad lost all control of my body. If 
It is important to appreciate that SheiIa's attitude about her ability to control her 
"body action'· is distinct from her attitude toward avoiding problems in her pregnancy. 
She did not assume that she would avoid any problems because her control over her body 
was so great that she could prevent problems from occurring.. There is no indication in 
64 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
her story that she felt that she had that much control over her body. ThUS,. her attitude 
about her bodily control was not what made her unprepared for the possibility of 
miscarriage; rather,. it only made her unprepared for dealing with the uncontroUable 
bleeding during miscarriage. 
A third self-regarding attitude of optimism in SheiIa's story was her attitude 
toward her commitment to caring for herself and her fetus and toward her capacity to 
know what that would take. That she knew what it would take is revealed by her remark 
that "'[pJregnancy is not an illness'; you should be able to continue as before with slight 
limitations." She must have accepted that advice about pregnancy, for it had influenced 
ber decision to go hiking in the mountains and influenced how much she exerted herself 
on the trip; earlier on in her story,. she explains that she had taken it easy by reducing her 
pace and carrying less weight than usual (Hey et a11996,. 21). She had purposefully done 
what she thought she needed to do to be responsIble,. and therefore, she must have been 
committed to acting responsIbly. InitiaUy she assumed that she was not tailing to live up 
to that commitment by going hiking, but her view of that plan changed after her 
miscarriage. She had been selfish to go on the trip and felt guilty for doing so. She had 
broken a commitment to care for herself and her fetus,. and had been wrong to assume 
that she knew how to act respoDSlbly in pregnancy; she concluded that she must have 
overstrained herselfwhiIe hiking and bad subsequently caused her own miscarriage. 
Like Jane(s guilt,. SheiIa's guilt was a respo~ in ~ to a failure to do what others 
(e.g.,. her potential future child) were relying on her to do .. 
SheiIa's guiIt may seem completely unreasonable" particularly to those who know 
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that it is highly unlikely that her biking was the cause of her miscarriage. However, it is 
important to interpret her guilt against the background of pronatalist norms that require 
women to go to extreme and often unnecessary lengths to care for their children or their 
offspring, and which presmne that it is simply second-nature for women to know how to 
care for them. Those norms imply that by virtue of being a woman, SheiIa should have 
known how to protect her fetus and should have ensured its protection. What SheiIa 
interpreted as guilt may have partly been shame in her own shortcomings as a woman 
and as a mother, revealed to her as a result of her miscarriage. Below, I explain that both 
her feelings of guilt and Janet's may have been mixed with shame. 
As [ argue below, in her complex response to her pregnancy and miscarriage, 
Sheila expressed self-trust and self-distrust in her attitudes about behaving responsIbly in 
pregnancy, self-confidence and a lack of self-confidence in her attitudes about sailing 
through her pregnancy, and self-reliance and a lack of self-reliance in her attitudes about 
her ability to control what goes on in her own body. In chapter 2, I contrasted trust with 
reliance, and here I add the further contrast of trust as opposed to confidence. 
Case 3 
Anna bad a positive pregnancy test at six weeks gestation, but the 
day after the test, she started bleeding severely and had a miscarriage. As 
a result of the miscarriage, she suffered a lot of emotional confusion. She 
had a loving partner who was deeply concerned about what she was going 
through, but who did not seem to be able to. help her to get through it.. 
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"1 found it really difficult to express just how difficult 1 was finding it 
emotionally after the miscarriage, and ... I guess partly because I didn't 
know anyone else who'd miscarried and I felt sort of like, welI, it was only 
six weeks. It wasn't like rd lo~ ... lost a baby or that rd had a stillbirth or 
something like that. .. and you know that maybe I shouldn't be as upset as I 
was" (Leaney & Silver 1995). 
Oft~ there is pressure on women not to grieve after a miscarriage because many people 
around them do not view their fetus's death as an event that warrants profound grief. 
That view is reflected in the kinds of responses that people often give to women when 
they miscarry. An example is that the miscarriage was a "blessing in disguise; the baby 
would have been deformed" (Hey et a11996, (29). Miscarriages are often interpreted as 
"blessings" not only when the fetus might have had an abnormality but also when the 
pregnancy was unwanted and the woman was trying to decide whether to terminate it It 
is a blessing that she did not have to make what for her might have been a difficult 
decision. However, even when women have miscarriages in unwanted pregnancies, they 
can experience the death of the fetus as a significant loss, and be confused or even 
offended when others suggest that they should be relieved about the outcome. S 
Whenever women feel incredible sadness over a miscarriag~ but others respond as if 
there is little to be upset about, the women can experience profound confusion about 
their feelings and, in particular, about whether the intensity of their feelings is warranted. 
Anna felt a kind of "emotional incompetency" when it came to dealing with her 
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miscarriage. As she said, she "found it really difficult to express just how difficult [she] 
was finding it emotionally after the miscarriage." There are two reasons why she might 
have felt that way. One is that she may have thought that most people would be 
unsympathetic to her feelings if she were to try to articulate them, and the other is that 
she was simply having trouble articulating them. She may have thought that people she 
knew, including her partner even, could not be truly sympathetic because none of them 
bad ever experienced what she was going through (as far as Anna knew). For instance, 
her partner never experienced what it was like to have their Itchild" inside of him. Others 
also might be unsympathetic because, "well, it was only six weeks," and "it wasn' like I'd 
lost ... a baby.'t Anna may have been imagining that people around her were interpreting 
her miscarriage as a relatively insignificant event, and that encouraged her to try to 
interpret it that way as well. 
However, Anna must have been confused about how she was feeling, rather than 
just concerned that others would be unsympathetic. She was somewhat persuaded by the 
view that the death of her fetus did not warrant profound grief: but she was experiencing 
that level of grief nonetheless. That must have made her confused about whether her 
feelings were warranted, and perhaps even uncertain about whether they were caused by 
her fetuts death. She may have been thinking that if its death was insignificant, then it 
could not have been the event that triggered those feelings. They must have been caused 
by something else, in which case they were not feelings of grief over the death of a fetus. 
They could have been feelings of anger over how others treated her after the miscarriage 
(perhaps she assumed that they blamed her for it), they could have been feelings about an 
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imagined death of an imaginary entity that had greater moral or personal significance 
than her fetus~ or they could have been caused, of course~ by abrupt hormonal changes. 
The two reasons why Anna may have found it difficult to express her feelings 
could be interconnected. More specifically~ she may have been confused about her 
feelings and about the occasion that produced them because of the lack, or presumed 
lack, of sympathy from others for those feelings. Sue CampbeIl's theory of feelings 
explains why that may have been the case (1997). Campbell argues that until others give 
"uptake" to our feelings~ that is. until they recognize them as the same sorts of feelings 
that we do. then usually we cannot be certain about what they are feelings Oh or of what 
their content is. She argues that feelings are individuated (that is, their content is 
defined) collaboratively through their expression. Their individuation depends both on 
how the person with those feelings interprets the occasion the significance of which she 
is trying to express, and on how the people to whom she expresses its significance 
interpret that occasion. If someone with whom she shares her feelings does not see how 
the occasion warrants the kinds of feelings she is claiming to have, then she may become 
confused about what those feelings are about (Campbell 1997. 109. 110). 
CampbeIl's theory is helpful in understanding the enormous difficulty that 
women, such as Anna, have in sorting out their feelings surrounding a miscarriage when 
those feelings clash with the way their society expects them to react emotionally to 
miscarriage. Their emotional turmoil is no coincidence, given that most people around 
them may not acknowledge their feelings or may even dehberately try to discourage them 
out of an interest in perpetuating our societ}'s rosy view of childbearing. Using 
69 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CampbeU's theory, we can account for the kind of emotional confusion that comments 
such as "it was a blessing in disguise" or "it could have been worse: you could have lost a 
baby" can cause for women who have miscarried Those women. need listeners who will 
give uptake to their feelings,. rather than demand different feelings. Those are people 
who have some understanding of the various kinds of emotional significance that 
miscarriage can have for women. 9 
Although Anna's ability to understand her feelings by clarifYing the significance 
of the event that caused them may be dependent on sympathetic listeners, one can still 
refer to her competency in that area, and of whether she trusts or distrusts it One could 
assume about that competency that it is relational in the sense that one's ability to 
exercise it depends on whether one has opportunities for collaboration with sympathetic 
others. [t is a competency tIqlt can manifest itself only if those opportunities exist. 
Below, [ call that competency a form of emotional competency; and I explain that Anna 
distrusted it in the domain of her miscarriage. 
3. Important Features of Self-Trust and Self-Distrust 
First I shall focus on the attitudes I identified above as self-trusting and 
distrusting attitudes; and I shall explain why we would conceptualize them as forms of 
trust, or distrust. They include Janets attitudes toward her own judgment that she was 
pregnant, Sheilas attitudes toward her commitment to act responstbly in her pregnancy~ 
and Anna's attitude about her emotional competency in the context of her miscarriage. to 
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I structure this section by going through each prototypical feature of trust and ~ 
and identifYing whether each is present in the above attitudes. I argue that all are present 
in some form or other, except the features that concern the relationship between the 
truster and the trusted. 
Interpersonal trust and self-trust are importantly similar in that when we trust 
others, we are trusting them to have certain competencies and to live up to their 
commitments to us, and when we trust ourselves, we are trusting our own competency 
and commitment. One unique aspect of self-trust is that the self-truster is the one 
trusting as well as the one trusted. To be the one trusting, she must be optimistic about 
the competency of the trusted (i.e.,. herself) and the commitment she has to do what she is 
counting on herself to do. To also be the one trusted, she must take some responsibility 
for exercising that competency and for meeting that commitment. 
l.1 The Competence of the Self 
The woments attitudes which I identified as trusting or distrusting attitudes all 
concern different competencies that the women possessed (or wished that they 
possessed) within particular domains. For example. Jands attitudes of optimism and 
pessimism had to do with whether she was competent to recognize when she was 
pregnant. Before her physician doubted her, she felt that she bad the expertise to 
determine on her own whether she was pregnant given her knowledge of her cycle. Her 
optimism about that expertise mimics the optimism of the characters in the vignettes in 
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chapter 2 who are optimistic about the epistemic powers,. or judgment,. of the trusted 
(they are Eva,. a 9-year old girl who trusts her father's judgment, and Todd,. who trusts his 
physician's judgment). In particular, like Todd.'s attitude about the expertise of Dr. Chen,. 
Janet's attitude is domain-specific. Her optimism and pessimism about her own 
judgment extend in her story only to judgments about changes in her body, particularly 
changes that occur in pregnancy. 
The attitudes of Sheila and Anna are also directed at domain-specific skills, or 
competencies. Sheila was optimistic before her miscarriage that she was competent to 
understand what it would take for her to act responstbly in her pregnancy. Her attitude 
focused on the epistemic dimensions of her moral competency,. as do the trusting 
attitudes of Josie and Marie, the characters from chapter 2 who trust one another in an 
intimate relationship. Their trust depends, in part,. on their optimism about one another's 
moral competence,. but not necessarily on whether they are correct about that 
competence. Similarly, although SheiIa was not wrong that she was competent to 
understand what it would take to act responsibly in her pregnancy, she could have been 
wrong and still have maintained her attitude of seIt:trust. That attitude would simply 
have been misplaced. If she were to lose her optimism about her moral competence in 
the domain of her pregnancy (which she did), then her self-trust in that domain would 
disappear. Once SheiIa decided that her miscarriage was her fault, she began to feel 
pessimistic about her prior moral understanding, and consequently distrusted that 
understanding as it related to her pregnancy. 
The relevant competency with Anna.'s negative attitude is her ability to identifY 
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and articulate her own feelings. She was pessimistic that she possessed that competency 
in the domain of her miscarriage, but not necessarily pessimistic that she possessed it in 
other domains. That competency is probably one dimension of "emotional competency," 
where another is having the ability to understand or at least be sympathetic to the feelings 
of others. Intimate partners often trust one another to have both dimensions of emotional 
competency. which is the case with Josie and Matie. By trusting one another to be 
emotionally supportive, they are trusting that the other is competent to be sympathetic 
toward the feelings of the other. They are also trusting one another to be able to express 
their feelings clearly, since each trusts the other to be open and honest about her feelings 
and to act appropriately given their content. Their trust in one another's emotional 
expression has the same object as Anna's pessimistic attitude toward herself. 
J.l The Moral Integrity of the Self: Feelings of Shame and Guilt 
It would be difficult to establish that the women were trusting themselves in the 
relevant domains unless their attitudes concerned not only their competence, but also 
their moral commitment to act in a certain way. I argued in chapter 2 that what 
distinguishes trust from mere reliance (where trust itself is a form of reliance) has to do 
with the sort of motivation one expects from trusted others. One expects them to act 
with moral integrity. When one is merely relying on others, one expects them to be 
motivated by hab~ selfish desires» or some threat of~ rather than by a commitment 
to doing what is right in the circumstances. I argue in this section that the women's 
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attitudes were focused on a commitment to doing what is right That is,. their attitudes 
shared with attitudes of interpersonal trust or distrust the feature of optimism or 
pessimism about the moral integrity of the trusted one. I explain that for them to have 
been trusting or distrusting themselves, their optimism or pessimism did not have to be 
conscious. And, furthermore, I claim that one source of evidence (although. not a 
conclusive source) for whether they had been trusting themselves is their emotional 
response when their trust was (supposedly) broken. The expected response to broken 
self-~ I argue, is guilt or shame. 
Because the women's attitudes were selt:regarding, it is important to demonstrate 
not only that the women were optimistic or pessimistic that they would act on a 
commitment to be moral, but also that they took some responsibility for living up to that 
commitment. Those who take such responstbility allow their moral commitments to 
regulate their primary motives for acting. In chapter 2, I distinguished between primary 
and secondary motives, and explained that a person with moral integrity is someone 
whose commitment to doing what is right acts as a secondary motive, regulating her 
conduct. Sometimes when it serves that function, the agent is introspecting her primary 
motives (i.e., the motives she has for acting) to confirm that they are consistent with her 
moral commitments. 
But a person can act with moral integrity without engaging in introspection if she 
already knows that what motivates her to act is consistent with a commitment to doing 
what is right. Often reflecting upon those motives "would be otiose and leave unchanged 
our intellectual and practical attitudes" towards them, as Lehrer suggests (1997, 4). That 
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leaves room for the possibility of unconscious trust which is common in interpersonal 
relations, and would be common with self-t:nJst if such attitudes exist. An example, 
involving interpersonal trust, is that often we do not put conscious effort into our trust in 
friends or lovers for it just seems obvious to us that they are trustworthy (Baier 1995,99). 
When we trust ourselves without conscious effort, one source of evidence for 
whether we are, or were, optimistic about our competence and commitment to do 
something is the way that we would respond to our fat1ure to do it For example, if I bad 
been optimistic that I would live up to a commitment to care for my dog, Fergus, but 
failed to live up to it because I was too lazy to walk him regularly or because [ sometimes 
forgot to feed him, one would expect that I would feel guilty or even ashamed. One 
assumes that the appropriate emotional response to a failure to live up to a commitment 
when one could have acted otherwise is guilt or shame. Moreover, if I had been counting 
on myself to be competent to care for Fergus but cared for him incompetently-by 
feeding him the wrong food, for example-then I would also feel guilty or ashamed. I 
would feel badly that I bad counted on myself, and had others count on me (especially 
Fergus)7 to do something that I was not actually competent to do. 
m the literature on emotions, shame and guilt are distinguished from one another 
by associating guilt with our actions, and shame with our nature (see especially, Bartky 
1990 and Deigh 1983). We feel the betrayaIll of broken se(f:trust more deeply when we 
respond with shame, for in our minds the betrayal represents not only a wrongdoing on 
our part,. but a shortcomin& or a flaw in our character(Bartk.y 1990, 87). Since 
wrongdoings usually retlect badly on our character, shame and guilt often accompany 
75 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
one another. Moreover~ as Sandra Lee 8artky notes~ "the boundaries between them tend 
to blur in actual experience. Psychological studies have shown that most people are hard 
put to state the difference between shame and guil~ nor can they easily classify their 
experiences under one heading or the other" (Bartky 1990,. 87,. 88; see ftn 23,. citing 
Miller 1985). ThUS,. although the women in the cases above descnbed their feelings over 
the disappointment of their self-trust as guilt,. they may. in fact,. have felt shame as welL 
Thus. if it is true that we can trust ourselves. then when that trust is broken, we 
will feel guilty and/or ashamed,. whether our trust is conscious or not That emotional 
response is consistent with the expected emotional responses to broken interpersonal 
trust by the truster and the one trusted. What we expect from the truster when 
interpersonal trust is broken is that she feels betrayed. What we expect from the trusted, 
that is. the one who broke the trust. is guilt or shame. since those emotions are 
appropriate for someone who has betrayed another. When we trust ourselves. we are the 
one trusted and therefore the one responsible for honouring the trust When we fail to 
meet that respollSlbility through some fault of our own, we feel guilty or ashamed 
because we have betrayed ourselves. 12 
However. a response of guilt or shame alone does not confirm that one bad been 
trusting oneself, since it alone does not establish that one bad been optimistic that one 
would act with moral integrity. There are three reasons why it does not confirm such 
optimism. First of all,. although shame and guilt are negative moral assessments we 
make of our behaviour or of our nature when we fail to live up to certain standards,. we 
may experience those emotions without accepting the relevant standards. We could have 
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internalized the standards without actually endorsing them (see Bartky 1990). For 
example, what spawned Sheila~s guilt, in part.. may have been the internalization of the 
standard that she drastically alter her normal behaviour in pregnancy because it is a 
disease-like state. Sheila does not endorse that particular view of pregnancy, but the 
pervasiveness of it in patriarchal society may have invaded her psyche, nonetheless. 
Similarly, Janet did not accept the standard that technical, scientific evidence is 
inherently superior to experiential evidence, but still., that societaI epistemic norm may 
partly explain her guilt about cJaiming to be pregnaIlt without much technical evidence, 
when, in fact, she might not have been pregnant. Guilt and shame that arise in response 
to internalized standards that we do not endorse do not reveal that we had been optimistic 
about acting with moral integrity, since integrity requires that we act in accordance with 
standards that we accept. To establish that those emotions are evidence of such 
optimism, one would have to have good reason to suspect that we did endorse the 
relevant standards and were committed to living up to them. 
Secondly, we may experience guilt or shame about violating a particular standard 
even if we did not accept it at the time that we violated it, but did so later on and wished 
that it had been guiding our behaviour. Consider the example of someone who 
frequently told lies in the past exaggerating his successes, but who never believed that 
those lies were really morally problematic. Ifhe now accepts that they are,. he will 
probably feel guilty or even ashamed about having told such lies. But his shame or guilt 
would not reveal that he had been optimistic in the past that he would act on a 
commitment to refrain from telling lies about himself 
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Lastly,. it is poSSIble that even if we had accepted a standard at the time that we 
violated it and now feel guilty or ashamed,. we might not have been optimistic that we 
would live up to that standard. Consider the example of someone who has always agreed 
that she ought to take good care of her body. On New Years Eve,. she makes a resolution 
to quit smoking,. but she does not really take seriously the possibility that she will quit 
because she knows how difficult that would be. There,. she is merely hopefol rather than 
optimistic that she will live up to her commitment to take better care ofherselt: and she 
will probably feel guilty or even ashamed when she has her first cigarette after the 
holiday. She was merely hopefuL but one would not go so far as to say that she was 
trusting herself to quit smoking. 
ThUS,. guilt or shame alone does not establish whether we had been optimistic that 
we would live up to a particular standard. Establishing that requires that one produce 
further evidence~ such as evidence that our past behaviour is consistent with a sincere 
attempt to meet the relevant standard, and that in all likelihood,. we would openly 
endorse that standard. 
Can we demonstrate,. then,. that the womens self-regarding attitudes focused on 
whether they would live up to certain moral commitments and woul~ therefore,. act with 
moral integrity? First we need to determine what the relevant moral commitments might 
be. What would it mean for the women to exercise the competencies on which their 
attitudes focus and act with moral integrity at the same time? After answering that 
question,. we need to establish that they ~ in fact,. optimistic or pessimistic that they 
would act with integrity,. and that they took some responstbility for acting in that way. 
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But we also need to show that by striving to fulfiIl the commitments on which 
their attitudes focus, the women were displaying a social virtue. As I argued in chapter 2, 
the virtue of integrity is social because it involves "standing for something," which 
requires that one take on forward-looking respoDSlbilities for ensuring that what one 
stands for is preserved or established, not only for one's own sake, but also for the sake 
of others. With self-trust.. we take on responsibilities for ourselves by standing up for 
what we need and value most:, andIor responstbilities for the welfare of others who are 
relying on us or trusting us. To be morally respoDSlble for ourselves, we must fully 
appreciate our own worth as moral agents, which requires that we attend to our own 
needs and desires. There are social elements to doing so, including sending the message 
to others that no one should compromise her own worth. Furthermore, self-trust 
motivates us to meet moral commitments to other people. It is the appropriate response 
to trust from others that we welcome, for to honour their trust, we must be optimistic that 
we will act competently and with moral integrity in doing what they are trusting us to do. 
Let us consider Janet first and determine which moral commitment she could 
have been living up to while making knowledge claims about her own body. A plaUSIble 
candidate is the commitment to making responsible claims. That is, she could have been 
striving to be a responstble epistemic agent, one who has no intention of deceiving others 
or herselfby making false or exaggerated claims. She would have been attempting to 
emulate such an agent not only for her own sake, but also for the sake of others, in 
particular her physician, who was relying on her to give him accurate information about 
her pregnant state. ThUS,., in being committed to epistemic responsibility, she would have 
79 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
been optimistic about exlubiting a social virtue. RespoDSlble epistemic agents are 
committed to making statements that are not simply convenient or useful, but true. 
Someone who admits that her claims are made solely out of convenience, simply to serve 
her own interests, could hardly call them ''knowledge claims." Being respoDSlble 
epistemically requires assessing the available evidence carefully and also recognizing the 
limits of one's knowledge (Le., recognizing that how much one knows is limited by 
whatever one has actual evidence to support). 
But how we understand epistemic responsibility is determined not merely by the 
bounds of evidence, but also by what counts as evidence, which is often partly a political 
issue. In some contexts, dominant groups gain the power that knowledge brings by 
ensuring that what is deemed to be "evidence't is whatever they have expertise in 
assessing, and by controlling who develops that expertise. 13 That is, sometimes, they 
exact limits on who gets to be epistemically respoDSlble by promoting a narrow 
conception of evidence. As I have mentioned, Janet does not endorse the dominant 
conception of evidence in medical contexts, and hence, the standard of epistemic 
responsibility she may have been living up to in claiming to be pregnant must have been 
a revised version of the dominant standard. 
Janet was committed to making respoDSlble knowledge claims and felt that her 
claim to be pregnant was respoDSlble before her physician doubted its truth. When he 
sai~ "You told me you were pregnant and I believed yo~ If he was suggesting that she 
had been irrespoDSlble in making that claim.. What he probably meant was that she bad 
been careless in recording her temperature on hercharts. The other evidence she had of 
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pregnancy-her experiential evidence-he probably did not take seriously from the 
beginning. That evidence did not save her, then, from being labelled irresponsible by 
him once he suspected that her technical evidence was unreliable. By responding to her 
physician's comment with guilt feelings (and perhaps also with shame), Janet revealed 
that she had at least internalized (but had not necessarily endorsed) the constraint that she 
strive to make respollSlble claims. As I argued above, she may have been responding to 
the dominant constraints on evidence at that point. even though she never actually 
believed in that conception of evidence and may have been striving to meet a standard of 
epistemic responsibility that is compatible with an alternative conception of what counts 
as evidence. 
However, Janet~s guilt does not confirm that she endorsed any standards of 
epistemic responsibility at the time that she claimed to be pregnant. She may have only 
realized after her physician suggested that her claim was irrespollSlble that she should 
have been committed earlier on in her interaction with her physician to making 
responstble claims to knOWledge. However, there is evidence in her behaviour while she 
was attempting to discover whether she was pregnant that the commitment to being 
epistemicaIly respollSlble was guiding that attempt and that she endorsed that 
commitment The evidence is that she "charted and monitored [her} cycle with great 
care until the exact moment" that she knew she could get pregnant (my emphasis). That 
she took great care reveals that she was committed to acting responstbly, and moreover, 
that she probably had been optimistic, rather than merely hopeful (but never actually 
serious) about being a respoDSlbIe mower. In. other words, she was optimistic that she 
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would act with moral integrity. Once her physician~s comment caused her to suspect her 
true motives for claiming to be pre~ she began to feel pessimistic about whether she 
had, in fact, acted respoDSlbly in making that claim. She was pessimistic not merely 
because the claim might not have been grounded in any "real" evidence, but also because 
she may have been "hysterical" in making that claim. Hence, it may have been 
inconsistent even with the evidence she valued and had available to her. 
For Sheila to act with moral integrity while exercising the competency on which 
her attitudes focus would involve her acting on a commitment to behave responsibly in 
her pregnancy. That respoDSlbility is clearly social as well as moral for it concerns her 
well-being as well as the well-being of her fetus. The "temble guilt" Sheila felt after the 
miscarriage because she thought she had caused it by overstraining herself on the hike, 
suggests that she may, in fact, have been committed to fulfilling that respoDSloility. 
Further evidence of that commitment lies in her plan to exert herself less than usual on 
the hike. Her view that she should limit herself slightly informed her commitment to 
protect herself and her fetus and that commitment was guiding her behaviour. Thus, 
SheiIa must have been optimistic that by going hiking she was acting in accordance with 
her moral commitments in pregnancy. That is, she must have been optimistic that she 
was acting with moral integrity. After the miscarriage, her optimism disappeared and 
was replaced by pessimism about her true motives for making the trip. She assumed that 
she had been motivated by selfishness rather than by a desire to act in a way that was 
consistent with her moral resPODSlOiIities. 
The kind of commitment Anna was striving to live up to is the commitment to 
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understand her emotions and to act appropriately given their content. Her commitment is 
probably the same as one of the commitments of Josie and Marie to one another (the 
characters from chapter 2): Josie and Marie trust not only that each other is competent to 
express her emotions clearly, but also that she is committed to expressing them clearly 
and to acting in ways that are consistent with her emotions. That Anna was struggling to 
"express just how difficult [she I was finding it emotionally after the miscarriage" reveals 
that she was committed both to understanding her emotional response to her miscarriage 
and to acting in appropriate ways given that response. She wanted to express her 
emotions clearly, which means she wanted her behaviour to communicate those 
emotions, that is, to be suitable behaviour given what those emotions were. Like Josie 
and Marie, Anna and her partner were probably committed to having an emotionally 
healthy relationship, which means that Anna probably felt obligated to settle her 
emotional confusion not only for her sak:e~ but also for her partner's sake. Thus, in all 
likelihood, her commitment to exfnbiting emotional competence in the domain of her 
miscarriage was guiding her behaviour; and to honour it, she would have been exfnbiting 
a social and a moral virtue. She was taking some responsIbility for living up to that 
commitment, but was having little success~ and therefore felt pessimistic about whether 
she was competent to live up to it. 
Thus~ like individuals who are trusting or distrusting others, the women in the 
cases were optimistic or pessimistic about whether they would live up to, or had lived up 
to,. a moral and social. commitment to act in a certain way. Their attitudes were focused 
not only on one of their competencies within the domain of pregnancy and miscarriage,. 
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but also on their moral integrity in that domain. Because those attitudes were directed at 
themselves (they were the one trusted as well as the one trusting), they also must have 
taken some responsibility for honouring their commitment. If they were fulfilling that 
responsibility~ then their commitment must have acted as their secondary motive, that is, 
as a motive regulating their primary motives to act I have argued that there is some 
evidence in their stories that their moral commitment was performing that regulative 
function. Moreover, I argued that it could have been performing that function even if the 
women were not consciously aware of it. 
3.3 The Expectation About What J Stand For 
Thus, the women's attitudes had two of the important features of prototypical 
trust: optimism about the competence of the trusted and optimism that she will act with 
moral integrity. Another important feature is the expectation that what she stands for is 
similar enough to what we stand for that we can trust her to be committed to doing what 
we are trusting her to do. We do not trust her to have that commitment simply by being 
optimistic that she will act with moral integrity; for she could act on a different moral 
commitment and stiII maintain integrity. However, as I argue, with self-trust, we do trust 
ourselves to act on certain moral commitments simply by being optimistic about our 
moral integrity. That optimism entails the expectation that the commitments that the one 
trusted (Le., ourselves) will act on will be our own. 
However, most self-trusting attitudes do focus on our future behaviour, [4 and so 
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do we not need to e~ when trusting ourselves, that we will be committed in the 
future to the same values that we now hold and that are relevant to our trust in ourselves? 
If that were true, we would have to be questioning our commitment to those values, and 
that in itself would reveal that we are not truly committed to them. One's endorsing or 
being committed to a moral value, such as social justice, presupposes one's having an 
expectation that one will hold that value in the future. If a young person claimed to stand 
for social justice and to oppose capitalist values, for example, but at the same time, he 
expected that when he got older he would probably vote for a right-wing political party 
just like most of the adults he knows, then we would question his commitment to the 
values he claims to hold. Moral values, then, are distinct from preferences, for we often 
expect that when we have a certain preference (e.g., a preference for jogging), unlike 
when we are committed to a moral value, we might give it up at some point. 
Since being optimistic about our moral integrity means being optimistic that we 
will act on our own moral commitments, and being committed to certain moral values 
entaIls the expectation that we will hold those values in the future, it would be redundant 
to add to a description of self-trust that focuses on our future behaviour the expectation 
that we will hold certain values in the future. 
But even though we do not expect our moral values to change in the future, they 
might change nonetheless. When we revise moral commitments that we had been 
trusting ourselves to have in the ~ do we betray ourselves? That issue is 
complicated by the fact that some feminist philosophers:> such as Susan Babbitt (1996):> 
Margaret Urban Walker (1998), and ctaudia Card (1996), have argued that acting with 
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integrity sometimes requires that we revise our commitments, rather than strive to meet 
commitments that are no longer appropriate given new circumstances or relationships we 
find ourselves in, or new knowledge we have gained about people's needs (including our 
own). If that is true, then we do not betray our optimism that we will act with moral 
integrity when we revise our values and act on new values instead of those that we had 
been trusting ourselves to promote. But the fact that we had been trusting ourselves to 
act on those values suggests that we do betray ourselves. 
The best response to that apparent paradox, in my view. is to acknowledge that 
when we revise our values in ways that are compatible with maintaining integrity. and, 
consequently, we fail to meet our earlier commitments, we may cause some harm or 
disappointment to others, but we do not betray ourselves as a result. IS If we were trusting 
ourselves to live up to responsibilities that are primanly other-directed, then we may 
disappoint the relevant others. But if we have revised our commitments and no longer 
care about our earlier commitments, then why would we be betraying ourselves if we do 
not live up to them? Consider someone who trusted herself always to put her family 
commitments before her commitments to close friends or even to intimate partners 
(those whom she would not classifY as family). She had been taught that the family was 
sacred and that the unity of it should not be sacrificed for any reason. But at some point, 
she realizes that this view of family is simply faIse. She then prioritizes her 
commitments differently and begins to act, in some circumstances, on commitments to 
friends, where those commitments conflict with family obligations. Her family might be 
hurt or disappointed as a result; but surely she has not betrayed herself 
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3.4 The Relational Features of Trust 
The features of our trust prototypes that I have not yet discussed in relation to 
seIf:trust are the following: the expectation that the trusted person's perception of the 
kind of relationship we have with one another is similar to our perception of ~ and the 
fact that there is a relationship between us and both of us are persons. I argued in chapter 
2 that it is important to include the feature about the trusted one's perception of our 
relationship in a description of trust where the trusting person is optimistic that in his 
relationship with the truste~ she will live up to a moral commitment that requires her to 
behave in a certain way only toward people with whom she has a special kind of 
relationship (such as a friendship, or a love relationship). For the trusting person to have 
that optimi~ he must expect that the trusted one perceives the kind of relationship they 
have with one another as the kind that requires her to fuIfill that commitment That 
expectation is not a feature of trust that is seIf:regarding since there is no issue there 
about what kind of relationship exists between the truster and the trusted Similarly, the 
feature of interpersonal relationality is irrelevant to self-trust 
However,. as I argued above .. whether seIf:trust is a genuine form of trust does not 
necessarily hang on whether it is missing one or two of the important features of trust 
prototypes. Yet I also acknowledged that some of the important features of prototypes 
could amount to necessary features of the phenomena which those prototypes depict 
Thus, the feature of interpersonal relationality, for example, may be a necessary or an 
especially important feature. But since many of us already use the term "trust" outside of 
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personal relationships,. it is doubtful that interpersonal relationality carries such 
importance. For example, sometimes we speak of trusting in governmental institutions. 
Thus~ trust must be coherent in the absence of interpersonal relationships. 
Although self-trust is not relational in the sense that it occurs within a 
relationship, it is relational in the sense that it can be fostered or undermined through our 
interactions with others and through our broader social and political environment. If 
something is relational in the second sense, then it is socially constituted. I have 
demonstrated in the cases of Janet. Sheil&, and Anna that their self-trusting and 
distrusting attitudes have that characteristic. 
Thus~ given the simiIarities between the womens self-regarding attitudes and 
attitudes of interpersonal trust and distrust, it is appropriate to extend the concepts of 
trust and distrust to them. Before I review those similarities, let me briefly explain the 
differences between self-trust and certain other seIf-regarding attitudes. namely self-
reliance, self-confidence, and self-respect.. 
4. Self-Trust and Other Forms of Self-Appreciation 
According to my theory of trust, when we are optimistic that we are competent to 
do something and will do it with moral integrity. we are trusting ourselves. On the other 
hand, if we are optimistic that we are competent to do something and will do it out of 
habit or fear,. we are merely relying on ourselves. I argued in chapter 2 that trust differs 
from mere reliance in that when we rely on others to be motivated not out of moral 
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integrity, but out of habit or out of a desire to avoid social sanctions, we are not trusting 
them. What is unique about self-confidence~ compared to self-trust and self-reliance, is 
that when we are confident that we will act in a certain way, we cannot imagine acting 
any differently (Lubmann 1988, 97). In other words, the self-confident person merely 
expects, rather than is optimistic, that she is competent to do something and will be 
motivated to do it. There, I am interpreting "expectation" differently from even 
enormous optimism by assuming that the latter, unlike the former, still implies an 
awareness of the poSSIbility of disappointment. In this sectio~ I distinguish self-trust 
from other forms of self-appreciation and identify the other self-regarding attitudes that 
Sheila had besides her self-trust and self-distrust. 
An important difference between Sheilats attitude about "sailing through her 
pregnancy" and her self-trusting attitude is that she merely expected to avoid all 
problems in her pregnancy, but did not necessarily expect to act respollSlbly. Her 
expectation about sailing through is revealed by her comment that "[tlhe poSSIbility of 
problems had never before occurred to me." She did not expect in the same way to act 
responsibly. since she was consciously regulating her behaviour by a commitment to act 
in that way (e.g., that occurred when she decided to carry less weight than usual on her 
hike). The former attitude is an attitude of confidence as opposed to trust. In being self-
confident, as NiIdas Luhmann observes~ 'j'ou do not consider alternatives" (1988, 97). 
You do not appreciate the risk that you may act differently and consequently disappoint 
yourself and others, whereas in trusting yoursel( you appreciate that risk but are 
committed to trying to avoid it ffyou firil to meet that commitment, you feel guilty or 
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asham~ whereas if you fail to act as you bad been confident that you woul~ the 
emotional response one would expect is shock or surprise. Sheila's response when she 
discovered that her pregnancy would not run smoothly was shock. 
The response to ill-deserved self-confidence may sometimes be mixed with guilt 
or shame. an~ hence. it may be difficult to distinguish from a response to broken self-
trust. We may feel guilty or ashamed upon discovering that our self-confidence was ill-
deserved because we may realize then that we should have been committed to being 
more honest with ourselves. and with others, about our level of competence. 
Sheila's attitude about her ability to control her "body action" was probably an 
attitude of mere self-reliance. [t is doubtful that she was trusting herself to have that 
control. since it is hard to imagine what moral commitment she could have been living 
up to while exercising it. Her attitude could possibly have been an attitude of 
confidence. but it is more likely that it was an attitude of mere reliance. since it is 
plaUSIble to assume that it was grounded in a fear ofIosing control. Sheila may have 
what our society labels "the superwoman syndrome." which women can develop in 
response to societal pressure to excel in their careers while at the same time accepting 
most of the responstbility at home for child care and domestic work (Hey et all996. 
l40). Some women who have an of those responsibilities find that they can cope only if 
they are optimistic about being in control over virtually every aspect of their lives. They 
live at least under the illusion of complete control-hence the term "superwoman 
syndrome." Sheila's desire to have control over her body may be a symptom of that so-
called. syndrome. lit She may strive to maintain control over her "body action" only 
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because she feels that if she were to lose control in one area of her Iife~ the rest of her life 
would fall apart. 
Let me explain briefly how selt:trust differs from one other form of self-
appreciation, namely selt:respect. One might expect there to be little difference between 
the two given that selt:respect concerns our moral character or integrity~ which is also 
true of self-trust (if I am right about the nature of it). But only one type of self-respect 
actually involves the appraisal of our character-what Stephen DarwaIl calls "appraisal 
self-respect"-whereas another involves simply recognizing that we are beings with moral 
worth who deserve to be treated respectfully-what Darwall calls "recognition self-
respect" (Darwall 1995). It is appraisal self-respect that overlaps significantly with self-
trust. The former targets our moral character and the competencies we develop as a 
result of that character (DarwaIl 1995, especially 187).17 Thus a physician, for example~ 
could respect herself for having personal and professional integrity and for being 
competent to care for her patients. She could also trust herself in that regard. 
How, the~ does self-trust differ from appraisal self-respect? The main difference 
is that when we respect ourselves because of our moral integrity, we are optimistic that 
we have that integrity, whereas when we trust ourselves, we are optimistic that we will 
act with moral integrity, not merely that we possess it Furthermore, an important feature 
of self-trust which self-respect lacks, and which I focus on in the next chapter, is 
vulnerability. That we are optimistic in trusting ourselves not only that we possess 
integrity, but that we will act with integrity, explains why we are vulnerable in trusting 
ourselves, but not in respecting ourselves. Thus, in important ways, those two attitudes 
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are distinct. Nonetheless~ they are closely related to one another~ for they are mutually 
reinforcing. Those with appraisal self-respect, or optimism about their moral integrity, 
are more hlcely than others to have self-trusting attitudes. Similarly, those who have self-
trust are more likely to prove their integrity and competence to themselves and, 
therefore. to build appraisal self-respect. 
5. Conclusion 
That the women's self-regarding attitudes which I identified as trusting or 
distrusting attitudes share most of the important features of interpersonal trust or distrust 
reveals that there are such attitudes as self-trust and self-distrust. The features of Janet 
and Sheila's optimistic attitudes that parallel the important features of our prototypes for 
trust are the following: optimism about their own competence in a particular domain, and 
optimism that they will act with moral integrity in that domain. where the latter presumes 
an expectation that the moral values they will hold in the future will be relevantly similar 
to the values they hold now. 
The women's negative attitudes toward themselves were simtlar to interpersonal 
distrust in that they were attitudes of pessimism about whether the women could ~ or 
should have trusted, their own competence in a particular ~ and in some cases .. also 
pessimism about whether they would act with moral integrity. Those attitudes arose not 
simply because of how the women perceived their own. competence or moral integrity, 
but because of how others perceived or would likely have perceived their bebavioar,. and, 
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moreover, because of certain ideological norms in our society. Therefore, those attitudes 
were "relational," in the socially constituted sense. 
Notes 
1. Prototype theory states that we understand concepts in terms of prototypical instances 
of the phenomena to which our concepts refer, rather than in terms of necessary and 
sufficient conditions. So, for example, when we see some type ofbir~ we conceive of it 
as a bird because of its similarity to our prototypes for bird (which for some North 
Americans may include, say, robins and bluejays), not because it satisfies a set of 
necessary and sufficient conditions for being a bird. 
2. See, for example, Heyetal(1996, 142) andRajan and Oaldey (1993, 85, 86). The 
literature on women's own experiences of miscarriage is relatively sparse in comparison 
to the literature on other areas ofwomen's reproductive lives (e.g., abortion and 
infertility treatment). 
3. That depends on what kind of test is performed and when it is performed. Blood tests 
are more sensitive in detecting the pregnancy hormone than urine tests, and modem urine 
tests will not detect it at all before four weeks gestation. Also, if a woman has what is 
called a "missed abortion," where the pregnancy has ended but there was no immediate 
miscarriage, the pregnancy test may come back negative even though an ultrasound 
would show some pregnancy tissue. (Source: Dr. Bruce Dunphy, reproductive 
endocrinologist, IWK-Grace Health Centre.) 
4. [say more below about what makes a knowledge claim responsible or irresponstble. 
5. That is a conservative estimate from Unsung Lullabies (1995). Rajan and Oakley 
estimate that about 80% of pregnancies end in miscarriage (1993, 75). 
6. One reason cited in the literature is the inhibitions people have in our culture in 
discussing death (Rajan & Oaldey 1993, 7S, SI). Most people may be even less 
comfortable in acknowledging the death of a fetus than they are with the death of a child 
or an adult because there are no socially sanctioned rituals in our culture for honouring 
the importance that a fetus (or potential future child.) may have had in people's lives. 
There are no established rituals, such as attending a funeral service or sending flowers to 
the woman who miscarried and/or to her partner. 
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7. A miscarriage is defined as a pregnancy loss that occurs priorto 20 weeks gestation 
(Unsung Lullabies 1995). Most women will not have been showing before they have a 
miscarriage. Any fetal death after 20 weeks gestation is called a stillbirth. 
8. I am drawing here on my own experience with having a miscarriage in an unwanted 
pregnancy. That experience is under-represented in the literature on miscarriage,. which 
focuses predominantly on the experiences of women in wanted pregnancies. 
9. As Campbell explains,. "uptake in collaborative individuation" can be "facilitated by ... 
overlapping biographies [or} personal knowledge" (1997, 108). The best listeners for 
women who have miscarried will usually be people whose biographies or personal 
knowledge overlap with the women"s experiences of miscarriage-that is,. listeners who 
themselves have had miscarriages or who have intimate knowledge of what women can 
experience emotionally after a miscarriage. 
There is some evidence in a study by Lynda Rajan and Ann OaIdey that women 
who have miscarried benefit emotionally by having access to sympathetic listeners 
(1993). Rajan and Oakley did a randomized controlled trial of providing social support 
to women who had suffered previous pregnancy losses and were currently pregnant. The 
kind of support offered was the opportunity to talk on a regular basis with a midwife, 
who understood what women can experience emotionally when they miscarry. Rajan 
and Oakley found that there was an appreciable difference in the emotional health of the 
women who received the social support in comparison to those who did not. 
Rajan and Oakley emphasize that women who have miscarried should have the 
opportunity to talk with someone who has expertise in counselling women about 
miscarriage. However, it is also important that primary health care providers have some 
training in responding to the emotional needs of those women. Otherwise, those care 
providers may cause harm by responding in uneducated ways to the emotional aspects of 
women's experiences with miscarriage. 
10. I reflect on how we would conceptualize SheiIa's other attitudes toward herself in the 
last section of the chapter. 
1 L We might feel the betrayal even when we are not actually betrayed. I explain in 
chapter 4 that trust can be merely disappointed rather than betrayed, but even with 
disappointed trust, we often suspect betrayal and, consequently, we may develop feelings 
of betrayaL 
12. I have some discussion of the plaUSIbility of the notion of selt:betrayal in chapter 4 
(section 2). 
13. Anne Fausto-Sterling makes a similar claim in her work on scientific theories about 
sex differences (1985). She points to the political motivations of scientists who are 
members of dominant groups to explain why they ignore perfectly good evidence in 
testing their results. Their political agendas shape wbat they deem to be actuaI evidence. 
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14. I do not want to exclude the poSSIbility that we could be trusting ourselves in the 
present moment to behave in a certain way. For example~ Janet could have been trusting 
herself while she was claiming to be pregnant that her claim was responsIble. 
15. But we might betray others as a result, as I explain in chapter 4. Self-trust and 
interpersonal trust are asymmetrical on the issue of whether revising one's values can 
lead to the betrayal of trust 
16. Calling it a syndrome is not entirely appropriate since the name suggests there is 
something wrong with the women rather than with the society that pressures women to 
take on so much respoDS1bility~ in particular for cfnld care and domestic work. 
17. Not just any competency is a proper object of self-re~ according to Darwall; the 
relevant competencies must reflect our moral character. It is not clear that all of the 
competencies we can trust ourselves to have would fit that description. For example~ if I 
trust myself as a tree-planter to be competent and committed to planting trees properly. 
my competency alone may not stem from my moral character. I may be competent 
because I am physically capable of planting trees well 
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Chapter 4 
Where Things Can Go Wrong: Unjustified Trusting and Distrusting 
1. Introduction 
In earlier chapters, I outlined the features of interpersonal trust that concern what 
we trust in others. [argued that self-trust is a form of trust that shares many, but not all, 
of those features. It involves optimism about the competence of the trusted one (Le., 
oneself) and optimism about one's moral integrity. One key feature [ have not yet 
discussed, which is relevant to self-trust as well as interpersonal trust, is vulnerability. In 
trusting ourselves or others, we incur vulnerability; for trust is a form of dependence. If 
things were to go wrong while trustin& that is, if the trusted one were to fail to honour 
our trust, we would be disappointed, and perhaps even seriously harmed. It is essential, 
then, that we are able to discriminate between people or situations that merit trust and 
those that merit distrust. In this chapter, [ explore some of the conditions that make trust, 
or distrust, justified. Moreover, I distinguish between trusting attitudes that are justified 
and those that are '\¥ell-grounded." The latter are always successful in targeting a 
trustworthy person, whereas the former do not guarantee that success. In other words, 
trust can be justified without it being well-grounded.1 
My primary aim in this chapter is to develop a theory ofwhat it means to trust 
oneself well, meaning in a justified way. One of the banns to which one is vulnerable in 
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trusting oneself is a loss of autonomy, as I argue in chapter 5. Not all forms of self-trust 
are important for autonomy: for example, seIt:trusting attitudes that are unjustified can 
be detrimental to it. Sometimes, justified self-distrust can preserve our autonomy, 
although too much self -distrust, of any kind, is a barrier to autonomy. In chapter 5, I 
argue that people who are autonomous possess the "skiIIs" of trusting and distrusting 
themselves well (Le., they are able to develop justified self-trusting and self-distrusting 
attitudes). In this chapter, I defend an account of those skills. 
What it means for self-trust to be justified, or unjustified, is no different, I 
asswne, from what it means for interpersonal trust to be justified. Hence, my discussion 
here centres around trust generally, rather than self-trust specifically. How we interpret 
the justification or well-groundedness of trust depends on what kind of mental attitude it 
is (Le .• whether it is a belief, an emotion, a disposition, etc.). Thus, I also give a theory 
of the nature of trusting attitudes. and there, ~ I assume that self-trust and 
interpersonal trust do not diverge from one another. The only issue relevant to this 
chapter where they might diverge is the degree of vulnerability one incurs with seIt:trust 
compared to interpersonal trust. Since we have more control over our own behaviour 
than over the behaviour of others, it may seem that we cannot be as wInerable in trusting 
ourselves as we are in interpersonal trust relations. I give reasons for rejecting that 
second point; I argue that self-trust can entail as much wInerability as interpersonal trust. 
Rather than provide a fully detailed theory of when it is justified to trust or 
distrust (which would take us beyond the scope of this thesis into complex debates in 
epistemology), I focus instead on what has been missing thus far in the literature about 
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the justification of those attitudes. One thing missing is an account based on the 
processes of coming to trust, or ~ someone. I argue that trust and distrust are 
justified when the processes that form and sustain them are reliable, and that they are 
unjustified when those processes are unreliable.2 Moreover, I claim that the sequence of 
processes responsIble for justified trust and distrust are inevitably social in nature. The 
justification of those attitudes depends, in part, on the reliability of the social feedback 
we receive to them. I propose that being able to trust welI, or to form justified trusting 
attitudes, requires at a minjmum that one be raised in a social environment that provides 
some opportunities for acquiring self-knowledge. Fewer of such opportunities exist for 
people who are oppressed or abused, compared to those in more supportive social 
relations. Oppression and abuse are often the causes of why things go seriously wrong 
with self-trust as well as with interpersonal trust. 
2. Self-Trust and Vulnerability: The Unique Harms of Betrayal 
In the introduction of this thesis, I mentioned that it is important to be able to 
trust others and to trust oneself in situations of wInerabiIity. 3 However, we also incur 
vulnerability by trusting because the trusted one may not honour our trust My main 
purpose in this section is to argue that wInerability to unfulfilled trust is as much a 
feature of self-trust as it is of interpersonal trust. 
Vulnerability is closely associated in. our minds with potential betrayal; we think 
of trust as something that engenders vulnerability because it can be betrayed. One might 
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wonder whether we could ever betray ourselves. I argue that we ~ and for many of the 
same reasons that we might betray others. Trust can also be disappointed as opposed to 
betraye~ although I argue the harms of betrayal are usually greater. Betrayal can 
engender or perpetuate low self-respect, and it can damage our ability to trust ourselves 
and others in the future. If we distrust ourselves too much, we also incur the risk of 
diminished self-respect Hence~ we are vulnerable to some degree in distrusting 
ourselves as well as in trusting ourselves. 
In distinguishing interpersonal trust from mere reliance in chapter 2~ r argued that 
the reason why a sense ofbetrayaI is an appropriate response to broken trust is that with 
~ as opposed to mere reliance, we expect the other to act with moral integrity. 
Normally~ betrayal occurs when the other fails to act from that motivation. But she 
coul~ instead. fail to honour our trust because her circumstances prevent her from acting 
with integrity, or because integrity requires that, in response to changes to her 
circumstances~ she revise her moral commitments. In either case, she disappoints our 
trust; but she does not necessarily betray it. Since we tend to associate "broken" trust 
with betrayal, neither would it seem appropriate to say that she has "broken our trust. It 
We couldfoel that she has broken or betrayed it, but we would be wrong in that 
assumption. Someone could feel betrayed but not be betrayed. 
We often feel betrayed when someone we were trusting has to revise his moral 
commitments and forego doing what we were trusting him to do. For example, if I was 
trusting my partner Andre to keep his promise to spend a weekend with me, but suddenly 
his work becomes hectic and he cannot get away, I might feel betrayed by him, even 
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though I might not have been betrayed Ifhis integrity demanded that he prioritize his 
commitment to work above his commitment to me, and, furthermore, ifhe makes 
amends for the "mess" he causes in our relationship, then he has acted with moral 
integrity. Making amends is important since having integrity entails being accountable 
for failing to meet ones commitments (as I argued in chapter 2). Andre has not betrayed 
my trust ifhe has acted with moral integrity. for that is how we expect trusted others to 
act Trust is a moral attitude; so if! had been expecting Andre to act immorally by 
putting his commitment to me before any commitments to anyone else, no matter how 
his circumstances might change, then I was not trusting him. I was merely relying on 
him to act out of intense feelings for me, perhaps, or maybe out of some threat I had 
issued to him. 
But what if Andre cannot make amends for the mess he causes by cancelling our 
weekend together? Sometimes when the circumstances of the trusted person stand in the 
way of his honouring our trust, he cannot be accountable for failing to honour it What if 
Andre and I had long been planning a special event for the weekend that would be 
impoSSIble to reschedule? In that case, Andre may not be able to make amends for 
missing the weekend, which suggests that he does betray my trust, although presumably 
he maintains his integrity. since he seems to do what integrity demands. But does he 
really do everything that integrity requires of him? If integrity is about being 
accountable, must Andre not lose at least a bit of it ifhe cannot make amends to me? It 
is plaUSIble to assume that my response to his behaviour might have some bearing on 
whether his integrity remains intact.. What if I am being unreasonable, though, in not 
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allowing ADdre to make amends? Questions of that sort are often difficult to answer,. and 
as a result, it is often difficult to draw a clear line between when trust is betrayed and 
when it is merely disappointed. 4 Sometim~ we are confused about what someone needs 
to do to maintain his integrity, and about whether we should relieve his guilt or shame if 
he fails to do what we were trusting him to do. 
As with interpersonal trust, with self-trust we are vulnerable to changes in our 
circumstances that convince us to reorder our commitments and act on commitments 
other than those we had been trusting ourselves to meet. But there we are not vulnerable 
to the betrayal of ourselves~ specifically. I explained in chapter 3 that we do not betray 
trust in ourselves when we revise our values in ways that are compatIble with 
maintaining our integrity. Thus~ on the issue of when betrayal can occur, interpersonal 
trust and self-trust are asymmetrical. 
One area where the theoretical distinction I have made between betrayed trust and 
disappointed trust may not be applicable is where trust is cultivated in people who have 
shown little evidence of integrity in the past. One of the ideas for which Mahatma 
Gandhi is famous is that trust can breed trustworthiness; by cultivating trust in others~ we 
can elicit trustworthy behaviour from them, even if they have a history of acting without 
integrity. S When I am optimistic that a trusted person will act with moral integrity, I am 
expecting her to act on certain moral commitments, or values, as I argued in chapter 2. 
When my trust in her is cultivated, I may have little to no evidence that she even holds 
the relevant values. That is especially true where the other is a child who does not yet 
have a developed system of moral values. Alternatively, it may be clear that the person 
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in whom we cultivate trust is committed to certain values, including the values we are 
trusting her to promote, but she is generally untrustworthy because of the weakness of 
her Wlll. In that case, if she does not live up to our ~ she fails to act with moral 
integrity.6 But given that we had little evidence that she would ever honour the kind of 
trust we placed in her, it seems strange to say that our trust is betrayed, or that we are 
justified in feeling betrayed. Thus, it seems possible for trust to be merely disappointed, 
even though the other does not act with moral integrity. 
The distinction between betrayed trust and disappointed trust is therefore kind of 
blurry. Nonetheless, it exists, and exists roughly between cases where trusted others fail 
to act with moral integrity, and where they maintain their integrity but do not do exactly 
what we were trusting them to do. Similarly, with self-trust, that distinction is not clear-
cut, and cultivated trust is a poSSIble exception to it.. For example, I could cultivate trust 
in myself in a domain where I know that I suffer from weakness of will. and ifl fail to 
honour my trust, I may only disappoint myseI( rather than betray myself. Also, when my 
circumstances change and I revise my commitments, sometimes I am confused about 
whether the revision is justified. and whether I should let myself off the hook for the 
harm I may have caused by failing to act in accordance with my trust. I may be 
especially concerned about that harm if most of it is borne by others. In the end, I might 
feel that my trust was betrayed, even though it may only have been disappointed 
Some might question, however, whether we could ever ''betray'' ourselves, a 
worry that might arise because of the close association in our minds between betrayal 
anddeception. One of the most common ways for another person to betray us is by 
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deceiving us about whether he would act with moral integrity in doing what we were 
trusting him to do, about whether he was competent to do it, or about both his 
competence and his motivation. In discussions of betrayal in the context of self-~ the 
issue arises of whether self-deception is a real phenomenon. Much philosophical debate 
has been devoted to that issue, for it seems paradoxical for someone to play the roles of 
deceiver (believing that X) and the role of deceived (believing that not-X) 
simultaneously. I find the most persuasive theorists in the debate to be those who 
explain how self-deception is poSSIble, where the most common explanation is that there 
are different levels of consciousness or there are subsystems in the min~ the contents of 
which can conflict (see~ especially, Johnston 1988, Rorty 1994, 1988). Since self-
deception is a frequent occurrence in the lives of many of us (Rorty 1994), it seems that 
it must be real, and hence, that it must be possible to betray ourselves through self-
deception. 
We can also betray ourselves ifwe fail to act with moral integrity because of 
weakness of will or insensitivity. We may trust ourselves to attend to certain needs of 
our own or of others, but when it comes time to fulfill those needs, we are too weak-
willed or too insensitive to attend to them properly. In either case, self-deception would 
never enter into the picture if we had been intending all along to live up to our trust and 
we never try to kid ourselves about whether we bad the opportunity to live up to it (i.e., 
never try to deceive ourselves into thinking that we could not possibly have acted on the 
relevant moral commitm~ given our circumstances). 
The harms we are vulnerable to when our trust is betrayed, or when it simply 
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feels betrayed, are greater than when we acknowledge that our-trust was merely 
disappointed. We tend to feel the harms of betrayal even when our feelings of betrayal 
are unjustified. One of those harms, one that is unique to betrayal,. is diminished self-
respect. We can lose self-respect as a result of feeling betrayed,. either by others or by 
ourselves, because the betrayal implies that we are not worthy of respect Betrayal by 
others can impact negatively on what Darwa1I (1995) calls "recognition self-respect,. " that 
is, the respect we have in acknowledging ourselves as beings with inherent moral worth 
who deserve to be treated respectfully by others. Betrayal by the self, on the other band, 
can damage "appraisal self-respect." which is our respect in our own moral character 
(Darwall 1995), respect that is called into question by a failure to act with moral 
integrity.7 
Feelings of betrayal can also interfere with our ability to trust well in the future. 
They may cause us to question that ability, making it more difficult for us to trust again. 
Furthermore,. serious forms of betrayal. particularly betrayal by an abuser, can actually 
damage our ability to trust well, rather than simply induce us to doubt it. As Judith 
Herman explains. the trauma of abuse often shatters whatever sense the survivor had of 
the world as a safe place, that is, as a place with trustworthy people in it (1992, 51, 52). 
Consequently. she may not know any longer where trust, and distrust, are appropriate. 
On the other hand,. those who suffered abuse early in life may never have developed the 
ability to trust. or distrust, well. Without those skills, they are at serious risk of further 
abuse. As Hennan notes, "[t}he risk of rape, sexual harassme~ or battering, though high 
for all wom~ is approximately doubled for survivors of childhood sexual abuse. If 
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Herman cites the work ofDiana Russel1, who found that two-thirds of women who 
experienced such abuse in childhood were subsequently raped (Herman 1992, 111; 
RussellI986). 
Abuse can also interfere with one's ability to trust oneself Trudy Govier refers to 
a small study by Doris Brothers which showed that the greatest problems relating to trust 
caused by incest and rape lie in the survivor's trust in herself (Brothers 1982; Govier 
1993, 99-10 I). With damage done to her ability to trust others well, the survivor will 
likely distrust that ability (which is a form of self-distrust). With her whole world in 
pieces, she also may distrust her capacity to cope with events or decisions in the future. 
Furthermore, she may distrust her own perception of the kinds of signals her behaviour is 
sending to others. It is common for people who are abused to blame themselves for their 
abuse either because their abusers encourage them to do so, or because blaming 
themselves is viewed as a way of Itreasserting control" (Le., they believe that they can 
prevent further abuse by behaving differently in the future; see, Govier 1993; Lepine 
1990; Dominelli 1989). 
The harms of trusting oneself too little, or of distrusting oneself too much, are 
severe. Perpetual self-distrust reinforces low levels of self.respect, and it also inlnbits 
autonomous action, as I argue in chapter 5. Thus, vulnerability accompanies self-distrust 
as well as self-trust. Among oppressed people~ the harms of self-distrust are encouraged 
by oppressive social stereotypes. For example, the stereotype of the inferior intellectual 
capacity of white women and of people of colour ofboth sexes can encourage them to be 
distrustful of their ability to be responsible epistemic agents. It can promote pessimism, 
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specifically~ in their epistemic competence. 
Interpersonal distrust also carries with it potential barms arising as a result of 
oppression. Some of those harms themselves are interpersonal: when distrust is either 
ill-deserved or well-deserved and the source of it is discrimination, or a reaction to 
discrimination, it prevents the development of healthy relationships. Furthennore~ 
interpersonal distrust that goes wrong or is ill-deserved can harm the individual who is 
distrusted. Since trust is an attitude of optimism about a persons moral integrity~ trusting 
must be a sign of respect for others. We do not trust merely for instrumental reasons~ 
contrary to the view of some moral philosophers~ such as Diego Gambetta (1998) and 
Russell Hardin (1996). Their trust theories imply that trust is just another mechani~ 
like a contract, for furthering our self-interest. On my theory~ trust may have 
instrumental value~ but it is also an indication of respect. When we distrust others who 
deserve to be trust~ we are displaying disrespect. 
Thus, getting things wrong when trusting or distrusting can be harmful; and the 
trusters are not necessarily the only ones who suffer the harm. I have argued that we are 
wlnerable in many of same ways in trusting ourselves as we are in trusting others. In 
both cases~ we are vulnerable to disappointed trust and to betrayed ~ where the 
potential harm of betrayal, or of perceived betra~ is greater. When the betrayal itself is 
exceedingly cruel, such as in cases of incest or rape~ it can cause pervasive damage to the 
survivors perception of herself and of her social world. 
One might accept that with seIf-~ we are vulnerable in the ways I have 
~ but object that we are never as vulnerable as we are in trust relations. One 
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might agree with Govier who writes that, 
With self-trust, the predictability of success [Le., of our trust being 
honoured] or failure may be greater: we should know better what is going 
on because it is, after all, our own self that we are trusting. That is not to 
say, obviously, that our self-knowledge is perfect. Risk remains: we are 
wlnerable to our own failings" (1998, 95). 
Govier is assuming there that we are better mowers of the self than of others, an~ 
therefore, that we are less wlnerable to getting things wrong with self-trust. However, 
some of the reasons for believing those epistemic claims are dubious. Traditionally, 
philosophers (most noteably Descartes) thought that introspection was an infallible, or 
nearly infalhDle route to self-knowledge. Since it is not a route we can take in 
understanding the mental attitudes of others, and we do not have an equally clear and 
accesSlDle route to understanding their attitudes, then, presumably, we are in a better 
position to know ourselves. However, Hilary Komblith has given us good reason to 
doubt the perspicacity of introspection. He argues, convincingly, that even with our 
causal proximity to our mental attitudes, introspection is insufficient "to ground claims to 
self-knowledge" (1998, 55). It does not allow us to rule out psychological conditions that 
are undetectable introspectively and that promote self-misunderstandings (1998, 55). 
Those conditions include paranoid personality disorder, as well as being "emotionally 
well-adjuste<L" which, as Komblith claims, tends to involve "a degree of optimism [that} 
can, on no reasonable construa.4 be justified by the filets" (1998, 58). Those kinds of 
conditions can occur in mild or severe forms (thereby, causing mild or severe forms of 
seIf-misunderstanding) and some of them are widespread Moreover, they can distort not 
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only our introspectio~ but also our "external" perception of ourselves. Perceivin~ or 
observin~ our own behaviour is an alternative route to self-knowledge. 
Nonetheless, Govier might be right that with self-trust, "we should know better 
what is going on." Komblith does not endorse skepticism regarding the self and does not 
exclude the possibility that we could know ourselves better than others. We may have 
good evidence that we are not suffering from the kinds of psychological conditions he 
lists. We could rule out severe paranoia, for example, if we were "experiencing no 
difficulties at work or ... have good relationships with others" (Komblith 59). Since we 
are in a better position to gather such evidence about ourselves, we are generally in a 
better position to know ourselves well than to know others. Notice that the evidence 
relevant to our self-understanding that Komblith emphasizes does not come from 
introspection alone, nor from the mere perception of our own behaviour. Rather, it 
comes, partly, from outside of ourselves. To know ourselves well, we rely on feedback 
from others about what our selves are like. How good their feedback is influences how 
well we can know ourselves. Those who often get unreliable feedback, such as people 
who are abused or oppressed, are in a worse position to obtain self-knowledge than 
others. a Still, those abused or oppressed often have at least some sources of reliable 
social feedback, which may put them. in a better position, generally speakin~ to know 
themselves than to know others. 
However, whether we trust or distrust well does not depend only on the kind of 
social feedback we receive about ourselves. As I discuss below, how well we trust or 
distrust, in ourselves or in others, is influenced as well by the paradigms fortrust we 
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learn from others. Oppression may distort those paradigms in ways that can make it 
more likely that we get things wrong with self-distrust than with distrust in others~ for 
example. Hence~ it is not obvious that most of us are more likely to get things wrong 
with interpersonal trust or distrust than we are with self-trust or self-distrust. 
Furthermore, in either case, we may experience the same degree ofharm if we do get 
things wron& as I established above. Whether we trust ourselves or trust others to do 
something important to us, often we put ourselves at risk for the same amount ofhann or 
disappointment. Thus, there are at least two distinct senses in which we may be as 
vulnerable in trusting ourselves as we are in trusting others. 
The importance of getting things right with self-trust lies primarily in the relation 
between self-trust and autonomy. I argue in chapter 5 that justified attitudes of self-trust 
are crucial for autonomy. Thus, the ways in which oppression and abuse can interfere 
with getting things right with self-trust and self-distrust have severe consequences for our 
autonomy. 
3. The Nature of Trusting and Distrusting Attitudes: Patterns of Salience and Behaviour 
For the task of explaining when it is justified to trust oneself or to distrust oneself: 
we need a clearer understanding of what kinds of mental attitudes trust and distrust are. I 
argue that they are emotional attitudes with cognitive components that are not reducible 
to beliefs. Moreover, they are normaIly co~ in ~ by "patterns of attention and 
tendencies of interpretation" (Jones 1996s 4)s which means that they draw our attention 
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toward certain features of the worl~ and influence how we interpret different features. 
IdentifYing those patterns allows us to explain why the attention of those who are trusting 
is directed away from evidence disconfirming the trustworthiness of those whom they 
trust However,. as I illustrate,. it is possible to be trusting even though ones attention is 
focused on contrary evidence.9 In such cases, one's trusting attitude is revealed mostly by 
ones behaviour. Thus, there are patterns of behaviour as well as attention,. or salience, 
that characterize trusting and distrusting attitudes. 
My account of the nature of those attitudes draws upon the work of a number of 
theorists writing on trust and/or the emotions. One of them is Karen Jones, who 
recognizes that trust is constituted in part by patterns of attention,. although she does not 
acknowledge its patterns of behaviour (1996). Like Jones,. I rely on the theory of 
emotions as perceptual attitudes developed by theorists such as RonaId de Sousa (1987) 
and Cheshire Calhoun (1984). [also draw on a theory developed by Sue CampbelI 
(1997), who establishes the importance of highlighting the behavioural dimensions to our 
emotions. 
[ defend those theories of emotions only insofar as they help us to understand 
certain features of trust and distrust. Let me emphasize that by arguing that those 
attitudes have perceptual and behavioural dimensions, r do not presume to be giving a 
complete theory of what it means to say that they are emotions. A complete account 
would explain what,. aside from those dimensions~ gives trust and distrust the identity of 
emotions (e.g.~ some kind of physiological change in the agent).10 
On the perceptual model of emotions developed by de Soma and others,. emotions 
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are a "species of determinate patterns of saIience~" or attention (de Sousa 196). They 
control our patterns of attention because~ like sensory perceptio~ they are 
"informationally encapsul~" meaning that they are attuned to a limited range of 
information an~ to a large degree~ are "cognitively impenetrable" to information that lies 
outside of that range (de Sousa 152~ 195). The information to which they make us 
attuned is information that tends to make them justified. When we experience an 
emotio~ we are resistant to evidence suggesting that it is unjustified or irrational, given 
our circumstances. 
To illustrate how that model works, consider the emotio~ fear. When we sense 
the presence of something we fear, such as a snake~ we are alive to information that 
confirms the continued presence of the snake~ and also to information confirming that the 
snake is truly harmful to us. We tend to ignore or deny evidence that the snake is no 
longer present, or was never actually present, or never actually posed a threat to us. 11 But 
our resistance to evidence that makes our fear unwarranted, or no longer warrant~ is 
not "limitless" (Jones 1996~ 16). Our emotions are not completely impenetrable to 
rational persuasion. If enough counter-evidence exists regarding the presence or threat of 
the snake, then at some point we will accept that evidence and our fear will diminish, and 
perhaps even disappear altogether. The intensity of our emotions lessens, on the 
perceptual mode~ as we begin to notice information that is not "encapsulated" within 
them. 
But what ifwe accept the evidence that the snake has disappeared or was never 
barmfUl to us, but we continue to behave as though we are very afraid of the snake? Our 
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patterns of attention might change upon accepting that evidence~ while our patterns of 
behaviour do not. Would we still say> the~ that our fear has lessened? Probably not. A 
behavioural model of emotions emphasizes that emotions can manifest themselves 
primarily in our behaviour,. in which case, to know that they exist, we must analyse our 
behaviour (Campbell 1997). 
On both the perceptual and behavioural models of emotions I am descnbing, 
emotions are cognitive in the sense that they represent emotive properties of objects in 
the world or of states of affairs (i.e.,. properties of those objects or states that tend to elicit 
certain emotions within a given culture). Thus., trust understood in terms of those models 
is a cognitive emotional attitude. If it were non-cognitive. it could not be evaluated in 
terms of whether it is well-grounded or justified. Trust is well-grounde~ as [ argue, if it 
accurately represents the property of trustworthiness in the trusted person. [t is justified 
if it is formed and sustained by reliable psychological processes. Trust-forming 
processes are reliable if they tend to produce attitudes that accurately represent people as 
trustworthy. 
To evaluate how accurately our emotions represent the worl~ we first have to 
identify their objects (e.g., the trusted person in the case of trust or self-trust). As Sue 
Campbell writes> "in some cases,. it is the actions of the subject of the emotion that 
establishes who or what [the object of that emotion] is" (1997,. 77). Where emotions are 
primarily behavio~ we need some understanding of the typical patterns of behaviour 
that are associated with those emotions to know which objects they target. For example,. 
to know that a person is displaying fear towards a snake,. as opposed to some other 
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creature or thing, we need to know what kinds of behaviour are indicative of fear and 
then study where that person's "fear" behaviour is directed 
The characteristic patterns of response of different emotional attitudes are learned 
through association with what de Sousa calls '"paradigm scenarios.'" Those scenarios are 
clear cases where it is appropriate to have the relevant emotion. As de Sousa explains~ 
they involve a usituation type.'7 which identifies the characteristic objects of the relevant 
emotio~ and a set of~onnal'" responses to that type of situation (1987~ 182). For 
example~ a paradigm scenario for envy in our culture is having someone else receive a 
reward that one had coveted for oneself. There, the situation type is the other person 
getting the reward. and the normal response is envy. That response is not merely 
perceptual, however; it is characterized by certain patterns of behaviour (e.g., 
congratulating the person who won in a half-hearted way~ or avoiding contact with him 
altogether). Thus, we learn to associate outward as well as inward responses with certain 
situations based on their resemblance to the situation types of our paradigm scenarios. 
After a whiIe~ those responses become habituaL 
As we learn the paradigm scenarios for different emotions!t we probably also 
acquire the prototypes for our concepts of them. The theory of emotionalleaming 
through paradigm scenarios seems to support the use of prototype theory in thinking 
about the structure of emotion concepts. The latter is a theory I used in earlier chapters 
as a way of understanding the extension of a concept (e.g., trust) to a phenomenon that 
shares many but not all of its important features (e.g., self-trust). With paradigm 
scenarios, we learn how to use the emotion concept as well as how to have the relevant 
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emotion. Like pIOtOtypes~ the scenarios guide us in identifYing situations where a 
particular emotion is present,. or where it would be an appropriate response. If the 
emotions are learned through such scenario~ then it seems sensible to assume that 
prototypes~ or "parad.igms~1t structure our concepts of them. 
In situations that only partially resemble the situation types of our paradigm 
scenarios~ we must modify our habitual responses so that our attitudes will accurately 
represent their objects. We can refine our paradigm scenarios at the same time because 
those scenarios are not static (de Sousa 1987). But knowing when to refine them or 
when to modify our habitual responses is a skill in itself. Having that skill or ability is 
crucial in knowing how to have emotions that are justifi~ that is~ that reliably depict the 
way the world is. We do not acquire that knowledge simply by being familiarized with 
paradigm scenarios. 
For some people. it is important that they have the opportunity to experience new 
scenarios. People rai~ for example~ in sexist or racist environments, are usually taught 
sexist or racist paradigms for different emotions. For example,. some women in our 
culture learn that the situation types that warrant shame include situations where they are 
sexually abused by m~ or~ altematively~ where they experience intense sexual pleasure. 
To end sexist oppression, it is important to hberate women from those types of scenarios. 
Thus, according to the theories of emotions I have described,. emotions are 
learned by association with paradigm scenarios and are constituted,. in part,. by patterns of 
behavioural and perceptual response. Beamse emotions have those patterns,. they taIl 
into the category of "attitudes,." where an attitude is a. posture or stance one takes before 
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the world de Sousa descn"bes attitudes as ')lerspectives" on the world, but that view is 
too narrow since it excludes attitudes that are behavioural (1987,. 156). Usually one" s 
whole posture reveals one"s attitude,. and adopting the same attitude as someone else 
involves assuming a posture in relation to the world that is similar to hers. That is,. one 
must perceive the world and actively engage with it in a similar (although not necessarily 
in the identical) way that she does. That seems to be true,. at least, of emotional attitudes,. 
for unless we take a similar stance as someone experiencing a particular emotion,. we 
will not share the emotion with her. If what she is experiencing is thrilling for her, her 
simply telling us that it is thrilling will not make us find it thrilling (de Sousa 1987. 156). 
We will not find it thrilling untl1 we adopt a posture in relation to it that resembles hers. 
Why. then,. accept that trust is an attitude that is emotional and is characterized by 
behavioural and perceptual patterns of response? First of all,. as Jones argues,. the view 
that it has distinctive patterns of attention allows us to explain why someone genuinely 
trusting is resistant to counter-evidence.12 I add that a behavioural model helps us to 
explain that as well. J udith Baker illustrates that feature of trust with the following 
example: a friend of mine has been accused of a crim~ and there is substantial evidence 
to support the accusation. But "what others regard as evidence against her isn't 
considered by me as evidence at alI. .• I believe that there is an explanation for the alleged 
evidence,. for the accusation,. which will clear it all up" (Baker 1987,. 3). What I believe 
is that my friend is inn~ and my trust in her sustains that beliefbecause it focuses 
my attention on certain aspects of her character and explanations of her behaviour that 
tend to confirm her innocence. But it may control my attention by first controlling my 
llS 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
behaviour. that is" by ensuring that I do not even look at the evidence against her, or do 
not search for that evidence myself. Thus, distinctive patterns of attention and behaviour 
can explain why someone trusting does not acknowledge contrary evidence. 
Secondly, the model of trust as an emotional attitude with perceptual and 
behavioural dimensions allows us to understand the reaction that people commonly have 
to the following kind of case. I am worried that Bob will not honour my trust in him, and 
so [ maneuvre myself close to Bob and monitor his behaviour. in an attempt to ensure 
that he honours my trust. Most people would say that trust is missing from my 
relationship with Bob, or that at least there may not be enough of it, depending on how 
much monitoring goes on. The reason for that reaction is that monitoring and 
maneuvring is inconsistent with the kinds of behavioural responses we normally 
associate with trust. Furthermore, it suggests that r. the person doing the maneuvring, am 
ever watchful for or anticipating evidence of untrustworthiness. Hence, [ cannot be 
trusting much,. since r am so alive to information that would make trust unjustified. A 
view of trust where anticipating such information and behaving in those ways reveals a 
lack of trust explains, therefore, our reaction to those kinds of cases. 13 
Thirdly, highlighting the behavioural dimensions of trust and distrust, in 
particular, is important for interpreting the following sort of situation. 14 My family 
physician has an excellent reputation and seems to have provided good health care to me 
in the past, but he has always made me feel slightly uneasy. As a result, my behaviour 
around him has always been guarded. I do not believe he is untrustworthy; in fact. [ 
believe he is probably trustworthy given the evidence available to me. Consequently, I 
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do not search for a different physician. IS Although my attention there is focused mostly 
on evidence of his trustworthiness~ it seems inaccurate to say that I trust him. As most of 
us would want to be able to say~ my unease around him and guarded behaviour translate 
into a distrusting attitude. That makes sense only on a behavioural model of trust and 
distrust. 
Based on the three scenarios above~ we can conclude that interpersonal trust fits a 
behavioural and perceptual model of emotions. Since we could replace each of those 
scenarios with examples involving self-trust or distrust, self-trust must fit that model of 
emotions as well. For example, we tend to think of someone who is self-trusting as 
someone who is resistant to counter-evidence; she is not easily swayed by the opinions of 
others who might question her abilities (Govier 1993). But where someone is continually 
anticipating that she will ~screw-up" or is behaving in ways that reveal serious doubts 
about her own abilities, we recognize her as a self-distrusting person. Furthermore, 
someone could express self-distrust in her behaviour, but not have her attention focused 
on her perceived inadequacies. For example, a student might speak hesitantly in class 
and apologize for hee written work, yet not assume that she is incompetent academically 
(Bartky 1990). Her behaviour indicates that she is ashamed and distrustful of her 
academic ability, but the limits of that ability are not necessarily the focus of her 
attention. She may actually do well academically and be as conscious of that fact as 
everyone else. Nonetheless, her behaviour reveals a lack of self-trust in that domain. 
Janes uses an example similar to the example I used of my family physician to 
argue that trust is neither a belief about someones trustworthiness, nor is it constituted. by 
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a belief(1996, 24). In my example,. ifwe were to suppose that my unease around my 
physician amounts to a belief in her untrustworthiness,. we would have to accept that 
forming beliefs is possible in the face of what the agent acknowledges to be substantial 
counter-evidence. The preponderance of argument in the literature on beliefs opposes 
that view. We do not, and cannot, have beliefs without regard for what we perceive to be 
evidence for or against them. 16 But while forming beliefs in the absence of such regard 
may be imposSIble. the case of my unease around my family physician suggests that the 
opposite is the case with trust and distrust; we can have those attitudes wlule 
acknowledging the existence of contrary evidence. 
Other cases where trusting attitudes "leap ahead" of the evidence are cases where 
trust is cultivated. 17 As I suggested above. it is poSSIble to cultivate trust where there is 
little evidence of trustworthiness, and substantial evidence of untrustworthiness. If a 
small amount of evidence exists in support of a particular stance, such as trust. we can 
place ourselves in a position where we can focus mainly on that evidence in order to 
cultivate something like trust. For example, I myself might be a bit scattered and, 
therefore, unreliable in meeting commitments to myself; but I know that I mean well and 
[ want to be more respollSlble in the future. To cultivate trust in mysel( I could focus on 
my good points and place myself in an environment where others reinforce them rather 
than remind me constantly about how scattered I have been. But even once I reposition 
myseifto cultivate seIf:~ I do not become oblivious to the presence of counter-
evidence. ThUS,. my trust does not amount to a beliefin my trustworthiness, since my 
situation is not amenable to the formation of such a belief: 
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A further point, one establishing that trust is not constituted entirely,. but only in 
~ by a belief in someone's trustworthiness,. is that one can have that belief without 
having the trusting attitude. I might believe that someone is trustworthy, but never have 
trusted her and never have considered trusting her,. since she tends to operate in domains 
with which my life does not intersect. For example,. from everything I have heard about 
Simone, she is a trustworthy hell-ski instructor; but since I have never considered hell-
skiing as a hobby, I have never assumed the need to trust Simone as an instructor. In 
fact, I have never assumed the need to trust her for anything,. since I am not even friends 
with Simone.1& Hence, my belief about her trustworthiness does not amount to a trusting 
attitude towards her. The belief and the attitude are separate. 
Thus, trust and distrust, either in the self or in others, are not beliefs; rather, they 
are emotional attitudes with behavioural and perceptual dimensions,. and also with a 
cognitive dimension. Let me point out, briefly, that they can be cognitive even though 
they are not constituted by a belief because attitudes can have cognitive components that 
are non-propositional.19 Even as non-propositional attitudes, however,. trust and distrust 
can be grounded in beliefs about people's trustworthiness or untrustworthiness. As de 
Sousa descn"bes, there are types of emotions that can be founded on beliefs or not, 
"depending on the context" (1987, 137). Trust and distrust seem to fall into that 
category. For example,. in the context of my relationship with my family physician who 
makes me feel uneasy,. my distrusting attitude is not founded on a belief. However,. in the 
case ofSimone, ifl changed. my mind about heli-skiing and decided to take lessons from 
her, my trust in Simone as an instructor would be grounded,. at least in part,. in a belief 
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about her trustworthiness. 
4. Resistance in the Literature to Theorizing about Justification 
Whether trust or distrust is grounded in a belief or not it is unjustified unless it 
takes into account a variety of factors about the circumstances of the trusting person. 
Rarely do trust theorists say or imply any more than that about the justification of trust 
and distrust. They assume that the factors relevant to their justification are too numerous 
and can interact with one another in too many ways for it to be reasonable to give 
generalizations about when those attitudes are justified. 20 Hence Baier assumes~ for 
example, that "the appropriateness of trust of sustaining trust ..• [must bel judged case by 
individual case" (1995. 181).21 For similar reasons. Jones declares a reluctance to 
generalize about justification, although she hints at a generalization, namely. that 
whether trust and distrust are justified depends on whether reliable processes produced 
them. I take her hint as instructive. but argue that the way she expresses it could mask 
the social nature of those processes. 
It is true _ normally. the factors relevant to the justification of trust and 
distrust are too numerous to give an exhaustive account of those factors and of how they 
might combine together in a given situation to make trust or distrust justified or 
unjustified. But the idea that we need to know what all of those factors are and how they 
might interact with one another before we can give an account of justification is dubious. 
Only internalist theories ofjustffication require that we ic:IentitY all "justifiers," to use a 
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term of Goldmarrs~ referring to all "facts or states of affairs that determine the 
justificational status of a belief [or attitude}" (1999b, 274). Intemalist theories demand 
that we be able to give explanations for why our attitudes are justified. For us to be able 
to do that, there must be some constraints on what qualifY as justifiers~ for if there were 
an unlimited number of them, we could never provide the necessary explanation 
(Goldman 1999b, 274). However, introducing such constraints is often unreasonable, 
since usually a large amount of what we have learned in the past is relevant to the 
justification of our attitude. That is certainly the case with trust and distrust, for a lot of 
prior knowledge and experience goes into trusting and distrusting well. Thus, it seems 
fruitless to strive for an internalist theory of trust and distrust, which is what Baier and 
Iones seem to do. Instead, we should aim for an extemalist theory.22 Where justification 
is external to us, it does not require that we understand the reasons why our attitudes are 
justified. ReIiabilism is an example, for it assumes that reliable processes may generate 
attitudes which are justified without the subject knowing exactly what those processes 
are and why they are reliable. 
Psychological processes generating trust and distrust can be reliable only if they 
identify and combine together the many justifiers in ways that tend to produce accurate 
representations of people as trustworthy or untrustworthy. Given how complicated those 
processes would normally have to be, they must proceed, in part, unconsciously. Below, 
I descnbe in very general terms what those processes involve; but first r review some of 
the factors defined in the literature as relevant to the justification of trust and distrust, 
and the factors that are relevant according to my own theory of trust from chapter 2. 
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As our trust prototypes reveal, and as many trust theorists suggest, both the 
character and competence of the trusted person are relevant to whether our trust is 
justified, and so is the domain in which we trust that person. On my trust theory, what is 
relevant specifically about the trusted person's character is whether she possesses moral 
integrity and whether she holds certain moral values. It is also important that she 
conceive of her relationship with us similarly to the way in which we conceive of it. 
Evidence of character and competence in the trusted person may lie~ as Govier 
explains. in our past experiences with that person, in second-hand reports about her. and 
also in her social role (1998. 122). A person's social role may even be relevant, either 
directly or indirectly. to whether she trusts or distrusts herself. For example. a health 
care practitioner may assume that she is untrustworthy in a particular domain because it 
extends beyond the role she has been assigned in her profession; or~ alternatively, she 
may distrust herself because of how others treat her in that role. For example~ a nurse 
who is treated as a dispensable and subordinate member of a health care team may 
distrust her own ability to do her job wei4 or she may distrust her judgment about how 
patients should be cared for. 
According to Jones, Baier~ and Govier~ the political climate or political structure 
of our society is also relevant to whether we should be trusting (Jones 1996. 20; Baier 
1995. 105; Govier 1999~ 117-138). What is important about that structure to many of us 
is how we are positioned within it. For example. in sexist societies. women are so 
positioned as to be under the continual threat of rape or sexual assault. For them to learn 
to trust and distrust well in that kind of climate means that they learn to take that threat 
122 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
into account while trusting or distrusting others. Ideally, their paradigm scenarios for 
trust become nuanced in response to it, in which case it is more likely that they will be 
cautious in trusting men, particularly in situations where they are most vulnerable to 
attack., such as when a male stranger offers to drive them somewhere or when they are at 
rowdy parties with men who are intoxicated. 
Political climate can also be relevant to self:.trust. For example, whether I feel I 
can trust myself as a middle-class white woman to understand what it is like to live as a 
poor black woman in our culture may depend on whether the dominant culture is classist 
and racist. If it is, there will be structures in place to maintain my privilege that I might 
suspect are largely hidden from my view. In that case, I may feel that I cannot trust 
myself to make a respoDSlble knowledge claim about the lives of people subordinated by 
those structures, given where I am socially positioned in relation to them. 
According to Jones, a further variable determining whether our trust is justified is 
whether we are good "affective instruments," that is, whether we tend to be good at 
trusting or distrusting in the relevant domain. If we are not, then, 
... we should distrust our trust, or distrust our distrust, and demand a 
correspondingly higher amount of evidence before we let ourselves trust 
or distrust in the kinds of cases in question. Consider responses to 
physicians. We can imagine someone with a tendency to find 
authoritative and avuncular physicians trustworthy and physicians who 
acknowledge the tentativeness of their diagnoses and the limits of their art 
untrustworthy. Given how sexism shapes what we take to be signs of 
competence, we should be wary of our tendency to trust when an etiology 
of that trust tells us it is as likely to be caused by mannerisms of privilege 
as by marks of untrustworthiness (Jones 1996,. 21). 
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Iones calls that criterion an "agent-specific" criterion. It is something the agent can 
evaluate by questioning the social norms that influence her trust, or distrust (as in the 
example Iones gives),. and/or by acknowledging how successful the agent has been in the 
past in trusting people who deserved to be trusted, or distrusting those who are, in fact, 
untrustworthy. For example, someone who has frequently been betrayed in the past by 
intimate partners should have some distrust for his trust in that domain, and should seek 
more evidence in the future about the trustworthiness of potential partners. 
Despite her intention to resist generalizing about justification, Jones implies a 
certain generalization with her agent-specific criterion. There, she hints that a person 
might be justified in trusting if she is a reliable truster; that is, if she tends to accurately 
assess the factors relevant to whether she should be trusting. Taking that hint from 
Jones, [ argue that what makes an attitude of trust or distrust justified is whether the 
processes that form and sustain it are reliable. However, descnbing that factor as "agent-
specific" implies that the reliability of those processes might be causally redUCIble to the 
agent, meaning that the agent alone determines their reliability. Yet, as Iones's own 
example about physicians suggests, the reliability of trust or distrust-forming processes 
may depend, in part, on the agent's socio-political environment. If that environment is 
characterized by sexist norms that shape the agent's perception of who is trustworthy and 
who is not, then she is less likely to develop reliable attitudes of trust and distrust. 
Alternatively, Iones may have meant by an "agent" someone who is represented 
in all ofhis complexity as a relational bein& profoundly influenced by his social 
environment. In that case,. Iones does notcxclude the causal role of the agents social 
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environment in determining the reliability of his trusting and distrusting attitudes. StilL 
the term "agent-specific" is ambiguous given that in much of traditional Western 
philosophy~ the agent is portrayed, not in all of his complexity, but as an atomistic entity. 
5. A Fe~ Social Theory of the Justification of Trust and Distrust 
To trust ourselves well, we need self-knowledge or to know that we are not self-
deceived about our own competence and integrity; and to trust others well, we require 
knowledge of our own ability to assess the trustworthiness of others. Self-knowledge and 
self-deception are both partly social in nature. We cannot have self-knowledge 
independently of certain kinds of social relations, and hence, the reliable processes that 
sustain jUstified trusting and distrusting attitudes must themselves be partly social. 
Those processes include comparing and contrasting paradigm scenarios for trust and 
distrust to the world, modifying our habitual responses, and taking into account the social 
feedback to those responses. As I argue, unless some of that feedback is itself reliable, 
we will not be in a good position to detect distorting influences on our trusting and 
distrusting attitudes. 
One potential source of distortion for trust and distrust is self-deception. In 
deceiving ourselves, as Amelie Rorty proposes~ we place ourselves "where patterns of 
salience are likely to deflect attention away from what we do not wish to see" (Rotty 
1994, 218). We are motivated by such a strategy, but usually not on a conscious level. 23 
Whether we could even be motivated on that level is called into question by the paradox 
125 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
I outlined above of being the deceiver (believing that X) and the deceived (believing not-
X) simultaneously. Where self-deception is unconscious, the evidence of it lies in our 
behaviour and in the inconsistencies between it and what we consciously believe or 
intend to do. Consider Rho. who is self-deceived about her sexuality. She might 
claim to be heterosexual., while her behaviour clearly reveals that she is lesbian (she is 
constantly flirting with lesbians, is visibly turned on sexually by women but not by men, 
etc.). If she were to admit to poSSIbly being a lesbian, then, perhaps, she would not self-
deceived about her sexuality; she would merely be confused about it. 
Usually when we deceive ourselves in profound ways, people around us respond 
to the inconsistencies between our behaviour and what we claim to believe or desire. 
Their responses suggest to us that we are self-deceived; but sometimes they prevent us 
from noticing our self-deception. For example, friends ofRhondafs who are homophobic 
may be aware of the inconsistencies in her behaviour surrounding her sexuality, but 
never challenge her to account for them. They may even actively reinforce her self-
conception as a heterosexual woman. That poSSIbility explains why Rorty refers to self-
deception as a "co-operative process" (214). As she states, "[iJt works through sustaining 
social support" (Rorty 215).24 
We could be mistaken about our competence and integrity, or about our ability to 
assess the competence and integrity of others not because we are self-deceived, but 
because we merely lack self-knowledge. Above, I outlined Komblitlis argument that 
there are psychological conditions, prevalent in the Population, that can interfere with the 
attainment of se~knowledge by perpetuating mistaken and self-deceptive attitudes about 
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the self However, in a social environment where we have the resources to detect such 
conditions, we can be in a position to know ourselves welL Hence, the pursuit of self-
knowledge must be social, rather than the private pursuit of an introspective agent. 
Thus, in developing trusting or distrusting attitudes, we need to rule out self-
deceptive or merely mistaken attitudes about our competence and integrity or about our 
assessments of the trustworthiness of others; but we cannot do that without reliable social 
feedback. If the feedback we get only diminishes rather than enhances our self-
knowledge, we will not be able to trust ourselves or others welL Fortunately, that 
feedback comes in a variety of forms, especially in democratized countries where the 
media and other sources of information are not as censored as they are elsewhere. The 
feedback does not have to come from real, live people; often, we receive it through 
literature or film, for example. If we have access to progressive literature and films 
which are critical of the status quo, then we can become aware of the influence of 
negative social norms on our trusting and distrusting attitudes (e.g., the norm to which 
Jones refers about the trustworthiness of avuncular physicians). 
However, the most common source of feedback to which we respond when 
forming those attitudes is the feedback we get when they are misplace<l With distrust. 
much of that feedback is indirect That is, we usually decide whether to be distrusting 
depending on how successful we have been in the past in trusting. ~ we know of 
that success because trusting attitudes which are mistaken tend to run smack against the 
world-that is, we experience immediate harm or disappointment in ways that make it 
clear to us how those attitudes were misplaced and how we should form them differently 
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in the future. On the other han~ we rarely discover whether distrusting attitudes are 
mistake~ since the harms to which they make us vulnerable tend not to be immediate. 
Thus, knowing when to distrust someone involves being attentive to the reliability (or 
unreliability) of our past trusting attitudes. 
Let me clarify and elaborate on my theory of the justification of trust and distrust 
using an example involving seIf-distrust. Eve distrusts her ability to make sound moral 
judgments about her prenatal care. Whenever her obstetrician seeks her informed choice 
for any aspect of her care (such as an ultrasound, antibiotics for a bacterial infection, or 
the mode of her delivery), Eve feels that any decision she would make would probably be 
a bad decision, both for her and for her fetus. Her self-distrust is manifested in her 
behaviour-mostly in the continual demands she makes of her obstetrician to tell her what 
he would do in her circumstances. Whenever he answers that question, she defers to his 
judgment. She does not even contemplate whether his judgment is consistent with how 
she conceives of her responsIbilities in pregnancy. since she does not trust her own 
judgment about what those responsIbilities require of her. 
On my theory. whether Eve's seIf-distrust is justified depends on how that 
attitude was generated. If it was generated by psychological processes that tend 
accurately to represent her level of competence and her commitment to acting with moral 
integrity, then it is justified. On the other hand, if it was produced by processes that tend 
to create inaccurate representations, it is unjustified. Below I consider a variety of 
scenarios in which Eve's self-distrust might be justified or unjustified, as well as well-
grounded or not well-grounded. But ~ I want to make a few quick points about this 
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account of the justification of her attitude. One is that the processes relevant to its 
justification are not only the processes that created the attitude. For her self-distrust to be 
justified, reliable processes would have to be sustaining it as Eve receives further 
evidence or feedback about whether she should be distrusting herself. Second, the 
reliability of those processes, overall, may be domain-specific, for it is possible that 
Eve~s self-distrusting attitudes tend to be reliable, or unreliable, in some domains but not 
in others. The relevant domain in the example would probably be situations in which 
Eve is required to make important moral decisions about her own welfare and the 
welfare of those close to her. Third, it is possible that the processes which produced 
Eve's self-distrust are only somewhat reliable, or somewhat unreliable. We can trust, or 
distrust, in a qualified way, and sometimes we are justified in doing so. Processes that 
form and sustain trusting or distrusting attitudes are partially reliable if they only tend to 
produce accurate representations of people as trustworthy or untrustworthy some of the 
time, or if they only somewhat resemble processes that are deemed reliable without 
qualification. The degree to which someone is justified in trusting cannot be equivalent, 
however, to the degree to which she is justified in distrusting; where they are of equal 
degree, the only attitude she is justified in adopting is one of neutrality. 
[ shall sketch the boundaries of where Eve's self-distrust could be justified or not, 
leaving open the possibility that her attitude might fall inside of those boundaries as an 
attitude that is partially justified or partially unjustified. Let us begin with the boundaries 
determining where her seIf-distrust is unjustified-that is, where the processes responsible 
for it are unreliable. Her attitude would be unjustified if Eve has not engaged in the 
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kinds of processes that would tend to give her well-grounded attitudes of self-distrust. 
As I argued above,. such processes would include some consideration for the reliability of 
past self.trusting attitudes. We must attend to the social feedback to our self.trust in 
determining whether to be self-distrustful. If Eve's distrust were generated by processes 
in which she ignores the relevant feedback,. then her attitude would be unjustified. That 
would not preclude Eve from being highly competent in making moral judgments, nor 
would it preclude her from being incompetent in that domain. What it would mean, 
simply, is that she is not always a reliable self-distruster in that domain. 
Alternatively, the processes which generated Eve's self-distrust may be unreliable 
because the kind of social feedback she tends to receive about whether she should be 
self-distrusting in the kind of situation she is in presently reinforces mistaken attitudes of 
self-distrust The explanation for that feedback may be that people in her community 
(including Eve herself, perhaps) have been taught paradigm scenarios for trust and 
distrust that make it appropriate for women to distrust their ability to make sound moral 
decisions, and hence appropriate for them to defer to the judgment of others (namely 
men). In other words,. those scenarios may be shaped by sexist stereotypes. such as the 
stereotype that women are not as competent as men in making judgments about serious 
moral or political issues. 
Given that a sexist community may actually have deprived Eve of the ability to 
make sound moral judgments,. it is poSSlble for her self-distrust to be unjustified (because 
the feedback to it is unreliable). and at the same time,. well-grounded (i.e.,. an accurate 
reflection ofEve"s (in)competence.) Eve may never have bad the opportunity to improve 
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her moral judgment because she was, and still is, bombarded with the kind of sexist 
feedback I have just descnoed. There, the relevant feedback is unreliable if it assumes 
that Eve is incompetent by virtue of being a woman and it is simply false that most 
women are incompetent in making moral decisions. There, Eve's self-distrust would be 
unjustified; yet, it would still be well-grounded because Eve does not possess the relevant 
competency. It is important to emphasize that the evidence for her lack of competency 
could not be superficial. Sexist stereotypes can cause some women merely to doubt 
competencies that they do, in fact, possess. For Eve's attitude to be well-grounded, she 
must actually be incompetent, either as a result of sexism. or for some other reason. 
Now consider what would make the processes that produced her self-distrust 
reliable. Eve could be incompetent in making difficult moral decisions while the 
feedback she receives to her self-distrusting attitudes is reliable in confirming her lack of 
competence in that domain. In that case, her self-distrust would be well-grounded as 
well as justified. The feedback to her attitude could be reliable and, at the same time, 
motivated by sexist stereotypes if those stereotypes were so damaging that they impeded 
the development of decision-making skills in most women. Whether sexist feedback, or 
feedback influenced by other forms of oppression, is reliable depends on the severity of 
the impact of oppressive norms and stereotypes. 
Eve's attitude could also be justified without it being well-grounded. Say that she 
tends to have reliable self-distrusting and self-trusting attitudes, generally speaking, 
which means that she tends to have the social resources she needs to obtain self-
knowledge and tends to use those resources wisely. However, in this particular case, 
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there is someone or something in her social environment manipulating her perception of 
her situation. Certain people (e.g.. her partner or her physician) might be ensuring that 
she perceive only evidence of simIlarities. rather than differences. between her situation 
and situations in the past where she formed reliable self-distrusting attitudes. and 
unreliable self-trusting attitudes. There are various films where that kind of scenario is 
played out. For example. in The Truman Show. everyone in the protagonist's social 
world collaborates to deceive him about the nature of his experience. Similarly. in 
Gaslight. a man nearly convinces his wife that she is crazy by so controlling and 
orchestrating her life that she is cut off from anyone who could confirm her perception of 
it (Benson 1994,655). It is poSSIble that some deception of that sort is going on in Eve's 
case. and, consequently. that she distrusts herself in a situation where she would 
otherwise trust herself. However, it: in developing that attitude of self-distrust, she 
engages in the reliable processes that normally generate her self-distrusting attitudes, 
then her self-distrust may be justified, even though it is not well-grounded. 
From a feminist perspective. whether it is reliable to trust or distrust in 
exceptional cases resembling The Truman Show is not particularly interesting. What is 
interesting is how systemic forces of oppression can influence when it is reliable for 
someone to be trusting or distrusting. Reliability is a relative term, indexed to a set of 
"normal" conditions. that is. conditions where one can expect a particular event to occur, 
or, as in the cases I am descnbin& expect an agent to be able to develop a particular 
attitude.2S Implicit in my discussion of the boundaries of justification for Eves self-
distrust is a certain understanding of what the "normal" conditions are~ for someone like 
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Eve, to develop justified attitudes of self-distrust (e.g.. I presumed that the kind of 
deception she faced in the last scenario made her situation "abnormal"). In the rest of 
this section. [ illustrate how "normal" conditions for the reliability of trust and distrust 
can vary depending on the agents socio-political position. 
Often. reliability in trusting and distrusting is understood only in relation to the 
privileged case, so that the "normal" conditions are interpreted as conditions where those 
attitudes are reliable primarily for the privileged. 26 To see why that understanding of 
reliability is problematic, consider again lones's example of avuncular and authoritative 
physicians. By Western standards, those physicians are generally deemed reliable. They 
are thought to be more trustworthy than physicians who are somewhat hesitant in giving 
diagnoses. or who are open about the limits of their knowledge of how to care for 
patients. But there are good reasons for thinking that avuncular physicians are not as 
trustworthy for minority groups as they might be for privileged patients. Most physicians 
are in a better position, generally speaking. to understand the health care needs of the 
privileged compared to the oppressed. They themselves usually live privileged lives. 
which shelter them from the kinds of social and environmental constraints on health that 
many oppressed people face (e.g., barriers posed by poverty, pollution, violence, racism, 
ableism, etc.). Moreover, the knowledge of physicians of how to treat medical 
conditions that manifest themselves in unique ways among minority groups (e.g., 
women) is often vague or incomplete, since members of those groups tend to be excluded 
or under-represented as subjects in medical research (Bay~ Downie, & Sherwin 1998). 
With those gaps in the knowledge of physicians about how to care for those patients, the 
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patients are probably best served by physicians who are honest about the limitations to 
their art The gaps narrow considerably for patients who are privileged in multiple ways 
(e.g.,. by class and gender). and hence. avuncular physicians are probably reliable for 
them most of the time. 
Whether it is reliable to trust in oppressive environments can differ for the 
oppressed compared to the privIleged for a number of reasons. Like in the above 
example. the circumstances may be such that it is unsafe for those who are oppressed to 
be trusting. yet safe for the privileged. An example. relevant specifically to gender 
oppressio~ is a crowded subway. Most men can reliably adopt a trusting posture on a 
crowded subway. whereas most women must be continually alive to the possibility that a 
man will try to grab them in a seemingly innocent way. Reliability is also relative to 
one's socio-political status where the available social feedback is less reliable for people 
who are oppressed than for the privileged. An example is an academic environment 
where instructors tend to be encouraging of the academic abilities of male students. and 
less encouraging of those abilities in female students. There are studies which show that 
such behaviour by instructors is common-for example, that they tend to reinforce the 
view that mens critical or analytic skills are strong, whereas those of women are 
relatively weak (see Bartky 1990.90-93). In classrooms where many of the men possess 
those skills. but so do many of the women and to similar degrees as the men, the 
reliability of the feedback by the instructors will tend to vary along gender lines. As a 
result, it will be easier for the men than for the women to trust themselves to perform 
wen academically in that setting. 
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When sexist feedback in classrooms or elsewhere impedes the development of 
certain skills in women, and enhances their development in men, it will be more reliable 
for women to distrust themselves than for men in situations requiring those skills. 
Things can go badly. particularly with sel&trust and seIf-distrust. not only when those 
attitudes are unjustified. but also when people are frequently justified in distrusting 
themselves. Oppression can have that effect not only by depriving people of the 
opportunity to learn various skills. but also by frequently placing them in double bind 
situations. Oppressed people tend to face such situations disproportionately compared to 
the privileged (Frye 1983). To give a broad example. they are frequently in the position 
where resisting their own oppression would be consistent with maintaining their 
integrity. but it would also put them at grave risk of serious harm. Because double binds 
are inherently difficult to get out ot: distrusting oneself to do so with one's moral integrity 
intact is usually more reliable than trusting oneself. Hence. self-disttust may be justified 
in more situations for the oppressed than for the privileged. 
[ have argued, then, that in contemplating the reliability, or justification, of trust 
and distrust. it is important to index reliability to a set of conditions that are normal given 
how the agent is socio-politically positioned. The criterion of whether the processes 
sustaining an agent's trust or distrust are reliable might, therefore, be better descnbed as 
"'group-specific:' rather than "agent-specific." This version of reliabili~ which I have 
defended as a way of understanding the justification of trust and di~ is social as well 
as feminist. 27 It is the latter because it is sensitive to the ways in which oppression can 
interfere with one" s ability to trust in others and in one's self. 
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6. Selt:Trust and Selt:Distrust as Skills 
[ have argued thus far that the conditions under which trust and distrust are 
justified are conditions under which the agent can reliably trust and distrust [have 
understood the processes that produce justified trusting and distrusting attitudes in light 
of a theory [ developed about the nature of those attitudes and the way they are learned. [ 
have descnbed them as emotions~ but now I want to consider whether it makes sense to 
caU them skills~ or abilities. We sometimes refer to trust or distrust as skills, particularly 
when someone does not trust well, in which case we might say ofhim, .the really doesn't 
know how to trust others. It Not knowing how to do something means that one lacks the 
ability to do it (Millikan (998). In this sectio~ [ explain that it is consistent with my 
theories of the nature of trust and distrust and of their justification to call them skills, or 
abilities. I argue in the next chapter that among the many skills needed for autonomy are 
the skills of trusting and distrusting oneself weILl! 
To say that trust and distrust are "skills" is to put them in a certain category of 
dispositions. My theory of how we [earn those attitudes by developing habitual patterns 
of response implies that they are already dispositionaI. Habits are a kind of disposition, 
for they allow us to predict how someone is likely to behave depending on her 
circumstances (Ryle 1978,. 346). Dispositions are "inference tickets,." to use a term of 
Gilbert Rylers, for they conform to law-like generaliDtions about peoplers behaviour. 
Ryle focuses on two main types of dispositions,. namely,. what he calls I~capacities or 
skills" compared to "tendencies or habits" (1978,. 353-357). He claims that trust falls into 
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the second category, but not the first; for him, it is a habit but not a skill (356). I argue 
that it can be both. 
According to Ryle, one factor distinguishing a tendency from a skill is that the 
latter, unlike the former, is a success term. Someone who has a skill can "bring things 
ott: or get things right," but someone who merely has a tendency does not necessarily get 
anything right (Ryle 356). Adjectives such as '''obstinate: ... 'fanatical: ... 'child-like'" can 
descnbe tendencies. but not skills (Ryle 356). Similarly, they can qualify the disposition 
of some people to trust others or themselves, but not qualify that disposition in others. 
Some of us trust and distrust and often "get things right," meaning that often we are 
accurate in representing people as trustworthy or untrustworthy. Hence. on the above 
criterion. the disposition can be either a skill or a tendency. 
To define someone's disposition to trust or distrust as a skill is not to imply that 
she always gets things right, or that she is always accurate in representing people's 
trustworthiness or untrustworthiness. In some situations, she may not exercise the skill, 
and in others. she may exercise it in ways that are flawed. The flawed exercise of a skill 
occurs when one is deceived or mistaken about the degree to which one's current 
situation sufficiently resembles situations in the past in which one was able to manifest 
the skill. Like reliable processes,. skills are indexed to a set of normal conditions. which 
are the conditions under which they were learned and have been used successfully. As I 
argued above, the conditions under which people can trust well tend to vary depending 
on their socio-political position. Those who have that skill will tend to develop. under 
"nonnal" conditions (i.e.,. normal for them). attitudes of trust and distrust that are 
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justified. Where the exercise of their skill is t1aw~ their attitudes may be justified but 
not well-grounded (e.g., if they were deceived in a T17I1TIll1I Show-like situation). Where 
the exercise of it is succ~ the resulting attitudes wHl be well-grounded. 
Another way that Ryle distinguishes a skill from a tendency is that skills "have 
methods," whereas tendencies only ''have sourceslf (356). Hence, it is appropriate to ask 
how someone manifests a skill, but not how he displays a tendency. We would only ask 
why he displays the latter in the hopes of determining its source. For example, we might 
ask how someone is scaling a mountain. since mountain-climbing is a skill, but we would 
only ask why that person desires to scale the mountain. since the desire is a tendency. It 
makes sense to ask how someone trusts or distrusts well because there are various 
processes, as I outlined above, for forming justified attitudes of trust and distrust My 
theory of their justification specifies a method for developing those attitudes, which is to 
modify behavioural and perceptual responses in light of the available evidence, including 
the social feedback to those responses. 
One might object that exercising a skill using a method suggests something 
active, whereas developing an attitude seems passive. But we cannot be passive in 
developing justified attitudes of trust and distrust. especially given the behavioural 
dimensions of those attitudes. While forming the~ we actively engage with the world in 
modifying habitual patterns of behaviour. Thus~ we can make sense of the idea that in 
developing those attitudes. we are doing something active~ as though we were exercising 
a skilL 
Like all skills. the skills of trusting and distrusting wen develop only in social 
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environments where one has the opportunity to learn them. People who are oppressed or 
abused are less likely than others to be given to such opportunities. Oppressed people are 
often taught paradigm scenarios for trust and distrust that inhIbit them from trusting and 
distrusting themselves well. As I mentioned above, many survivors of childhood incest 
tend to be bad trusters and distrusters in adulthood.. Also, people who are abused later in 
life can lose the skills of trusting and distrusting the self and others well as a result of the 
abuse. 
Thus, trust and distrust can resemble skills or abilities enough that it makes sense 
to place them in that category of dispositions. We can say of someone who trusts or 
distrusts well that she tends to "get things right," and we can ask how she does that 
Also, we can identitY a method for exercising that skill. The skills of trusting or 
distrusting the self or others manifest themselves under certain social conditions, the 
nature of which can differ for members of different socio-politicaI groups. Those who 
have those skills will develop, under "normal" conditions, justified attitudes of trust and 
distrust 
7. Conclusion 
[ began this chapter by arguing that we are vulnerable not only while trusting 
others but also whIle trusting ourselves, and that we are even somewhat wlnerable in 
distrusting ourselves. Hence, we need to be skilled. at determining which circumstances 
merit our self-trust, or seIf~ and which do not. I have developed a theory, hinted 
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at by Jones, that the justification of trust and distrust in the self and in others depends on 
the reliability of the processes that produce those attitudes. Those processes cannot be 
reliable independently of a social environment that promotes selt:knowledge. as opposed 
to selt:misunderstanding. They are more likely to be unreliable in oppressive or abusive 
environments compared to more supportive environments, since the former tend to 
encourage mistaken or self-deceptive attitudes about one's own competence and integrity. 
and they tend to educate people in paradigm. scenarios for trust and distrust that 
perpetuate sexism or other forms of oppression. 
My theory of the justification of trust and distrust included a theory of the nature 
of those attitudes. I argued that they are emotions with perceptual as well as behavioural 
dimensions. Their behavioural component. in particular, allows us to make sense of the 
notions of trusting and distrusting well as skills. Someone has those skIlls, it: under 
"normallt conditions. she is able to develop justified attitudes of trust and distrust, which 
she could do only if she knew how to perform the processes that generate such attitudes. 
Whether she is able to perform those processes successfully. however, will depend on the 
nature of her social environment 
Notes 
L And as I explain in section 5, it is also possible for trust. or distrust. to be well-
grounded without it being justified. 
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2. Here~ I am influenced by the reliabilist epistemology of AIvin Goldman (l970~ 1992; 
see, also 19998., where he mentions the implications of a social epistemology for 
reliabilist theories,. 129-130). 
3. However, trust is not relevant only to those kinds of situations, as I suggest in this 
section (e.g.~ some instances where a parent cultivates trust in a child may be related 
solely to the moral education of that child, rather than to the vulnerability of the parent). 
4. Drawing that line is also difficult with trust that is unwelcome. When someone does 
not welcome our trust and so does not act in accordance with i~ does she betray that trust 
or merely disappoint it? That would depend, it seems~ on how accurate her perception is 
of the nature of our relationship. As I have argued, trust is unwelcome when the trusted 
one does not perceive her relationship with us as the kind that requires her to fultiII the 
responsibility that we are trusting her to fulfill. But she could be wrong about the nature 
of our relationship. Through her own behaviour and the expectations she has encouraged 
us to have~ she could have unwittingly established a kind of relationship with us that she 
might think she has avoided. In that case~ if she does not satisfy our trust, she betrays it, 
even though it was unwanted. 
5. Govier discusses this idea, an idea about what H.J-N. Horsburgh calls "therapeutic 
trust," in Dilemmas o/Trust (1998, 170-174). She cites the works of Gandhi (see, 
especially~ ftn 8, 225). 
6. That would not necessarily be true in the former case because if the trusted person 
does not hold the relevant vaIues~ it cannot violate her integrity for her to fail to act on 
them. 
7. [discuss Darwall's distinction between recognition and appraisal self-respect in 
chapter 3~ section 4. 
8. Oppressive or abusive environments, which inhibit self-know[edge~ usually infubit 
knowledge of others as well. Those who do not know themselves well because they have 
been coerced into believing that they are inferior beings do not know others well in 
thinking that they are inherently superior. 
9. There, our attention on such evidence may be momentary or it may continue for a 
long period of time. If we are deeply seIf-deceived about whether we have a trusting 
attitude toward someon~ we may continue to focus on evidence of her 
untrustworthiness~ while displaying trusting behaviour toward her. 
10. Behavioural and perceptual dimensions alone do not explain why an attitude is 
emotio~ for one could have behavioural and perceptual attitudes without experiencing 
a particular emotion. A common answer to the question of what determines the identity 
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of emotions is some kind of physiological change or "disturbance't (Griffiths 1997). 
Unless we accept that what makes certain attitudes emotional is the Itfeelings" they 
embody (both figuratively and Iiterally)~ then we "take the feeling out offeelings" (to 
quote Charlie Martin; personal communication). However, it is a mistake to assume that 
the feelings are merely physiological changes and do not "embed" any form of cognition 
(CampbeIl1998,71). Nonetheless, they tend to be portrayed in that way even within so-
called Itcognitivist" theories of emotions (e.g.~ Lyons 1980, Davis 1988), where the 
cognitive component of an emotion tends to be separated out from the feeling 
component, thus leaving the question unanswered of how a ~eeling could be about 
anything (Campbell 1998. 71). It is inevitable that many cognitivist theories would 
divide those components, since many of them describe the relevant cognitive acts as 
propositional attitudes, which admit of truth or falsity, whereas feelings are not attitudes 
to which most of us would ascn"be truth values (Campbell 1998, 71, 72). There is an 
alternative, however, to a cognitive model that is propositional, and that is a model where 
emotions have a non-propositional cognitive dimension, a dimension representing the 
relation of the subject not to a proposition, but to something like an experience of being 
in the world (see Campbell 72-74; Bartky 1990; Dillon (997). My theory of trust as an 
emotional attitude endorses that alternative (an alternative where trust represents our 
experience of being in a world with people who exude competence and moral integrity). 
Different theories in philosophy of emotions identify emotions not only in terms 
of cognitive acts and physiological changes, but also in terms of the biological and/or 
social origins of emotions. For example, de Sousa suggests that we can identify emotions 
by the functional role they play in our evolution (1987, 190-203). However, he also 
defends a theory of emotional learning that gives our emotions a strong social dimension. 
[ support that view and illustrate it with examples of how emotions can be learned in 
ways that perpetuate oppression. I do not deny that they have an innate, or biological 
component as well as a social component, but neither do I support any particular theory 
of their biological origins. It would be consistent, though. with what I argue about trust 
as an emotion that the capacity to learn howto form certain emotions, such as trust and 
fear. is innate. 
I L Alternatively, when a snake is actually present, an overall fear of snakes could cause 
us to deny its presence. We might be so fearful of snakes that we cannot bring ourselves 
to accept that a snake is close by. In that case~ it seems appropriate to say that a 
disposition to fear snakes is controlling our attention in ways that allow us to justify our 
lack of occurrent fear. 
12. See Jones (l996~ 16-17). That resistance itself is a source of vulnerability wlnle 
trusting. As Jones writes~ "[tlrust ... opens one up to harm, for it gives rise to selective 
interpretation, which means that one can be fooI~ that the truth might lie~ as it were, 
outside one's gazJ!" (1996~ 12). A trusting posture, directing one's gaze toward certain 
kinds of information, makes one wlnerable to deception, since it makes it difficult to 
detect deception and easy to be mistaken about the filctOIS relevant to whether one 
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should be trusting. 
13. However, such behaviour may be compatible, as I imply, with partial trusting, 
depending on how much monitoring and maneuvring goes on. 
14. The situation is modelled on an example taken by Jones from Patricia Greenspan's 
Emotions and Reasons (1988; Jones 1996,23-24). 
15. It is commonly understood that we can have emotions that conflict with our beliefs 
about the nature of our situation. Paul Gri:ffiths illustrates that phenomenon by stating 
that "[t]be fear of earthworms and the conviction that earthworms are harmless 
commonly co-occur. The judgment supposedly underlying the fear is one we would 
hotly deny making" (1997, 28, 29). 
16. In ''Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe," Richard Holton argues that trust is not a 
belief: since one can decide to trust, but not simply decide to believe (1994). 
17. See Jones ( 1996, 22). The reason why we would want to cultivate trust is to elicit 
trustworthy behaviour. We may desire for someone to become more trustworthy simply 
because we are in a position of having to trust him or, rather, because it would enhance 
his self-respect. Cultivating trust can actually be a duty. Parents, for example, ought to 
cultivate trust in their children as a way of encouraging them to become trustworthy 
agents. 
18. It is important that [ have never felt the need to trust Simone. because if I bad. [ may 
have a dispositional attitude of trust towards her. [could stIlI have a trusting attitude 
towards Simone even without trusting her occurrently. For my argument to work (my 
argument that trusting is a distinct from a beIiefin someon~s trustworthiness), I need to 
separate out any kind of trusting attitude, dispositional or occmre~ from such a belief. 
19. That is, an attitude can be representational without being propositional. For a 
discussion of non-propositional attitudes or states and their justification, see" Are 'Old 
WiveS Tales' Justified?" by Vrinda Dalmiya and Linda Alcoff(1993). 
20. See, for example,. Jones (1996.20). Also, in her chapter on ''Reasons for Trust and 
Distrust, If Govier lists the factors that bear upon someon~s trustworthiness or 
untrustworthiness, but does not give a theory about when trust, or distrust, might be 
justified (1998, 119-138). 
21. However, it is not obvious here what Baier means by "appropriateness." She may 
mean only moral appropriateness rather than epistemic "appropriateness,'r given that her 
work tends to focus on what makes trust "morally rotten. If' 
She does generalize about when trust is morally rotten in a way that resembles my 
143 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
generalization for when trust is justified. It is morally rotten, she claims~ if it is sustained 
by processes that involve deception; that is, if its continuation depends upon "successful 
cover-ups of breaches of trust" (she adds that neither can it rely upon "successful threats 
held over the ~" but as I argued in chapter 2~ such threats preclude ~ in the first 
place; 1995, 123). For her, trust is not morally decent unless it is formed in the absence 
of deception; for me, trust cannot be justified unless it is formed by reliable processes. 
Since she provides only a negative condition for when trust is "appropriate," her view, 
unlike my own, does not allow us to say when, in a positive sense, it is "appropriate," or 
justified, to ~ or distrust. 
22. However, I do not deny that there are some problems with extemalism. A significant 
problem arises in trying to identify which processes are reliable. I give a partial 
"contextuaIist1t solution to that problem (see Annis 1993); that is, a solution where 
reliability is defined in terms of certain contextual factors. My externaIist theory of the 
justification of trust and distrust focuses on how reliability in trusting and distrusting 
varies depending on the socio-politica1 position of the subject. 
23. Mark Johnston argues that self-deception does not even occur on an intentional 
level, but rather on what he calls a "sub-intentional level" (1988). 
24. Also see William Ruddick (1988). and Rom Harre (1988). 
25. A standard objection to reliabilist theories of justification is that it is impossible to 
define reliability, and the "normal" conditions to which it is indexed, in a non-arbitrary 
way (polIock 1986, 118-120). For example, in the last scenario involving Eve, where I 
have said that her self -distrust is justified, it seems equally plausible to say that the 
processes respoDSlble for her attitude are unreliable. It is tempting to say that although 
normally those processes are reliable,. they are unreliable in circumstances involving 
deception. However~ it is equally tempting to insist that they are reliable even in such 
circumstances, given that normally they produce attitudes that are well-grounded. How 
can we decide,. then, non-arbitrariIy which description of those processes to accept? 
Answering that objection demands a lot of epistemological work. I attempt merely to 
demonstrate here that an adequate answer must attend to the various ways in which 
reliability is relativized to the socio-poIitical position of the agent. 
26. I speak generally of "the privileged" and "the oppressed" in this section, where I 
assume that the people who will fall into those categories will vary depending on the 
nature of the example about the reliability of trust and distrust. For instance, in examples 
illustrating how sexism influences the reliability of those attitudes, men are the 
privileged and women are the oppressed. Still, I am generalizing in my use of those 
categories, since people from different socio-poIiticaI groups can experience the same 
form of oppression in different ways. 
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27. For that reaso~ specifically~ it differs from Goldman's reliabili~ which does not 
have a feminist element to it. 
28. Diana Meyers argues that autonomy requires a "repertory of skills" (1989). [add 
selt:trust to that repertory. 
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ChapterS 
The Importance of Getting it Right: A Feminist Theory 
of the Relation Between Autonomy and Self-Trust 
1. Introduction 
When we trust ourselves. we are optimistic that we will act competently and in 
accordance with a moral commitment. The commitment might simply be to stand up for 
what we value most or it can be directed specifically at the welfare of another. In 
trusting oneself: it is posSIble to get things wrong, since seIf:trust is an emotional attitude 
that is cognitive, meaning that it represents the world in some way, and it can do that 
well or badly. Our self-trust is not well-grounded-that is, it represents the world 
inaccurately-if we are wrong about being competent in our present circumstances to do 
what we are trusting ourselves to do and about being committed to doing it with moral 
integrity. Getting things wrong while trusting ourselves can cause harm or 
disappointment to ourselves and others when we fail to meet our moral commitments. 
Getting things wrong in distrusting ourselves can cause harm to us, for it can reinforce 
low levels of self-respect and prevent us from seizing new opportunities. I have argued 
that oppression and abuse can be a barrier to the formation ofweU-grounded attitudes of 
self-trust and self-distrust.. Those who are oppressed or abused are especially wlnerable 
to the disappointment or harm. that comes with trusting or distrusting oneselfbadly. 
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In this chapter,. I want to focus on why it is important to gets things right with 
self-trust and self-distrust. The importance lies in the connection between trusting 
oneself well and being an autonomous agent. Autonomy is a property of agents who are 
acting in a particular way (or a property of actions insofar as they are committed by 
agents who are acting autonomously). To possess autonomy~ agents must reflect on what 
they truly believe and value, and act accordingly. They must be competent and 
committed to engage in such reflection and to act on the results. Moreover, as Trudy 
Govier argues (1993), they must have a positive attitude toward their own competency 
and commitment. That is, they must trust themselves to make an autonomous decision. 
As Govier astutely remarks, that attitude is "not to be taken for granted: [it} can be put in 
question by challenges-either from other people or from the course of events" (Govier 
1993, 112). In this chapter, I expand upon and refine her theory that seIf-trust is essential 
for autonomy. [add to it a feminist analysis of the challenges that many people face to 
their potential to be self-trusting. Moreover, since [ interpret selt:trust as a moral attitude 
towards the self(unlike Govier), I argue that the autonomy it promotes must have a 
moral dimension. In my view,. all autonomous action has that dimension, and thus, 
self-trust is crucial for all autonomous behaviour. 
Furthermore,. I consider whether just any agent who trusts herself is autonomous. 
Govier mentions that those who trust themselves too much are not autonomous (1993,. 
115). I specifY what "too much" means by arguing that to be autonomous,. one must have 
the skill of trusting oneself well-that is, the ability to develop justified self-trusting 
attitudes-and one must exercise that skill the majority of the time. [ It is also important 
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for autonomy that one have the skill of distrusting oneself well Attitudes of trust and 
distrust are justified if the psychological and social processes generating them are 
reliable~ in the sense that they tend to produce well-grounded trusting and distrusting 
attitudes. Autonomy demands that one often have reliable self-trusting and 
self -distrusting attitudes, but not necessan1y that one gets things right all of the time. 
Any agent who is non-autonomous in developing self-trusting attitudes also lacks 
autonomy. On my theory of self-trust and autonomy, the relation between them is not 
unidirectional, but reciprocal I maintain, along with Keith Lehrer (1997), that autonomy 
is important for self-~ although the reasons I give are different from Lehrets. I also 
interpret what "autonomy" means and what the conditions are that promote it differently 
than Lehrer. 
The value of autonomy itself, apart from its relation to self-trust, can be 
explain~ partly, in terms of the disvalue of exploitation, oppression, and abuse. Those 
who lack the skills necessary for exercising autonomy are especially vulnerable to the 
subtle workings of oppression and to other forms of injustice. Thus, an ethical principle 
of respect for the autonomy of others has emancipatory appeal,2 particularly in contexts 
where there is a heightened threat of abuse or coercion. However, autonomy is not about 
the mere absence of threats to the selt: As I argue, following writers such as Diana 
Meyers (1989) and Robert Young (1989), autonomous agents have goals which they set 
for themselves and which give their lives some purpose. 
Despite its emancipatory appeal, the ideal of autonomy is contentious in feminist 
circles. Feminists have argued that it reinforces masculine ideals of independence and 
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self.interest, and that it is built on a conception of the self as presocial, that is~ a self 
"untainted by socialiDtion" (e.g., Pateman 1988; Benhabib 1987, 1992; Jaggar 1983).3 
That conception is absurd from the perspective of many women, who tend to experience 
themselves in ways that highlight the degree to which their selves are shaped by multiple 
(and often competing) social and political forces. 
Feminist criticisms of the autonomy ideal are mostly directed toward hberal 
conceptions of autonomy. In response to those criticisms, some feminists philosophers 
have developed alternative, Itrelational" conceptions. Feminist relational theories of 
autonomy emphasize the role of social and relational aspects of persons not only in 
interfering with their ability to be autonomous, but also in engendering that ability 
(Mackenzie & Stoljar 1999; Sberwin 1998). On those theories, the skills necessary for 
autonomy are relational, meaning that they are fostered, or undermined, depending on the 
agents social environment I have argued that the skIlls of trusting and distrusting 
oneself well are relational, forthey are learned best in social environments that support 
the agent in acquiring self.knowledge. My theory, then, in this chapter can be situated 
within the frame of feminist relational autonomy theory. 
I structure this chapter in the following way. First, I explain the contrIbution of 
feminist relational approaches to contemporary autonomy theory and offer some feminist 
criticism of the standard approaches to autonomy in bioetbics and moral philosophy. 
Second, I use cases in reproductive medicine involving women and men who have 
undergone infertility treatment to illustrate the importance of self-trust for autonomy, and 
how oppression can interfere with seIf:trust in ways that infubit autonomy. Third, r give 
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reasons for thinking that all autonomous behaviour is moral behaviour (in the sense that 
the agent is acting in accordance with a moral commitment) and hence, that self-trust can 
be the self-regarding attitude motivating such behaviour. ~ I explain why the 
self-trust that promotes our autonomy must be reliable most of the time, and must also be 
formed autonomously. [argue that the skills of trusting and distrusting ourselves well 
are necessary for autonomy because of the importance of self-knowledge for autonomous 
decision-making. In that final sectio~ I descnbe in more detail what I mean by 
"autonomy," and I defend a substantive account, that is, an account that places some 
restrictions on the kinds of beliefs, values, and desires on which an autonomous agent 
can act. 
2. Standard Versus Relational Theories of Autonomy: How the Former Patbologize the 
Non-Autonomous Subject 
Feminist critiques of traditional autonomy theory tend to characterize autonomy 
as individualistic. That characterization is not entirely fair, for many of the theories of 
autonomy in mainstream moral philosophy and bioethics acknowledge that autonomous 
behaviour is consistent with maintaining personal relationships (see, e.g., Beauchamp & 
Childress 1994, Dworkin (989). Those theories accept that autonomous agents may act 
on an interest to improve relations with others or to support the needs of others as wen as 
their own. What the standard theories do tail to recognize is the full extent to which 
social and political relations can im~ both negatively and positively, on one's ability 
to make autonomous decisions, whether or not those decisions benefit others or (merely) 
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oneself Hence~ those theories are not properly characterized as "relational" as I defined 
that characteristic of autonomy theories above. In this sectio~ I descnbe how the 
standard theories interpret the basic conditions for autonomy as well as the potential 
obstacles to those conditions. The theories in moral philosophy,. in particular, tend to 
assume that the sources of non-autonomous behaviour lie mainly in individual pathology 
and explicit coercion. Feminist relational theories, on the other hand, acknowledge 
oppression as a substantial threat to autonomy. Drawing on the relational theories 
mainly ofSusan Sherwin (1998) and Catriona Mackenzie (1999),. I explain how 
oppression poses that threat; and why, then, supportive social relations are needed for 
autonomy. 
Standard theorists of autonomy in bioethics and moral philosophy do not all agree 
on the conditions necessary for autonomy. Without presuming agreement among them, r 
construct a list of conditions that draws together their many contributions to 
contemporary autonomy theory. Broadly speaking, those conditions include that agents 
are able to make choices based on their own desires, beliefs,. and values,. that they can act 
on those choices, and that the desires and values informing their choices are 
unintluenced by forces "alien" to the self 
To be able to choose based on our own desires and values,. bioethicists argue that 
we must have Itdecisional capacit¥,." or "competence,." as well as an adequate 
understanding of our options (Beau champ &; Childress 1994; Faden &. Beauchamp 1986). 
We have decisionaI capacity if we are capable of understanding options and of evaluating 
them in light of our own belief and value systems. But to be in a position to exercise that 
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capacity,. we must be adequately informed. In settings where it is unlikely that we would 
have the relevant information ready at hand,. such as a health care setting.. it is important 
that someone disclose information about our options to us. Most bioethicists 
acknowledge that inadequate disclosure and poor communication by health care 
providers is a potential obstacle to understanding. They also tend to highlight the 
"limited knowledge bases" of some patients (see, e.g., Beauchamp &. Childress 1994, 
158). For many bioethicists, as well as mainstream moral philosophers, ignorance is a 
primary obstacle to autonomy:' 
Bioethicists tend not to specify which desires and values of our own should 
inform our choices. However, it cannot be that just any desires and values will do since 
some of them may conflict and some we may hold only fleetingly. An adequate theory of 
autonomy must explain, in particular, how we sort through incompatible desires, values, 
and beliefs when choosing autonomously. We do that. according to many moral 
philosophers, by reflecting on our desires and values at a "second-order level," and by 
acting on whichever desires and values we "identify with" at that level (Christman 1989, 
7; see, e.g., Dworkin 1989, Frankfurt 1989). Someone who acts on herfirst-orderdesires 
or values without identifYing with them,. or without willing them as her own, does not act 
autonomously. She is what Harry Frankfurt calls a "wanton": someone who is not 
concerned about "whether the desires that move [her] to act are desires by which [she] 
wants to be moved to act" (1989, 68). Wantonness, weakness ofwill, as well as 
brainwashing and post-hypnotic suggestion are the main obstacles to identification 
according to standard theories of autonomy in mon! philosophy. 
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Some moral philosophers,. such as Young (1989) and Meyers (1989), argue that it 
is crucial for autonomy that the subject decide in accordance with a "life plan. IfS 
Autonomy is about self-direction,. but we cannot be self-directed unless some sort of plan 
is guiding our action. 6 What should explain,. in part, why we identifY with certain desires 
and values is that those desires and values further our life plan. Meyers explains that life 
plans conducive to autonomy can be continually under revision and ill-defined with 
respect to some areas of the person's life (1989, 49). YOUJl& on the other hand, argues 
that to have the type of plan needed for autonomy, the agent must have brought "the 
entire course of his life into a unified order" (1989, 78).1 Young labels a person 
"anomic" who falls to organize his life and the maxims guiding his behaviour in a unified 
way. 
It is not sufficient for autonomy,. however, that we are in a position to make 
choices that reflect our own life plans as well as beliefs and values with which we 
identitY. Another important condition is that we are free to act on the choices we make,. 
as opposed to choices made for us by others. Thus, moral philosophers acknowledge that 
coercion,. for example, is an obstacle to autonomy (see, e.g, Dworkin 1989,61), and 
bioethicists emphasize that an important condition for autonomy is "voluntariness" (e.g.,. 
8eaucbamp and Childress 1994; Faden & 8eauchamp 1986). The latter rightly insist that 
patientst decisions must be voluntaIy, meaning free of coercion and manipulation. 
However, bioethicists tend to define coercion so narrowly that it includes only explicit 
forms of coercion which are directed "toward (or away from} one of [the patients} 
options" (SheIWin 1998,. 26). They, along with most moral pbilosoph~ do not 
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acknowledge that coercion can. be more subtle and have a broader tar~ such as the 
patient's appreciation for her own competence in making decisions. One would have to 
conclude, on most of the standard theories, that the patient who is influenced by social 
norms and stereotypes that cballenge her decisional capacity is not coerced; she is simply 
weak-willed. 
Undermining a person's appreciation for her decisional capacity often amounts to 
coercion for the following reason. Coercion occurs, as Richmond CampbeU explains, 
"when I so manipulate your circumstances that you have fewer options than before, and 
the best of them, X, which is what I want you to do, is one you would not have chosen in 
the prethreat situation" (1998, 185). If! so manipulate you that you do not feel capable 
of making many decisions on your own, then the best option for you will probably be to 
defer to my authority. Doing otherwise confidently is no (onger an option, and therefore, 
in an important sense, your options have decreased. I have coerced you if deferring to 
me or if what I choose on your behalf is not what you would have chosen in the 
"prethreat situation." The ''lIt in that scenario can be the entire institutional structure of a 
society and the social norms and stereotypes embedded within it. There does not have to 
be a conscio~ dehberate agent doing the coercion. 
A third broad condition for autonomy appears in the work of some moral 
philosophers, namely Young (1989) and John Christman (1989, 1991). They argue that 
the manner in which the goals and second-order desires and values of agents are formed 
is also relevant to whether those agents are autonomous. Young, for example,. argues 
that the path to autonomy lies in becoming aware ofwbatever forces might be 
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influencing one's second-order desires and values in ways that make them alien to the 
self (82, 83). He focuses almost exclusively on forces of alienation that are rooted in the 
self, such as neuroses and self-deception. 
Standard theories of autonomy in bioethics and moral philosophy have 
contrIbuted greatly to our understanding of autonomy; yet at the same time, they have 
misled us about what the primary obstacles are to autonomous behaviour. [agree that all 
of the conditions above are necessary for autonomy, but disagree that more often than 
not, their absence can be explained by some pathology or weakness of the agent. For 
most moral philosophers, the paradigms of the heteronomous subject are "the neurotic," 
"the anomic, If and "the wanton." They pathologize that subject by depicting her as 
pathologically weak-willed, self-deceived, or simply pathological. Moreover, they 
reinforce that impression by narrowly defining the external sources of heteronomy and 
restricting them, beyond cases of explicit coercion, to such unusual cases as 
brainwashing and post-hypnotic suggestion. Bioethicists also give a narrow description 
of those sources, although they do often blame physicians for limiting the autonomy of 
patients. The external barriers to autonomy which they ignore, along with most moral 
philosophers, are oppressive and abusive social environments. 
Any adequate theory of autonomy must account for the ways in which oppression 
and abuse can interfere with the various conditions necessary for autonomy. Some 
feminist theorists of relational autonomy, such as Sherwin (1998) and MacKenzie 
(1999), explain how oppression can form a barrier to each of those conditions. First of 
all, it can infnbitthe ability of agents to choose wen by hinderingtbe development of the 
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skills they need to make choices in light of their own beIiefs~ values,. and life goals. As 
Meyers explains, autonomy demands a set ofwcoordinated skills," including the skills of 
"discem[ing] the import offelt selt:referential responses [i.e.,. one's attraction or 
repulsion to different options]," and of resisting unwanted pressure from others (1989,. 
81,. 84). The formation of such autonomy skills can be blocked or delayed because of the 
influence of oppressive stereotypes that target the (in)competence or worth of members 
of oppressed groups. One such stereotype is the "inferiority of women's autonomy" 
(Meyers 1989, 142). As Meyers emphasizes, a stereotype of women in most patriarchal 
cultures is that they are dependent on the approval of others and are disinclined to make 
choices that further their own interests. S But women whose behaviour fits that stereotype 
are not inherently non-autonomous; many of them have been taught to "over-identifY 
with others' interests and to neglect their own" (Meyers 1989, 143). Some may not even 
have learned how to discern what their own interests are by evaluating their 
"selt:referential responses. W Standard theorists of autonomy seem to assume that such 
skills of discernment and reflection are innate. That may be true of them to some degree, 
but it is also true that they can be enhanced or diminished depending on the subject's 
social environment (Meyers 1989). In. cultures that promote sexist stereotypes about 
women's diminished capacity for autonomy, women have less opportunity than men to 
fully develop those skills. 
Oppression is also a factor at the level at which choices are made because it can 
ensure that members of oppressed groups are not situated to choose as well as members 
of privileged groups, having less of the information they need to make autonomous 
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choices. Sherwin makes that point in the context of health care delivery, where the 
information available to patients is limited to whatever research has been conducted and, 
ofte~ to whatever individual health care providers can imagine is relevant to their 
patients (1998, 27). However, rarely does medical research cover gender-differences~ for 
example, in the manifestation, prevalence, and treatment of different illnesses, for (to 
make matters worse for women) that research is often performed primarily on subjects 
who are male (Baylis, Downie, Sherwin 1998,238). Consequently, the information 
derived through medical research does not put women in as good a position as men to 
choose autonomously in many health care contexts. 
Furthermore, patients depend on individual providers to inform them of the 
benefits and harms associated with different procedures; and yet, often, what constitutes 
a harm or a benefit is relative to one's social position. The social positioning, in 
particular of patients who experience multiple forms of oppression (such as racism, 
poverty, and ableism) tends to differ dramatically from that of health care providers 
(Sherwin 1998, 27). Their difference in standpoint may pose a barrier to effective 
communication, and, ultimately, to patients' receiving the information they need to make 
decisions that further their own goals and interests. 
Secondly, oppression can interfere at the level of the agent's ability to act on the 
choices she makes. When the relevant choices oppose her oppression, she may lack the 
courage to act on them or have lingering desires, with which she does not fully identify, 
that conflict with those choices. For example, like most other women, she may have 
been taught to believe that a wollUlll's greatest asset is her looks. After years of going to 
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great lengths to conform to society's beauty standards for women, she decides to throw 
out her hot-rollers~ her drawer full of make-up, and cancel next weeICs appointment for a 
facial and waxing. She is sick of spending so much of her time trying to make herself 
look beautiful. But soon she starts to regret her decision, 9 not because she questions that 
it is the right decision, but because of the rewards that she is giving up, which tor her 
include greater respect and attention at work by those who have some control over the 
advancement of her career. There~ she is in a double bind situation, where the likely 
consequences of choosing either of her options (of conforming or not conforming) are 
harmful (Morgan 1991). Since oppressed people tend to find themselves in those kinds 
of situations disproportionately relative to the privIleged (Frye (983), it is more common 
for them to confront barriers to their ability to act on their choices. 
Oppression can interfere with that abIlity not only through double binds, but also 
by ensuring that whatever option would maximize one's desires or interests does not even 
exist. The autonomy of marginaIized groups in health care contexts may be limited, as 
Sherwin notes, because the option they might have preferred is "prematurely excluded" 
(1998, 26). Usually that is the case for lesbian women, for example~ who might choose a 
high.-tech means of assisted reproduction to have a genetically related child if they had 
that optiOn.l0 It is more common for the oppressed than the privIleged to find themselves 
in that kind of position because the former are underrepresented on institutional bodies 
that make policy decisions about which options should be available to patients (Sherwin 
1998,27). 
Thirdly, oppression can shape the desires and goals of oppressed people in ways 
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that limit their autonomy (Mackenzie 1999; McLeod & Sherwin 1999). It does that by so 
influencing their self-concepts or identities that they adopt goals and values that further 
their own oppression. For example, a woman who is infertile may have learned to 
identify so strongly with pregnancy and motherhood that she is willing to do whatever it 
takes to get pregnant, even subjecting herself over a long period of time to infertility 
treatments which she finds emotionally and physically harmful Often oppression, along 
with abuse, encourages non-autonomous goals and values by diminishing self-respect and 
self-worth (Oillon 1992, 1997; Benson 1994). A person who is abused or oppressed may 
feel that she is not worthy of respectful treatment, and the life goals, desires, and values 
with which she identifies will reflect that self-conception. But to say that she suffers 
from some pathology would be disrespectful, for it implies that the fault lies within her. 
m her case, a social pathology, rather than an individual pathology, is interfering with the 
formation of her desires, values, and goals. 
Thus, oppression is a potential barrier to each of the conditions necessary for 
autonomy. However, as Sherwin emphasizes, the actual barrier it poses to each 
oppressed person will vary significantly (1998, 37, 38). Not everyone who is oppressed 
internalizes oppressive norms or is denied any opportunity to develop autonomy skills. 
Some oppressed people (e.g., some black or aboriginal people) live in proud and 
culturally Vibrant communities that tend to foster autonomy skills in their members. 
Unfortunately, rarely do women have such communities of their own (Bartky 1990, 25), 
though often they come close to creating them by establishing various kinds of women's 
groups. Furthermore" some women are situated in overlapping spheres of oppression and 
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privilege, and consequently. they experience some of the ways in which privilege can 
enhance autonomy. For example. a woman with middle-class privilege may have the 
opportunity to strengthen her capacities for understanding and critical reflection by 
receiving an excellent education. But even privilege is not an unqualified good in the 
domain of autonomy. The formation of the values and beliefs of that middle-class 
woman may be influenced by the forces of cIassism or racism, which she might regard as 
alien to her. 
To review this section, [ have criticized standard theories of autonomy for 
pathologizing people who lack autonomy by ignoring how their choices and actions may 
be profoundly influenced by oppression or abuse. Nonetheless, [ have endorsed the 
conditions for autonomy outlined in those theories. Near the end. [ mentioned a further 
condition in stating that diminished self-worth and se[f:.respect can interfere with 
autonomy. Paul Senson (1994) and Robin Dillon (1992, 1991) have argued, respectively. 
that those forms of self-appreciation are essential for autonomy. Now having introduced 
those conditions, it is important to distinguish between what are called "substantive" as 
opposed to "procedural" dimensions of autonomy. 
Most of the conditions for autonomy [ attributed above to the standard theories 
are procedural. That means they require that the agent subject his beliefs, desires, or 
values to some procedure or method of evaluation, and that he act on whatever desires or 
values satisfy that procedure. Examples are that the agent reflect on his desires and 
values at a second-order level and that he determine whether any alienating forces 
influenced that act of reflection. Theories of autonomy that are purely procedural do not 
160 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
require for autonomy that the agent believe or value anything specific to be autonomous. 
They are, as Benson puts it, "content-neutral" (1994,653). 
Most standard theories of autonomy endorse neutrality specifically with respect to 
the normative content of our mental attitudes. Few put any restrictions either on what 
many would regard as factual content (Benson 1994,653). BioethicaI theories are an 
exception, for they emphasize the condition of understanding, which limits what patients 
can believe about the nature of their options if they are to choose autonomously. That 
condition is "substantive," for it restricts the content of the beliefs of an autonomous 
agent It means that if her beliefs about her options,. specifically, do not accurately 
represent the nature of her options, then she is not choosing autonomously. Oillon and 
Benson argue for substantive restrictions on what autonomous agents can believe and 
value about themselves. They contend, and I agree, that to be autonomous~ one must 
respect oneself and have a positive conception of ones own worth. II 
3. Oppression-Related and Paralytic Self-distrust: The Context of Infertility Treatment 
The various ways in which oppression can impact negatively on women's 
autonomy are present in the context of modem infertility treatment.. Although 
proponents of the new technologies in that area claim that they enhance the autonomy of 
some women (and some men) by offering them choices that have hitherto been 
unavailable (e.g., Robertson 1994), many feminists have shown the weaknesses in their 
arguments. For example, Laura Sbanner (1996) andKathryn Pauly Morgan(1989) 
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contest that position by highlighting social norms,. such as the norms of pronatalism,. that 
make it extremely difficult for women to refuse a technology such as in vitro fertilization 
(IVF) when they discover that they are infertile. Such norms and other mechanisms of 
oppression can prevent wome~ as well as m~ who experience infertility from trusting 
themselves to make autonomous decisions about the use of those technologies. Drawing 
on examples from accounts of the experiences of women and men with assisted forms of 
reproduction (IVF. in particular). I shall now explain why self-distrust is an obstacle to 
autonomy that is often tied to oppression. 
Self-distrust can occur at all three of the levels at which oppression can interfere 
with autonomy: agents can distrust that they will choose well or that they will act on the 
choices they make. and they can distrust their judgment about which values. beliefs. or 
desires should inform their choices. To trust that they will choose well, they must be 
able to rely on their skills in making choices. rely on the information they use to make 
choices. and also trust the sources of that information. It is difficult for people who are 
oppressed or abused to rely on their autonomy skills if oppression or abuse has interfered 
with their development. But even if they have acquired those skills in the face of 
oppression or abuse, they stilI might feel pessimistic about their ability to choose 
autonomously because of what society or an abuser has taught them to expect about their 
own abilities. Even though they might have been successful in the past in making good 
decisions, for instance, they might interpret most of those successes as flukes, and 
suspect that, at any moment, someone will expose them as a fake. 
However,. a person need not feel "like a take .. " or distrust herself in every domain 
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as a result of oppression or abuse. Distrust in one's own ability to choose well can be 
domain-specific if that self-distrust is motivated by emotional abuse or oppressive 
stereotypes that target specific competencies. For example. uneducated people are often 
stereotyped as incompetent in making decisions that involve abstract reasoning about 
intellectual moral issues. but not in deciding how to treat others respectfully or how to 
care properly for those who are close to them. Alternatively ~ the stereotypes that 
engender domain-specific self-distrust may target not the (in)competency of a particular 
group, but the expertise of another. Physicians, for example, tend to be stereotyped 
(positively from their perspective) as wise and thoughtful decision-makers on all kinds of 
health care matters, including those that are not primarily medical. A patient who is 
given the choice of seeking IVF may distrust her own ability to choose well while in the 
company of a physician, whom she may feel is more qualified than her to make the 
decision. 
Sometimes self-distrust is appropriate, but where it is not and it persi~ it forms 
a barrier to autonomy. It is sometimes appropriate, for example, to distrust onets ability 
to choose well in domains where one has frequently made bad decisions in the past. 
However, people who cannot trust themselves to choose well in a variety of domains can 
be paralyzed from choosing on their own at all. They may avoid making choices as much 
as poSSIble and/or simply defer to the judgment of others. As Govier writes~ "[wJith the 
self in default, something else would take over. Perhaps one would be governed by 
others-a parent, husband, orcbarismatic leader' (1993, 10&). The other may govern 
benevolently or simply manipulate the self-distrustfuI person to fuIfill the others desires. 
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The manipulation would be easy since the one who is seIf-distrustful prefers not to 
choose on his own anyway. 
A1so~ to trust that one will choose well, one has to be able to rely on the 
information one has received that is relevant to one's choice and also trust the source of 
that information. In the context of infertility treatment it is difficult to rely on the 
relevant information since it is often vague or incomplete. Many forms of assisted 
reproduction are still experimental in nature and so the risks associated with them are 
largely unknown. As Lama Sbanner observes~ it is common for women who undergo 
IVF to feel that their physicians could not provide them with "good evidence or straight 
answers to [their} questions about [their} risks for cancer or other complications in the 
future" (1996~ 130). Concerns about cancer,. for example,. arise in connection with the 
drugs used to suppress or stimulate ovuIatio~ and they extend to the health of the 
potential chilci l2 
Physicians in IVF clinics also sometimes refuse to give straight answers about 
success rates. There has been much controversy about that issue recently in C~ 
where most clinics do not publicize their own live birth rates. ~ they quote 
universal data to patients about the success of the procedure globally or within Canada 
specifically. Such information is misleading since the success rates in Canada are often 
much lower than. in the United States,. for example,. and they can vary substantially 
among Canadian clinics. t3 
Lastly~ in the context oflVF,. patients are not always adequately informed about 
what an "emotional roller-coaster' IVF can be,. especially for the woman who undergoes 
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frequent hormone injections,. invasive physical exams,. and who can be "cancelled" 14 from 
the program at any moment for "failing" to owIate or because the embryos do not 
implant in her uterus. IS One woman quoted recently by the media in Canada said that "it 
was like going to a used-car dealership. You had no idea what you were getting into" 
(Globe & Mail. May 22. 1999. A9). Some, but not all,16 clinics have counsellors on hand 
who could descnbe the emotional aspects of the treatment and provide some emotional 
support wfule the treatment is ongoing. However. as employees of the clinics 
themselves, those counsellors have dual loyalties (to patients and to physicians); and that 
likely compromises their relationships with patients. Understandably, many patients may 
feel uncomfortable expressing concerns about what kind of treatment they will receive or 
are receiving to counsellors who have some allegiance to the program's physicians. 
Some patients may find it difficult to rely on the information they receive about 
assisted reproductive services because they lack trust in the providers of those services. 
Their distrust may be related, moreover, to their own socio-politicaI position. For 
example, a black woman, or black couple,. in North America may find it difficult to trust 
health care providers to perform expeiimental procedures because of the temble histoty 
of black people serving as research subjects without their consent in atrocious medical 
experiments. As Rayna Rapp explains, many black people are all too aware of that 
history, for experiments such as the infamous Tuskeegee syphilis experiment was and 
still is "widely reported in Black-focused media" (199g, 147). The media coverage 
makes it even more likely that black patients will be distrusting in the context of 
infertility treatment,. given that much of that treatment is experimental. 17 
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If, for whatever reaso~ patients cannot rely on information about assisted 
reproductive services .. but they trust a decision to use those services nonetheless .. their 
decision may not be fUlly autonomous. As I have mentione~ not all forms of 
self-distrust are detrimental to autonomy .. and sinnlarly .. not all forms of selt:trust 
promote autonomy. Autonomous choices are meant to further our own values and 
interests .. but choices with many unexpected consequences can have the opposite effect, 
that of subverting our values and interests. Granted, there are times when we value 
making a choice merely for its own sake, in which case the consequences of it are 
irrelevant to whether the choice is autonomous. But usually we make choices for the 
sake of achieving a certain outcome .. which is true in the case of infertility treatment, 
where the desired outcome is a (genetically related) chIld. 
However, the consequences relevant to whether a choice in favour ofIVF is 
autonomous may not only be the probable outcome of the procedure. There is a limit to 
what many patients are willing to go through to achieve the goal of having a child of 
"their own." In other words, many do not have the mindset of doing "whatever it takes." 
For example, it is not clear that Joanne was willing to go as far as lVF took her to have a 
child who is genetically related to her. She trusted her decision to undergo IVF knowing 
that doing so would be difficult emotionally, but she assumed that she could cope 
because she had been successful in coping with many difficult situations in the past 
(Williams 1989, 136). However, she never expected IVF to be as difficult as it was: 
It was so bad,. so stressful And I consider myself pretty good at coping 
with things usually. But at one point .•• honest to God! almost packed up 
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and left. I thought, 'I cannot stand this another second' It was like a time 
capsule of all of your expectations and all of your stress just jam packed 
into five days or six days or whatever it was. And you never got any relief 
from it 18 
It may be that Joanne simply underestimated her ability to cope or she was never 
informed properly about how emotionally draining an IVF cycle can be. Either way~ her 
choice might not have been fully autonomous,. since she suffered extreme and 
unexpected consequences,. which undermined the value she probably placed in her own 
well-being. 
When Joanne "almost packed up and le~" she may have decided that quitting the 
program was the best decision for her; but she did not act on that decision because she 
could not trust herself to do so. Trusting oneself to act on one's choices is also crucial for 
autonomy, and in the context oflVF and other reproductive technologies, there are 
factors relating to women's oppression that can inlubit that trust. 19 As Morgan explains, 
we live in a culture of"obligatory fertility" for women (1989, 70)~20 where women who 
are infertile are "diseasedlt and those who choose to be childless are selfish or crazy. 21 
Feminists who argue that technologies such as IVF limit women's choices point to the 
ease with which they allow others to judge women who are infertile but who choose not 
to have or not to continue with infertility treatment (Royal Commission 1992, 37). When 
women stop the treatment or choose not to start it, they are susceptible to the criticism 
that their infertility is their own fault, and thus, to the stigma of"voluntary childlessness" 
(Shanner 1996, 131). Worry over that stigma might partly explain Loists behaviour after 
discovering that she- had been cancelled from an lVF program because she- had ovulated 
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before her ova could be retrieved: 
... I remember getting in the car and crying all the way home. fm never 
going back there. They've had enough£ fm not a guinea pig any moret 
(she laughs nervously) And I was just ... fd had it. I thought-this is it. 
Pm not doing this again. But about two days afterwards it was,. okay, let's 
go back in (she laughs) (WiIliams 1989~ 130). 
If one views her choice to It go back in" without reflecting on the social context of it one 
might assume that she is masochistic and,. perhaps, even schizophrenic. But a more 
charitable interpretation in light of that context is that Lois cannot trust herself to act on a 
decision to end her infertIlity treatment since not only might that make her childless, it 
would imply that she chose to be that way. 
Patients who are undergoing infertility treatment might distrust themselves to act 
on or to voice decisions about how their treatment should proceed. They might fear that 
if they go against their physicians' recommendations or object to the way that their 
physicians are performing procedures, they wm be labelled "noncompliant" and 
uncooperative, and, as a result, will lose the support of their care-providers. Recall the 
case of Lee from the fntroduction. She strongly objected to what was happening to her 
during the hysteroscopy, but getting off of the operating table and leaving the room 
would have given her providers further reason for viewing her as a "problem" patient. 
Women or men might distrust themselves to act on a choice to enter an infertility 
program if they are aware of some of the complexities surrounding that choice, such as 
the way in which it might reinforce the social perception of women as chiIdbearers or the 
notion of infertiIi1y as a disease. They might be aware of the restricted access of 
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procedures~ such as IVF~ to couples who can afford it and sometimes to women who are 
heterosexual or married. Also, they may realize that many disadvantaged women in 
North America and elsewhere do not even have access to basic reproductive health care 
services (Royal Commission 1992, 38, 39). OveraR they may understand, in other 
words, that a choice in favour of infertility treatment is not purely personal (Sherwin 
L992). It lends support to a certain stereotype of women as well as to an unfair 
distnbution of health care resources.22 However, despite what that choice implies, it is 
understandable why some people are drawn to it (Le., without presuming they are just 
selfish). All of their lives, they may have pictured having a child "of their own," and now 
they face continual reminders in the media and elsewhere about how empty their lives 
must be without children. They may trust that a decision to have infertIlity treatment is 
the right decision for them because of the pain of childlessness they are enduring; yet still 
they may have lingering desires to avoid perpetuating social injustice. 
The double binds of infertility in a pronatalist and high-tech culture can promote 
self-distrust at the level of one's judgment about the beliefs~ values, and desires 
influencing one's choices. Some women who are infertIle might question whether the 
strong need they feel to have a genetically-related child is autonomous because of its 
obvious connection to pronatalist norms and the gender sociaIization of women. They 
might question a desire to enter an infertility program. because ofhowtbat decision might 
further their own oppression, especially given the severe emotional and physical stress it 
might entaIl. Lois's sudden reversal in her position about further IVF treatment could be 
explained by distrust in her ownjudgment about which of her desires or values should 
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inform that position. 
During infertility treatment, distrust at the level of one's judgment can also arise 
as a result of feeling objectified. Frequently having your body exposed and prodded by 
people unknown to you can easily cause such feelings. Lee connected her own 
objectification with feelings of confusion and uncertainty about what she needed and 
deserved The more objectified she felt, the more confused she became. Such a 
response is explicable on an understanding of objectification as a form of "psychic 
alienatio~" or "estrangement...of a person from some of the essential attnbutes of 
personbood" (Bartky 1990, 30). It causes such estrangement., as Sandra Lee 8artky 
explains, by reducing a person to the status of parts of her that are inessential to her 
personbood, such as her sexual or reproductive parts (Bartky 26). [t makes sense that 
feeling separated from what makes one a person would result in confusion about whether 
one truly deserves to have one's opinions heard and to be treated respectfully. 
Patients may be confused and distrust their judgment about whether feelings of 
objectification are even justified because of forces in our culture that normalize the kinds 
of medical interventions which they find objectifYing. They may feel that the 
interventions treat women as mere "reproductive vessels:' but at the same time, they 
know that it is "normal" for women to undergo such treatment Consider Steven 
Mentors response when his partner had her ova removed during an IVF cycle: 
... all of a sudden fIn in the Twilight Zone. It's not a hospital, it's 
a. .. garage! And my wife is the car and these are the grease monkeys, 
down to the bad radio blaring and the power tools. I feel a surge of anger 
at this; how could they treat my wife's body as nit were a machine? Then 
170 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
I waver-no; ifs just that they've done this so many times it is mechanical 
for them. It shows confidence~ not disrespect. After aI4 rm in their shop 
(1998,68). 
Mentor here seems influenced as well by sexist norms that physicians who are 
over-confident-that is, who display masculine characteristics of strength and certainty 
regarding their behaviour-are more reliable than physicians who are more hesitant or 
cautious (see Chapter 4, and Jones 1996, 21). Those nonns, along with societaI 
expectations about what is "normal" for the treatment of women in modem reproductive 
medicine, can influence patients' values and beliefs to the point that they seem alien to 
the self. 
Lastly. patients may distrust their judgment in the context of infertility treatment 
because of the inherent complexity of some of the decisions they may have to make. For 
example, they might be faced with the decision to continue taking so-called "fertility" 
drugs (Le., ovulation-induction agents)~ to try ovarian hyper-stimuIation, Z3 or to go with 
something "more bigh-tech," such as IVF. They also might have the option oflVF 
coupled with rCSI (intra-cytoplasmic spermatozoa injection), where sperm are injected 
right into the ova with the goal of improving the chances of fertilization. With each of 
those options, the likelihood of conception increases, but so does the financial cost, along 
with the banns and potential health risks. Given the difficulty of weighing those risks, 
the costs, and the success rates of the different procedures, patients may distrust their 
own judgment about which decision is best for them. They may trust their 
decision-mamg skills and the information they have received, but find that the decision 
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itself is so complex that it leaves them utterly confused. Consequently,. they may pick up 
on any suggestion made by their physician about what they should do, and go with that 
suggestion. Their inclination to defer to the judgment of their physician because they 
distrust their own judgment may prevent them from making an autonomous choice-that 
is, a choice based on their own life goals and values, rather than the values of their 
physician. 
Thus, in the context of infertility treatment, barriers such as oppression-related 
double binds and inadequate information can cause patients to distrust that they will 
choose and act autonomously. Although some of those barriers,. such as inadequate 
informatio~ can exist in other medical contexts as well, the context of reproductive 
medicine is unique overall in posing barriers to women's self-trust that are related to their 
oppressed reproductive roles. Women contemplating infertility treatment have to weigh 
their options not only in light of inadequate information but also in light of complex 
pronataIist norms and expectations that tend to reinforce sexist oppression. Those 
barriers can engender self-distrust that is so severe it paralyzes the patient or forces her to 
defer to others. Self-distrust of that sort is a serious threat to autonomy. 
Not all of the ways in which patients might distrust themselves in infertility 
contexts threaten their autonomy,. however. They might distrust that a choice to undergo 
lVF is consistent with their moral values,. and worry legitimately that acting on that 
choice might subvert their values. They may hold values in favour of sociaIjustice but 
also value the rights of individuals to pursue,. within limits,. what is most dear to them,. 
which, in their case,. is the opportunity to have a child genetically related to them. They 
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may be uncertain about what all of their values together dictate about infertility 
treatmen~ and, therefore, distrust that whatever choice they make would further their 
moral commitments. 
Thus, self-distrust poses a potential threat to autonomy. but not necessarily an 
actual threat to it. That point does not establish, however, that self-trust is important for 
autonomy, for someone could lack self-distrust and yet not be self-trusting. As I have 
argued, following Karen Jones, trust and distrust are contraries, not contradictories 
(Chapter 2, Section 4), which means that someone could be merely indifferent toward his 
own trustworthiness. But an autonomous agent must be more than just indifferent 
toward his own competence and commitment to make decisions reflecting his own 
values and interests; he must be optimistic in that regard. Ifhe did not care about 
whether he was capable and motivated to choose and act in accordance with his own 
values, he would lack the will to be autonomous. [t would not matter to him ifhis 
choices were informed by the values of others instead. Thus, to be autonomous, an agent 
must have some self-~ of some sort. 
But why should "self-trust" be the self-regarding attitude that descnbes our will to 
be autonomous? And, furthermore, if it is the relevant attitude there, and if I am right 
that it is a moral attitude towards the sel( then does that not imply that all autonomous 
decisions should have a moral dimension? But can we not choose and act autonomously 
in spheres that are non-moral? 
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4. The Moral Dimension of Autonomy 
In this sectio~ I claim, in opposition to Meyers specifically (1989), that there is a 
moral aspect to all autonomous decisions, which means that selt:trust can be the self-
regarding attitude motivating us to be autonomous. In choosing and acting 
autonomously, we strive to meet moral responsibilities to the sel( to others, or to both 
the self and others. We are optimistic that we will fuIfill those responstbilities when we 
trust owselves to choose well, to act on our choices, and when we trust our judgment 
about the values, beliefs, and desires informing those choices. 
Meyers acknowledges the importance of having the will to act autonomously in 
her autonomy theory. She argues that two "volitional modes" are necessary for 
autonomy: resistance to "unwarranted pressure" from others, and resolve, which "is a 
person's determination to act on his or her own judgments" (1989, 83). The resolve 
criterion overlaps with my criterion of trusting oneself to act on one's choices. Resolve 
and selt:trust are not identical attitudes, however. One can resolve to do something that 
has no moral significance (e.g., becoming good at playing at nintendo) whereas one does 
not trust oneself to do something unless it has a moral dimension. 
But does acting autonomously always involve acting on a moral commitment? 
Meyers says no. She urges that the category of "personal autonomy" encompasses a 
wider range of behaviour than "moral autonomy" (1989, 13-19), where the latter refers~ 
roughly, to selt:regulating beflaviour consistent with the agents own "moral sense" of her 
responsibilities or obligations (Meyers 1987). According to Meyers~ some autonomous 
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decisions are purely personal; she claims that is true ordinarily of the choice of someone 
as one's spouse,. for example (1989, (5). However,. on MeyeIS' account,. no one type of 
decision is always purely personal. She writes that whether one chooses a particular 
person as one's spouse becomes a moral matter if "one has actively [and voluntarily] 
encouraged a suitor to think that his or her love is returned and that a proposal of 
marriage would be accepted" (1989, 15). It becomes a moral matter, the~ when refusing 
might violate ones duties to the other person. As Meyers' argues, the kinds of personal 
decisions we can make without violating our moral autonomy are limited by the class of 
actions we deem to be morally permissible. In other words, our moral autonomy 
determines the "outer bounds" of our personal autonomy (Meyers 1989, (4). 
It is conceivable, generally, that the boundaries to personal autonomy dictated by 
one's moral sense are not substantive boundaries. They would have to be substantive if 
being morally autonomous required that we conceive of our moral responstbilities in 
specific ways. It is possible,. however,. that moral autonomy is purely procedural. In 
other words, there might be only procedural restrictions on what our moral sense can 
dictate,. such as the Kantian restriction that the rules governing our behaviour be 
universalizable-that is~ applicable to any agent in relevantly similar circumstances 
(Meyers 1989,. (3). There, as long as we successfully follow the procedure of 
universalizing what we conceive to be our moral duties,. those duties are,. in fact, moral; 
and we are morally autonomous in living up to them. 
A purely procedural theory of moral autonomy,. although conceivable,. is 
unconvincing. As Meyers comments,. horrendous types of behaviour could satisfY most 
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procedural restrictions. For example, someone could, as Meyers puts it,. "sincerely 
universalizethe most despicable practices" (1987, 150).24 Thus, in herview~ a theory of 
moral autonomy must place some substantive limits on what counts as moral behaviour, 
or as a moral attitude.25 I have endorsed such a limit in arguing that autonomous agents 
must appreciate their own. moral worth. 
Meyers herself formally accepts the substantive restriction that moral 
responstbilities to the self should guide our behaviour (1989, 17; 1987, 152); however, 
many of the examples she gives of choices that are meant to be "purely personal" concern 
whether we are fWfilling those respollSlbilities. Once we acknowledge duties to the self, 
it is hard to imagine~ for instance~ why a choice of someone as one's spouse would not 
ordinarily have a moral dimension. There are instances where that choice is purely 
personal, but surely those instances are atypical. The moral dimensions of choosing a 
spouse are only mooted in situations where one has to choose between two people as 
one's spouse and either choice would fuIfill one's respoDSlbilities to oneself and to them. 
Normally it is not a moot issue, however, whether in choosing someone as one's spouse, 
one is being "true to [oneselfJ-[to one's} own needs and desires" (1987, (52). That is 
how Meyers interprets the way in which we are morally respoDSlble to ourselves.26 On 
that description, it is difficult to see why many of her examples fall outside of the realm 
of moral autonomy. Take the struggle of"lbserrs Nora ... to break out of her husband's 
stifling emotional grip and also out of her societYs hold on her apprehension of her 
proper role" (Meyers 1989, 19). Surely, Nom is moraDyobligated to be more attentive to 
her own needs and desires, rather than focused predominantly on the needs and 
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expectations of others. Standing up for what one values and desires is what it means to 
be appreciative of one's own moral worth. 
There are decisions that fall into the realm of the purely personal, but, I suspect, 
that realm is not as vast as Meyers suggests. [disagree with her not only about the 
breadth of that reaIm, but also about whether it is relevant to ask of choices occupying it 
whether they are autonomous. True, there are some purely personal choices, meaning 
choices that do not entail any responstbility for doing the right or the wrong thing. That 
is the case, ordinarily, with the decision to wear a skirt to work, for example, or with the 
decision to have spaghetti for dinner. Meyers is right, though, that no one type of 
decision is always personal. Choosing a skirt could have moral implications if one 
worked in a sexist environment where women are expected to wear skirts, and where 
wearing pants would be an act of defiance against sexism. But where the choice to wear 
a skirt is purely personal, the question of whether r am autonomous in making that choice 
seems entirely out of place. Am r autonomous in trying on a pair of pants at the mall, in 
stopping at the corner store to buy a newspaper, or in spending this Saturday with my 
friend Ariella? It is odd to speak of autonomy in those contexts because of where the 
value of autonomy lies. It is valuable, as I have claimed, because of its emancipatory 
potential and because people who are autonomous live according to life plans that give 
their lives some purpose and direction. Iftbat is why autonomy is meaningful, then the 
term Itamonomy" should be reserved for non-trivial decisions, that is, for decisions that 
Will probably have a significant impact on the direction our lives take. A good example 
would be the decision to undergo infertility treatment.. 
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Meyers herself reserves discussion about autonomy for non-trivial matters~ but 
she does not acknowledge that the non-trivial decisions we make have implications for 
whether we are fidfilling our responsibilities to ourselves. Thus, formally, she sets up a 
distinction between personal and moral autonomy, but r think the distinction becomes 
blurred in her examples of personally autonomous, or personally non-autonomous, 
choices, all of which seem to have a moral component. Those examples tend to focus on 
situations where a person is not "living in harmony" with his "true self' (1989, 18, 19). 
Personal autonomy, on Meyer's theory~ is about achieving harmony between one's 
authentic self and one's life plan. To illustrate, she uses the example of a character from 
Frank Capm.' s Lost Horizons named Robert Conway, who "in terms of the appurtenances 
of self-interest as it is normally understood, ... lacks nothin& " but who feels that his life 
might be meaningless, nonetheless (1989, 19). As Meyers explains, "[h}is propensity for 
contemplation and his longing for a sense of unity with other people can find no outlet in 
his diplomatic career" (1989, 19). Because Conways "seIfand his overall life plan are in 
tension, " he is not fully autonomous, according to Meyers. 
r agree that Conway is not fully autonomous, but I believe the reason why is that 
he is not taking full moral responstbility for himself Meyers might assume that he is 
being responstble to himselfbecause he seems to have chosen a life path in which he is 
not degrading himself But whether that is true, exactly, depends on why Conway has 
remained in his diplomatic career. The explanation is that the career conforms with 
societal expectations ofhim as a member of a certain social class. As Conway himself 
says, he "[hasn\} the nerve to be anything else" (Meyers 1989, 4).. Surely that reveals 
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about Conway that he is not honouring his moral responsibilities to himself(at least not 
entirely). Rather than leading a life that conforms to what he values and desires~ he has 
allowed himself to be a pawn to upper-class society. [fbeing responsible to ourselves 
involves acting in accordance with our own values and goals~ then it must be a moral 
matter whether any serious tension exists between our selves and our life plans. People 
who experience intense and perpetual disharmony within themselves are not taking 
responstbility for themselves, or else, they are prevented from doing so. 
l agree with Meyers that autonomy involves "living in harmony with one's true 
self' if that means following a life plan that is consistent with what one truly desires as 
opposed to what society dictates that one should desire. Furthermore~ what one "truly 
desires" must reflect one's own moral wo~ since life plans that endorse one's own 
subjection are incompatIble with autonomy. Autonomy, then, requires that our life plans 
be our own, that they embody our wo~ and that we act in accordance with them. But 
meeting our respoDSlbilities to oUISelves~ or being "true to ourselves," as Meyers writes~ 
requires the same thing. Thus, I would argue that autonomy inevitably has a moral 
dimension, and it is appropriate that the self-regarding attitude motivating us to be 
autonomous is a moral attitude. In choosing and acting autonomously, we aim to fulfill 
certain moral respoDSlbilities, and to be motivated to do so, we need some self-trust. rT 
Note that there is an important implication for bioethics from my view that purely 
personal decisions are irrelevant to our autonomy. If autonomy and mere personal 
preference are ~ then the duty physicians have to respect our personal preferences 
is separate from their duty to respect our autonomy. They or anyone else could coerce us 
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in the realm of the purely personal: for example, a physician could intimidate us into 
deciding to wait another half an hour for our appointment, rather than head home instead, 
which is what we prefer to do. If the decision to stay is purely personal, then the 
physician has not violated our autonomy. StiI4 she may have violated her duty to respect 
our personal preferences.28 
5. The Value of Justified and Autonomous Self-Trust 
The cases about infertility treatment in section 3 illustrated the importance of 
having some self-trust for autonomy. However, not every kind of seIf-trust is conducive 
to choosing and acting autonomously, precisely because there are some substantive 
restrictions on autonomy. For example, when we trust ourselves to choose well but do 
not have adequate information about our options, our self-trust does not promote our 
autonomy_ In this section, I introduce a new substantive condition for autonomy, namely 
that agents have adequate self-knowledge. That condition requires that the trust they 
place in their ability to choose well and to act on their choices is justified. Furthermore, I 
argue that the self-trust needed for autonomy must be developed autonomously; and in 
defending that position, I claritY my own view of the nature of autonomy and of the 
conditions that promote it. 
There are at least two reasons why autonomous agents require some seIf-
knowledge. One is that they would not be self-directed otherwise. As I have ~ 
fonowing Young and Meyers, seIf-direction requires that we decide and act in 
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accordance with a life plan. Now it makes sense to say that a person could be guided by 
a plan, but profoundly mistaken about whether most of her decisions or actions conform 
to it-that is, about whether they are likely to advance the plan. But if she were so wrong 
about the likely consequences of her decisions or actions, would we still say that she is 
self-directed? Consider the following analogy. Would it be accurate to say that I am 
directing my canoe through a maze of rocks if my canoe were swerving all over and 
bashing into the rocks? [would have to be maneouvring it around the rocks to be 
directing it through the maze, would I not? If the canoe were swerving all over, one 
would say that I was unsuccessful in directing it, or that the canoe lacked direction. The 
term "direction" implies some actual movement towards a goal, as opposed to utter 
chaos. The person who is never able to actualize her plans is not directed toward 
anything; she is best descnbed as "lost," or lacking in direction. 
One is not seif-directed unless one causes one's life to move in the direction of 
certain goals. A person of privilege might succeed in achieving his life goals with a lot 
of help from others, but he lacks self-direction if most ofhis success is due to his 
privilege. If my canoe moves smoothly through a maze of rocks only because there are 
strong currents that take it through, then [ am not directing the canoe. If a privileged 
person uses very few of his own abilities to achieve his goals, then he is only minimally 
seIf-directed. Alternatively, ifhe receives help from others only in developing his 
abilities and in having some opportunity to exercise them, then he could be optimally 
seIf-ditected. Most abilities or competencies are not innate, and the fact that they are 
learned and fostered in certain kinds of social environments does not make them any less 
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authentic. 
Self-directio~ as r have defined it, demands some self-knowledge at the level at 
which choices are made, at the level at which we act on our choices, and at the level of 
judging whether the goals and values intluencing our choices are truly our own. Because 
"direction" implies actual movement towards a goal, it is important to be realistic in 
choosing how to meet our goals. For our choices to be realistic, they must reflect some 
knowledge of where our competencies lie. Furthermore, our expectations about whether 
we will act on those choices must be realistic. Those expectations must be grounded in 
some knowledge of how committed we are to our goals and whether we are competent to 
act on the decisions we make. Lastly, to be self-directed, our judgments about whether 
our goals have been set by us rather than by others must be informed by some knowledge 
of the accuracy of our judgments about where our goals originate. 
Our assumptions about ourselves and whether we are competent to meet our 
goals do not have to be completely accurate all of the time for us to be self-directed, or to 
be autonomous agents. Most of us have bad days when we make bad decisions that put 
us behind in meeting our goals; but usually, the~ we do not all of a sudden become 
non-autonomous. Assessments of our autonomy should refer to our behaviour over a 
significant length of time, rather than to a single point in time at which we might have 
committed a non-autonomous act Gran~ it is poSSIble that a single act with enormous 
consequences will have a negative impact on our autonomy. For example, Lee's decision 
to enter the kind of infertility program. she did was not fully autonomous because she 
lacked sufficient information about what she would experience during the program. The 
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decision compromised her autonomy because of the severe consequences she suffered 
(which included a diagnosis of Post-traumatic Stress Syndrome). Most of the time, 
however, people can maintain autonomy and act non-autonomously every once in a 
while. 
Moreover, people can be autonomous to varying degrees. Meyers distinguishes 
between minimally, medially, and fully autonomous agents based on the degree to which 
they possess the fullltrepertory't of autonomy skills (1989, 170). Roughly, a minimally 
autonomous agent is someone who '·possesses at least some disposition to consult his or 
her self and at least some ability to act on his or her own beliefs~ desires, and so forth," 
but whose autonomy skills, in general, are poorly developed (Meyers 1989, 170). I shall 
say that minimally autonomous agents must have the self-knowledge they need to trust 
themselves in a justified way to manifest their minimal ability to act on their own beliefs 
and desires. Fully autonomous agents, on the other band, that is, those who are fully 
skilled in choosing and acting autonomously, must have the self-knowledge needed to 
manifest those skills; otherwise, the fact that they are more skilled generally than others 
would make no difference to their level of autonomy in comparison to others. Medially 
autonomous agents, as Meyers writes, '·range along a spectrum between these two poleslt 
(1989, 170); the degree to which they know themselves &lIs somewhere in between the 
minimally and the fully autonomous agent. 
[ mentioned that there was another reason why self-knowledge is crucial for 
autonomy_ That reason concerns the substantive conditions for autonomy of self-worth 
and self-respect. To know whether we are deserving ofrespect or whether we possess 
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moral worth requires that we have some self-knowledge. The person who does not know 
whether she is respoDSlble for many of her accomplishments does not know whether to 
respect herself. The person who does not know whether she inherently possesses moral 
worth lacks a sense of self-worth. She therefore could not be autonomous, since 
self-worth and self-respect are essential for autonomy. 
If what we presume to know about ourselves reflects how competent and 
deserving we are only according to oppressive norms and stereotypes, then it is unlikely 
that we will develop self-respect or possess self-worth. Accurate attitudes toward the self 
are harder to come by when one's social identity is defined in terms of stereotypical 
norms. To be able to acquire such attitudes in those circumstances, one must be fairly 
successful in screening out distorting oppressive influences. However, achieving that 
success is extremely difficult without at least some informational resources at hand that 
expose the falsity of cultural assumptions perpetuating one's oppression. As I argued in 
chapter 4, seIt:knowledge is social, for it flourishes in conditions where there are some 
reliable external resources confirming or disconfirming the accuracy of our judgments 
about ourselves. Resources deemed "reliable," or "unreliable" must be assessed in terms 
of how often they target people's actual competencies, rather than in terms of the 
(in)competencies they supposedly possess according to oppressive social stereotypes. 
Thus, self-knowledge, defined against the background of a social world in which 
our-true competencies can manifest themselves, is essential for autonomy. It is a 
substantive condition for autonomy because it demands some accuracy in the beliefs and 
values about ourselves that inform our decisions. That condition explains why the 
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self-trust motivating us to be autonomous must be justified most of the time. It need not 
be well-grounded, for autonomy does not require perfect self-knowledge. Neither does it 
have to be justified all of the time, for autonomous agents can have lazy days when they 
make ill-considered decisions. What is required for autonomy is that our selt:trust is 
usually reliable~ meaning that it tends to be grounded in knowledge not only of the 
options available to us, but also of our competence and commitment to fuIfill certain 
moral responstbilities, such as our responsibility to ourselves to stand up for our own 
needs and values. 
Hence, it is crucial for autonomy that we have what I referred to in chapter 4 as 
"the skill of trusting oneself well" (Le., the skill to develop justified self-trusting 
attitudes), and that we are able to exercise that skill most of the time. That does not 
mean, however, that the skill of distrusting oneself well is trivial. To preserve our 
autonomy and self-direction, it is important in some situations that we distrust ourselves, 
at [east to some degree, if we lack the competence to choose wel1, to act on our choices, 
or where we simply lack reliable information about our options. But if we distrust 
ourselves most of the time, even in a justified way, we cannot be autonomous. As [ 
suggested in chapter 4, oppressed people often find themselves in situations where it is 
justified to be self-distrustful. The double binds of infertility make infertility treatment 
one of those situations for women. Even though, there, seIf-distrust may be justified, it 
interferes with their autonomy. It paralyzes women from choosing and acting in ways 
that promote their own interests. 
Thus, on my theory of autonomy and seIf-trust. people lack autonomy if they 
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cannot trust themselves in justified ways to further their own values and interests, either 
because their situation prohtbits that trust or because they lack se~knowledge. Here, I 
have emphasized that we cannot be autonomous if we are frequently mistaken or 
uncertain about our own worth or about our ability to achieve our ends. That view of 
autonomy differs substantially from the standard view in contemporary autonomy theory, 
and below, I clarify how it differs exactly. I explain that unlike the standard theories, I) 
my theory suggests that autonomy is about "being in a certain way,1t rather than merely 
about control (Wolf 1989); 2) it presupposes an autonomous self that is not presocial; 
and, 3) it demands that the processes forming our autonomous decisions be partly social 
in nature. 
Standard accounts of autonomy recommend certain procedures for the evaluation 
of our values and beliefs, where the aim of those procedures is to determine what the self 
truly values and believes in the absence of "alienating" influences.29 That 'tdeep seIf," as 
Susan Wolf calls it (1989), is a self that is not determined by anything outside of itself. 30 
As Meyers writes, It is "cleanse[d] of the stain ofsociaIization" (1989, 42). Furthermore, 
it is not a self that is necessarily correct in what it believes and values about itself. On 
the standard theories, autonomy is primarily about control (Wolf 1989); as long as we 
control which values and beliefs inform our choices and act on those choices, then we 
are autonomous~ no matter what the content is of our beliefs and values. 
But autonomy is not only about control. What Wolf writes about responsibility 
and freedom is also true of autonomy: "not all things necessary for freedom and 
re5pODSlbility must be types of power and control. We may need simply to be a certain 
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way~ even though it is not within our power to determine whether we are that way or not" 
(Wolf 1989, 144). The way we need to be, according to Wol( is "sane," which means 
that we have the ability to "cognitively and normatively recognize and appreciate the 
world for what it is" (1989, (45). In other words~ we must be able to distinguish between 
right and wrong and to perceive other aspects of the world clearly. For autonomy, I have 
argued, specifically, that we need to be able "to cognitively and normatively recognize 
and appreciate" ourselves for what we are, at least to a minimal extent. I have also 
claimed that we need to be able to manifest that skill most of the time. By contrast, Wolf 
argues that being respollSlble and free do not require that we exercise the ability she 
associates with sanity (1989, 150). 
On my theory of autonomy, the self cannot be profoundly mistaken about its own 
competencies and wo~ and neither can it be "deep." If we have self-knowledge and 
justified attitudes of self-trust and distrust, then some positive social feedback must be 
influencing our perception of ourselves. As I argued in chapter 4, the reason why the 
processes sustaining those attitudes must be partly social is that introspection alone is 
seriously limited as a means of gaining self-knowledge (Komblith 1998). Since 
self-trust grounded in our self-knowledge~ is crucial for autonomy, the processes 
responsible for our autonomous decisions must also be partly social Ye~ on most 
standard theories of autonomy, those processes are purely individual. They involve 
merely the introspection of our beliefs and values, or the introspection of their formation. 
An example is the procedure of determining whether we identifY with our beliefs and 
values. 
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Autonomy is not only about "being in a certain way" on my theory,. namely,. being 
someone whose mental attitudes accurately represent his own competencies and worth.. 
It is also about following certain procedures for the evaluation of one's beliefs and 
desires,. procedures that have a social component to them.. Autonomy must be partly 
procedural, since, presumably, someone could be forced to adopt the attitudes necessary 
for autonomy, in which case she would not be truly autonomous. To be autonomous, she 
must engage in the various processes I outlined in section 2 for evaluating her values and 
beliefs, and she must respond to social feedback while engaging in those processes. 
However, she cannot allow that feedback to dictate what she believes and values. She 
must be skilled enough to be able to perform on her own the procedures of evaluation 
necessary for autonomy. As Meyers urges, autonomy is a competency because of the 
skills it demands (1989). It is about being skilled in a certain way, not only about being 
in a certain way. 
Similarly, if someone has even well-grounded self-trust in her ability to make 
certain decisions and to act on those decisions, but the source of her self-trust is her 
deference to an admired and benevolent friend who tells her what to think about herseIt: 
then she lacks autonomy_ Thus, not only must the self-trust required for autonomy be 
justified, it must also be formed and sustained autonomously_ The relation between 
autonomy and self-trust, then, is symbiotic; autonomy is important for self-trust just as 
self-trust is important for autonomy. They feed off of one another, like some organisms 
who share ecosystems. Since relations can be symbiotic in nature, there is no reason to 
assume that symbiosis could not occur among different attitudes or states of persons. 
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Let me conclude by distinguishing briefly my view from Lehrer's of why 
autonomy is important for self-trust, and of what autonomy demands. fn his boo~ 
Self-Trust (1997), Lehrer claims that we must be autonomous if we are to be worthy of 
our trust in ourselves. There, he is referring to '~" specifically, in the reasonableness 
of what we "accept and prefer," that is, of what we believe to be true and prefer to have, 
given what we desire. Attitudes that are only about the reasonableness of our beliefs and 
preferences are not self-trusting attitudes, on my theory. Thus, a significant difference 
between Lehrer and I is how we interpret self-trust Another important difference is that 
I do not argue that to be "worthy of our trust," we need to be autonomous, necessarily. 
Lebrer writes that, 
I cannot be worthy of my trust [by which he means that I cannot trust what 
is worth trusting (1997, 5)} if I am not autonomous beca~ if the 
evaluations I make are imposed or fortuitous, I have no way of telling 
whether what I evaluate as worth accepting or preferring is worth 
accepting or preferring" (1997, 95). 
So unless I am autonomous and can evaluate whether my trust is justified, my trust 
cannot be justified. That presumes that the justification of selt:trust is internal to the 
subject, however. The view I defended of its justification in chapter 4 is extemalist. As 
long as the processes that generate our self-trust are reliable, our trust is justified. It is a 
further matter to ask whether we perform those processes autonomously_ Jt 
Furthermore, the kind of autonomy needed for self-trust in my theory is 
substantially different than in Lehrer's. His view of autonomy conforms to the standard 
model where autonomy is purely procedura4 where the relevant procedure for choosing 
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autonomously is purely individua4 and where that procedure is aimed at unmasking our 
"deep selves." Lehrer uses the language of preferences to descn"be our higher-order 
evaluations of our desires~ and argues that to be autonomous~ we must be the "author" of 
our own preferences (l997~ 100, 101). That itseIfis guarant~ supposedly~ ifwe have 
what Lehrer calls a "power preference," namely a preference to have the preference 
structure that we have. He suggests that gaining the power preference is a purely 
procedural and introspective matter. 
I have argued that the autonomy important for self-trust is both relational and 
substantive. It is relational partly because it demands that whIle engaging in the various 
processes of reflection on our values and beliefs~ we pay particular attention to social 
feedback about the values and beliefs we have concerning ourselves. However, it places 
some substantive limits on the kinds of beliefs and values that we can have as a result of 
those processes if we are to be autonomous. If we do not end up with values and beliefs 
that accurately reflect our own worth and competencies, we will lack autonomy. If the 
social world with which we engage in forming those values and beliefs gives us a 
distorted picture of ourselves, then our autonomy will suffer. 
6. Conclusion 
The discussion in this chapter of some of the problems with modem infertility 
treatm~ which I illustrated. using the personal accounts of some patients, demonstrated 
how forces of oppression can interfere with se(f:.trust at various levels of autonomous 
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decision-making. Sometimes, oppression interferes by confusing patients about whether 
they are truly competent and can rely on themselves to be committed to choosing and 
acting autonomously. That is, it can prevent them from knowing themselves, or at least 
from assuming that they know themselves, wen enough to be able to trust themselves. 
For example, stereotypes about women's diminished autonomy can make some women 
uncertain of whether they are truly competent to make the kinds of difficult choices that 
often arise during treatment for infertility. Double binds rooted in their oppression, such 
as the bind of having to choose between infertility treatments that can cause serious harm 
and the stigma of "voluntary childlessness:' can breed confusion in the level of their 
commitment to act on one choice or another, or about their competence to judge what is 
motivating them to choose one way or the other. 
Thus, lacking self-knowledge, or simply experiencing self-doubt, can prevent us 
from developing the self-trust we need to be autonomous. But lacking self-knowledge 
can also interfere with autonomy if we trust ourselves to choose and act in the absence of 
that knowledge. It is important to get things right in trusting ourselves because of the 
importance of self-knowledge for autonomy and self-direction. Autonomy requires that 
we possess and exercise the skill of trusting ourselves wen so that often our self-trusting 
attitudes accurately represent our own competencies and commitment to acting with 
moral integrity. Moreover, we require the skill ofImowing when to distrust ourselves for 
the sake of preserving our autonomy in circumstances where our knowledge of ourselves 
and of our options is severely limited. 
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Notes 
L However,. the degree to which people possess that skill may vary. I explain below that 
autonomy can admit of degrees and the degree to which one must trust oneself reliably in 
order to be autonomous depends on what level of autonomy we have in mind. 
2. Susan Sherwin explains the appeal of that principle in health care contexts 
specifically in "A Relational Approach to Autonomy in Health Care" (1998, 20-23). 
3. The term "untainted by socialization" comes from Diana Meyers (1989,. 42). She 
herself does not object to the autonomy ideal,. but she is sensitive to feminist concerns 
about the presocial self underlying most contemporary views of autonomy (Le., the views 
in moral philosophy that I discuss in section 2). Those theories presuppose that kind of 
self, as Meyers explains, because they interpret autonomy as a kind of free will that 
demands transcendence above the levelofsocialization (see 1989, part IT, section I). 
4. Examples of those moral philosophers are Dworkin (1989,. 61), and Young (1989,. 81), 
where Young focuses specifically on ignorance that arises as a result of self-deception. 
Most moral philosophers do not specify, however,. what agents must be able to 
understand to be autonomous. Unlike bioethicists, they do not emphasize that 
autonomous agents cannot be ignorant of the nature of their options. 
5. [mention Meyers here, but do not include her among the "standard" theorists who 
ignore the relational aspects of autonomy. Meyers has made important contnbutions to 
relational autonomy theory by arguing that autonomy requires that the agent possess a set 
of sIalls which depend for their development on non-oppressive social relations. 
6. A further reason Meyers gives for why a life plan is crucial for autonomy is that it 
allows us to explain how someone could engage in spontaneous autonomous behaviour. 
Meyers writes, "the alternative to having a life plan is to consult one's self at length with 
regard to each and every personal decision,. that is,. to have no preaffirmed dispositions 
and no preestablished policies" (1989,. 51). I argue below that not "each and every 
personal decision" is relevant to our autonomy. StilI,. it is important that we be able to 
make some autonomous decisions spontaneously. 
7. Youngs version of the kind of life plan needed for autonomy is unpersuasive; surely 
people can be autonomous without having that much order in their lives (in f~ one 
wonders if they might lack autonomy if they did have such ordered lives). I support 
Meyers' theory of how planned out an autonomous life must be (see, especially,. 1989, 
49-53). 
8. See,. also Sandra Lee 8artky (1990, 24,. 25). Bartky writes that women "cannot be 
autonomous, as men are thought to be autonomous, without in some sense ceasing to be 
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women" (24). 
9. Regret is usually an indication that one has made a non-autonomous choice (Meyers 
(989), but I suspect that is not always the case. For example, one could regret making a 
decision that caused one to give up something of value in favour of something else of 
equal or slightly greater value~ even though the decision was made autonomously. 
lOo Julien Murphyexplains that there are variety of reasons why that option is often 
unavailable for lesbian women, the most obvious ofwbich is that some infertility clinics 
simply refuse them access (there, Murphy cites Robinson 1997; Murphy 1999, 105). 
11. Bensonts criterion of seJ.t:.worth overlaps significantly with what DarwalI calls 
Itrecognition selt-respect" (see Chapter 3, Section 4). 
12. Some of those drugs are estrogen-based, and, as Kate Fillion mentions, there is a 
well-known correlation between estrogen and breast cancer (Fillion 1994, 46). 
Furthermore, Mary Anne Rossing and J.R. Dating et al have found that women who have 
twelve or more cycles of drug-induced ovulation have an elevated risk of developing 
ovarian tumours (1994). 
Fillion also notes the poSSIble risk of childhood cancer. She writes that ITa] 
review of Japan Childrens Cancer Register from 1985-89 identified significantly more 
cases of childhood malignant disease in children born to mothers who underwent 
ovulation induction" (55, ftn 2). 
13. See The Globe & Mail (May 24, 1999, AI, A6, A1; May 22, 1999, AI, A8, A9). In 
response to the outrage, the federal government in Canada has proposed new legislation 
requiring IVF clinics to release their own live birth rates. 
14. Being cancelled means that you miss a cycle, not that you are kicked out of the 
program altogether. Missing a cycle can be devastating enough because you may have 
placed all of your hopes in getting pregnant in one particular cycle and/or you might not 
have the financial means to try again (patients have to pay separately for each cycle). 
15. A number of writers have descnbed in some detail how stressfullVF can be. For 
example, se Sbanner(1996), Fillion (1994), and Williams (1989). For a detailed account 
ofwbat the procedure involves medically, see Farqubar(l996, chapter 5). 
16. For example, the clinic I attended as part of my clinical practicum provides no 
counselling service. The Canadian Royal Commission on New Reproductive 
Technologies recommended that counselling be available at all clinics as a means to 
avoiding I~unexpected consequences" of the newtechnofogies (1993, 4). 
11. It is experimental in nature partly beca1lse it involves the frequent use of ovulation-
induction agents, which cany unknown risks. 
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I8. Joannes story is da~ but it is consistent with more recent reports about what many 
wome~ and m~ experience emotionally during IVF treatment (see,. e.g.,. FiIlion 1994,. 
Mentor I998. Shanner I996,. and also The Globe & Mail reports I cited above). Fillion 
quotes one man as saying that "Every month. for three days its like a funeral. We've had. 
twenty-four funerals. If she does get pregnant,. fm not going to feel that something is 
beginning. fm going to feel 'Thank God it's over''' (1994, 33). 
I9. There are other factors indirectly related to their oppression that may undermine that 
trust For example, a number of feminists refer to the "technological imperative" in the 
context of assisted reproduction and prenatal care (e.g.,. Davis-F1oydand Dumit I998,. 
Morgan 1989, Shanner 1996). The imperative is to seek out new technologies of any sort 
because, supposedly, they enhance our freedom. 
20. Morgan acknowledges that not all women experience that dimension of sexism in 
every doma~ and some women (e.g., lesbian women and poor women) are often 
pressured in the opposite direction, that is, not to reproduce. Yet as Morgan notes, 
within their own communities, lesbian and poor women may experience "fertility" as 
obligatory (1989, 78). 
21. Shanner explains that the couples she interviewed at fVF clinics in Australia felt that 
their society made negative and unwarranted assumptions about adults without children 
(Le., they are selfish, immature; I996, 129). She cites a study,. which unfortunately is 
outdated (1979), but which confirms that attitude (see footnote 28,. I41). 
22. That choice becomes even more complex once we factor in the implications it has 
for the value of the lives of children already living who are homeless or who are in foster 
care, and perhaps also for the value of children "produced" through IVF, who may be 
commodified by that process. 
23. With. ovarian hyperstimulation, the woman takes hormone injections to stimulate her 
ovaries to produce multiple eggs in one cycle,. rather than the usual L The rationale 
behind the procedure is that the more eggs and sperm that are interacting,. the greater the 
chances are of conception (source: patient information leaflet). 
24. In her more recent work,. Meyers explains that it is compatible with the Kantian 
categorical imperative to will despicable practices because the imperative relies solely on 
the use of impartial reason and ignores the importance of empathy in moral reflection 
(1994,. chapter 2). Moreover, in earlier work. she discusses other types of procedural 
restrictions on moral autonomy, such as Rawlss reflective equilibrium,. and explains how 
they too could be consistent with "abominable solutions" (19&7, 150). 
25. Although in. Se/j; Society and Personal Choice, she says only that "there may be 
substantive as wen as formal and procedural goods that all morally autonomous lives 
exhtbit" (my emphasis; 1989, 82). 
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26. She makes that point, specifically~ in the context of defending a form of moral 
autonomy that is consistent with an ethic of care. She says that "mature adherents of the 
care perspective embrace a dual injunction to be true to themselves-their own needs and 
desires-while giving care to others" (l987~ 152). That injunction must be moral since a 
care perspective is a moral perspective. 
27. Those responSIbilities can be other directed as well as self-directed. For example, in 
trusting herself to be autonomous in deciding whether to attempt to have a child through 
an assisted means of reproductio~ a woman might be concerned about whether the 
decision reflects what she truly desires and values not only for herself but also for her 
potentiaL future child. She may perceive that there are norms commodifYing children in 
her culture, and may trust that she is not influenced by those norms in making her 
decision. 
28. That duty must be circumscnbed by a duty to uphold fundamental moral values of 
our society (and, therefore,. to refuse prenatal sex selectio~ for example). 
29. Another possible interpretation of an "alienating" influence is whatever causes us to 
feel alienated from Qurselves. 
30. "Deep Self' theorists,. as Wolf explains, are attempting to allay fears of determinism 
by distinguishing "cases in which desires are determined by forces foreign to oneself 
from desires which are determined by one's self-by one's 'real: or second-order-desiring, 
or valuing, or deep self' (1989,. 141). It should be noted that the "deep self' is not 
defined in that way throughout pfulosophical discussions of the self. rn deep ecology,. a 
deep self is "ecological,." meaning that it is shaped by a web of relations,. including 
relations with non-human entities (see Naess 1994; Devall & Sessions 1985). 
31. For as I suggest above,. the process of deferring to a wise and benevolent person 
about which self-trusting attitudes we should adopt could be a reliable process (although, 
granted, our self-trust would then be minimal given that we are deferring to someone 
else). However,. we would not be autonomous if the self-trusting attitudes motivating us 
to act were generated in that way. 
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Chapter 6 
Improving Respect for Patient Autonomy: 
Patient Self-Trust in a Woman-Centred Obstetrics 
I. Introduction 
Autonomous agents have some knowledge about themselves and about their 
options, and they have various skills allowing them to further their values and to act in 
accordance with a life plan. Self-trusting attitudes motivate them to be autonomous and 
self-distrusting attitudes guard them against non-autonomous behaviour. But those 
attitudes can play those roles only if they are manifestations of the skills of trusting and 
distrusting the self well. In the previous chapter. I discussed how oppression can 
suppress the development and use of those skills at the levels of choosing well. of acting 
on one's choices, and of judging the authenticity of the values and beliefs that inform 
one's choices. In domains where oppression is most likely to influence the expression of 
self-trust at each of those levels. one's autonomy can suffer greatly. One of those 
domains for women is the domain of modem reproductive medicine. 
In reproductive medicine, the gender socialization of women and the dynamics of 
gendered, and often class-based, epistemic power in many physician-patient relationships 
are potential obstacles to justified self-trust among female patients. We have witnessed 
in this thesis the impact of gender sociaIization on the ability of women to trust 
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themselves well in the contexts of both miscarriage and infertility treatment. Pronatalist 
norms can explain why women such as Sheila (chapter 3)~ who miscarri~ and Lois 
(chapter 5), who had trouble deciding whether to continue with infertility treatmen~ were 
self -distrustful. The epistemic authority of physicians was ultimately a barrier to self-
trust in the case of Janet from chapter 3. Her physician's authority was gender-based as 
well as based on his access to technological scientific evidence. Sometimes physicians 
maintain epistemic authority, moreover, because patients simply fear, as we saw in the 
case of Lee (Introduction), that if they disagree or are "non-complian~" they will lose the 
support of their care-providers. 
But even in the face of pronatalist pressures and physician authority, some female 
patients maintain self-trust and autonomy in reproductive contexts. Moreover. not all 
physicians wield their epistemic authority in ways that can undermine the self-trust of 
patients. However, the obstacles to patient self-trust in obstetrics and infertility 
treatment do necessanly not stem from the behaviour of physicians, and even where 
those obstacles do arise primarily because of their behaviour, well-intentioned physicians 
can be unaware of them. Thus, it is important to consider what changes can be made to 
reproductive health care practice to promote the self-trust and reproductive autonomy of 
patients, and how individual health care providers can be respectful of patient self-trust. 
In the bioethics literature on autonomy and informed conse~ there is no detailed 
discussion of the importance of self-trust for autonomy, and, furthermore, in most of that 
lit~ aside from the feminist contributions, the threat to autonomy of oppression is 
ignored- Physicians are told that they have a duty to respect the autonomy of patients, 
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where that is often reduced to the duty to obtain their informed consent, but rarely are 
physicians told to respect and promote the self-trust of patients to further their own goals 
and to determine what those goals should be. 1 In this chapter, I use cases involving 
prenatal diagnosis to illustrate how self-trust is frequently undermined in obstetrical 
situations, and what health care providers can do to bolster patient self-trust I argue that 
we must reconceive the duty to respect patient autonomy so that we understand how 
oppression can interfere with the skills of trusting and distrusting oneself wel~ and so 
that we acknowledge the importance of certain forms of self-trust and self-distrust for 
autonomy_ 
But it is not enough to argue that health care practitioners should create an 
optimal environment for the development and expression of patient self-trust In certain 
ways, the whole paradigm of medicine and the epistemology that underlies it are opposed 
to that kind of environment. Thus. we can only incorporate into the practice of medicine 
insights about the relation between patient self-trust and autonomy by first making 
substantial changes to that practice. For example, as I argue, physicians can no (onger be 
the sole authorities on the nature and meaning of patients' own bodily experiences. To 
have self-trust, patients need to be able to define those experiences in ways with which 
they identify, meaning in ways that are integrated with their own belief and value 
systemS.2 For that change to occur in obstetrics, the practice ofit would have to become 
more woman-centred. As I shall explain, in situations involving prenatal diagnosis in 
particular, a woman-centred obstetrics respects the embodied relation of a woman to her 
fetus, as well as her embodied knowledge of her pregnancy. 
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1. Informed Consent or "Choice," in Theory and in Practice 
In bioethics and in medical practice, informed consent is meant to be a 
mechanism for preserving patient autonomy. Because of how it is often obtained in 
practice, however, it is not a way for many patients to become autonomous agents in 
choosing the treatments they receive. Some bioethicists have recommended changes to 
the procedure of obtaining informed consent so that it is more conducive to the exercise 
of patient autonomy (e.g., Lidz. Appelbaum, Meisel 1988, Beauchamp & Childress 
I 994). But the recommendations of non-feminist theorists, in particular, fall short of 
identifying how power imbalances in physician-patient relationships and how cultural 
norms and stereotypes can interfere with patient autonomy. In this section, I discuss 
what is present and what is absent in most of the theory about and practice of informed 
consent. 
Usually in medical practice, informed consent occurs as a discrete event in which 
physicians fuIfilI their legal obligation to patients to disclose whatever a reasonable 
person would want to know about the harms and benefits of a recommended procedure. 
That event is descnbed in detail by Janet Farrell Smith in "Communicative Ethics in 
Medicine" (I 996). She gives the following synopsis: after analysing information 
obtained through a patient interview, a physical ~ and poSSIbly through laboratory 
tests, physicians will inform the patient of a diagnosis or a recommended course of 
action, bigbIightingthe legalIyrelevant harms and benefits (187-190). Physicians then 
ask whether the patient agrees with thcrecommended procedure,. and sometimes have the 
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patient sign a consent form. fn situations where physicians tend not to give specific 
recommendations, but simply descnbe the options available to the patient,3 they will 
often inform the patient that she must choose based on her own values and beliefs. 
Smith explains that rarely does any significant communication occur about the patient's 
options beyond the transfer of medical information. Studies have shown that "patient-
initiated questions are often 'dispreferred''' in medical interviews, but even when patients 
do ask questions, they rarely challenge the accuracy of the information provided or the 
recommended course of action, if a recommendation is given (Smith 1996, 190). 
Most patients do not question what physicians recommend to them because of the 
authoritative knowledge of physicians in the area of human health. Many patients 
welcome that authority; what it means for them to trust their physicians is that they do 
not have to worry about what is the best approach to their care or the accuracy of their 
physicians' diagnoses. They can simply take their physicians' word for it. At the other 
extreme are patients for whom the knowledge of physicians is not authoritative. Those 
are patients who believe that their physicians are fallible and that their knowledge has no 
greater value than the patients' own knowledge of their bodies or than the knowledge of 
people who practice alternative forms of medicine. Still, those patients may not question 
the approach of their physicians when they disagree with their approach if they have no 
choice but to see a physician and they fear being abandoned. They may have no choice if 
alternative healing practices are unavailable or financially prohibitive. The reason why 
those people are in the position ofbaving to rely on a physician in the first place, 
however, is because of the epistemic hegemony of physicians in-our culture, a hegemony 
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which ensures that alternative healing methods are often unsubsidized. Thus, even for 
patients for whom medical knowledge is not authoritative, their resistance to challenging 
their physicians can usually be explained in terms of the epistemic authority of 
physicians. 
Medical anthropologists~ Carole Browner and Nancy Press (1997), have found 
that American women seeking prenatal care tend to fall somewhere in between the above 
extremes.4 That is~ some of the advice their physicians give to them is authoritative for 
them and some is not. Sometimes they reject their physicians' advice simply because it is 
too difficult to follow, given their own daily routines and responstbilities, but other times 
they reject it because they suspect it is unfounded. What often guides them in evaluating 
their physicians' recommendations is their own embodied knowledge of their 
pregnancies. Such knowledge is "derived from a woman's perceptions of her body and 
its natural processes as these change throughout a pregnancy's course'~ (Browner & Press 
1997, 113). [f medical advice conflicts with that knowledge, then women will often 
question the advice. Yet, as Browner and Press found, if the advice is supported by 
medical technology or it concerns the use of such technology (such as ultrasound or 
prenatal genetic testing), then women are unlikely to reject it. Browner and Press 
conclude that what is authoritative for many women in prenatal care in the United States 
is medical technology, more so than the physicians themselves. 
However, a further reason why some women might accept advice about 
reproductive technologies is that they feel they have little opportunity to refuse it. The 
difference between advice about how their lifestyles should change and advice about 
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having an ultrasound or prenatal genetic testing is that women can reject the former,. 
unlike the latter, usually without their physicians knowing anything about it. The study 
that Browner and Press performed did not show that when women reject any 
recommendations about changes to their diet, for example, or about exercise, they do so 
openly with their physicians. Thus, their prenatal visits may still conform to the pattern 
Smith descnees for patient-physician interviews. Patients can consent to advice about 
lifestyle changes, knowing full well that they will not follow it. On the other hand, if 
they consent to an ultrasound, they cannot easily avoid it afterwards. Although Browner 
and Press are probably right that many women prefer technological monitoring of their 
pregnancies and births, an alternative explanation for why some of them consent to it is 
that the dynamics of their relationship with their physicians make it difficult for them 
ever to flatly refuse what their physicians recommend. 
Many bioethicists have objected to the traditional dynamic of patient-physician 
relationships and the way that informed consent is often obtained within them. They 
argue that if patients merely consent to procedures that their physicians recommend, 
there is no guarantee that the decision they have made is right for them, given their 
values, life goals, and social circumstances (see, e.g., Lidz, Appelba~ Meisel 1988). 
For patients to choose autonomously,. they must participate in a meaningful way in the 
decision-making process. Moreover,. they must have the opportunity to refuse as well as 
consent-in other words,. they must be able to make a choice. The problem with 
physicians maintaining epistemic authority through wbatever means in their relationships 
with patients is that it leaves patients little opportunity to refuse. In defence of their right 
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to refuse. some bioethicists. such as Francoise 8ayIis (1993. fin I). argue in favourofa 
shift towards the language of"infonned choice."5 That shift is not merely semantic; it 
reflects an enlightened view of the nature of autonomous decision-making. 
Some bioethicists specify that satisfYing the conditions for autonomy requires that 
informed choice occur as an interactive process. rather than as a single event at which 
physicians disclose information to patients (e.g., Lidz. Appelba~ Meisel 1988; 
Beauchamp &. Childress 1994). As r discussed in chapter 5. the standard list of 
conditions for autonomy in contemporary bioethics is the following: I} patients must be 
competent or have "decisional capacity"; 2} they must possess relevant understanding; 
and, 3) they must choose and act voluntarily. To ensure the presence of those conditions. 
advocates of the "process model" of informed choice argue that it is important that 
physicians engage with patients in evaluating the available options, and that they assist 
patients in making decisions that are consistent with the latter'S values. Through the 
active involvement of patients in negotiating the approach to their care, physicians can 
assess whether the patient likely possesses decisionaI capaciif and whether he is likely 
to be choosing freely. rather than under the influence of some coercive or manipulative 
force. 
Furthermore,. giving patients the opportunity to ask questions and to express 
concerns should improve their understanding of the relevant medical information. Only 
once they appreciate the significance of that information for their own lives is the 
condition for autonomy of understanding satisfied (Appelbaum &. Roth 1982). 
Appreciatingthat significance means that patients are aware of the poSSIble or probable 
203 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
changes that coul~ or woul~ occur in their lives if they were to choose any of their 
options. To achieve that awareness~ they must factor in non-medical information about 
the posSIble or probable impact of a particular decision on their wor~ for example, on 
their sense of selt: or on their relationships with others. 
Clearly. on the process model, it is essential that physicians develop a 
relationship with their patients. One of the ethical problems in the case of Lee from the 
fntroduction is that she was denied a relationship with her health care providers. As a 
result, she felt that she was deprived of the ability to make informed choices. Only in 
relationships with patients can physicians give patients the assistance they need in 
understanding and evaluating their options. 
The inventors of the process model, namely Charles Lidz, Paul Appelbaum, and 
Alan Meisel~ argue, furthermo~ that physicians should clarify what their own values and 
expectations are to patients, so that patients will understand exactly why their physicians 
are recommending a particular approach to treatment (1988, 1386). Physicians 
themselves must realize that their recommendations are not value-free: that they 
presuppose values, including. perhaps, the value of living in optimal health as opposed to 
enjoying a few physically harmful pleasures, or the value of living without any pain as 
opposed to living with all of one~ s cognitive faculties intact Patients may disagree with 
physicians about which values should be guiding the approach to their health care. 
The process model of informed choice does identitY many of the problems with 
the standard "event model"; however~ it does not go far enough in addressing the 
potential barriers to autonomy in interactions between patients and physicians. If 
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physicians were to be open and honest about their values and expectations, that might 
diffiJse some of their epistemic power, thereby leaving more room for patient 
involvement in decision-making.. 7 But as we have seen, physicians gain at least some of 
that power through. the technology they use to support their diagnoses, and medical 
anthropologists have shown that for many of us, the authority of medical technology goes 
unquestioned (e.g.., Davis-Ftoyd 1992, Browner & Press 1997). Although much of 
medical technology is extremely useful, not all of it warrants the exalted status it has in 
our society. Maternal serum screening, which is a form of prenatal genetic screening, is 
an example. It has a false-positive rate of approximately 59.4, increasing to over 40% for 
women over the age of35 (Mennuti 1996, 1442). The screening tests a woman's blood 
for serum markers that are predictive ofDownrs syndrome and open neural tube defects.s 
It can inform her only of her individual riSK for baving a fetus with either of those types 
of genetic anomalies. Thus, the meaning of a "positive" result tends to be ambiguous not 
only because of the high rate of false positives, but also because the result is still only an 
indication of risk. In spite of that ambiguity, as Browner and Press have found (1995), 
very few women refuse maternal serum screening when it is offered. Although a variety 
of factors may influence whether they consent to that test (as I illustrate in the first case 
below), one of those factors may simply be "the power of medical technology." 
The crucial element missing in most process accounts of informed choice is the 
way in which oppression can undermine patient autonomy. Those accounts tend to leave 
out an important condition for autonomy (one I outlined in chapter 5) that the formation 
of the seIf-concepts, values, and goals of agents are not influenced by coercive forces, 
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including forces of oppression.. Such coercion is not necessarily directed toward or away 
from one of the patient's options (Sherwin 1998~ 26)~9 whereas advocates of the process 
model usually assume that coercion must have that focus (see~ e.g., 8eauchamp & 
ChiIdress 1994, Faden & 8eauchamp 1986). Oppressive stereotypes can influence the 
self-appreciation of some patients, and the threat posed by those stereotypes can be 
heightened in interactions with physicians~ the majority of whom are members of 
dominant groups. Oppressive norms may have the overall effect ofinlubiting some 
patients from participating at all in the decision-making process. It is not enough to 
recommend that all patients be encouraged to participate because the reasons why some 
do not are more complex than the mere absence of encouragement. For example~ some 
patients lack self-trust, which means either that they WIll not be inclined to participate or 
will only participate in such a way that they are deferrin& ultimately, to the judgment of 
others, such as the judgment of their physician. 
There are many obstacles in health care settings to the formation of justified 
attitudes of self-trust for patients who are oppressed. I have identified many of those 
obstacles already, and I identifY a few others in this chapter. However,. my main purpose 
here is to explain how physicians can minjmjze those barriers~ and how the practice of 
medicine can be conceived differently to make room for the preservation or promotion of 
patient self-trust. My discussion centres around the area of obstetrics,. but many of the 
recommendations I make are relevant to, other areas of medicine. I want to emphasize 
that by focusing on obstetrics, my intention is not to reinforce the hegemony of 
physicians in caring for pregnant women.. In ~ I accept that midwives and doulas tend . 
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to be better than physicians at promoting the se)f:trust of patients. Moreover,. I 
recommend that the obstetrical care of pregnant women be more inter-disciplinary than it 
currently tends to be,. so that social workers, for example,. and other types of counsellors. 
play a more integral role in it. 
3. Promoting Self-trust Around Prenatal Diagnosis: 
3.1 Patient Trust in Choosing well 
The theory of autonomy I defended in chapter 5 is more elaborate than the 
standard theory in contemporary bioethics. For example. I argued that at the level of 
choosing well, agents must have more than just decisional capacity and understanding. 
They must identify with the values and beliefs informing their choices, and they also 
must trust their ability to choose well. That self-trust is contingent on whether they can 
trust the source of the information they use to understand their situation. It also must be 
grounded in some knowledge oftbe accuracy of their decision-making skills, and of 
whether they are competent and committed to do what their decision requires of them (if 
anything). As I argued, self-knowledge is a substantive condition for autonomy. and 
therefore, the self-trust motivating us to choose autonomously must be justified. 
In this section,.. I use cases to illustrate the potential barriers to patient se)f:trust at 
the level of choosing well. Some of those barriers emanate from oppressive forces that 
inhIbit womerrs reproductive autonomy. Others appear in health care contexts more 
generally-that is, in contexts where women's reproductive health is not necessarily at 
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issue. The first case I use, and my discussion surrounding it, are based on clinical 
observations I made of patients and practitioners in prenatal clinics and genetic 
counselling sessions while doing a clinical practicum in ethics and obstetrics as a PhD. 
student. tO The case is also consistent with sociological and anthropological literature on 
the pressures many women tend to feel in Western culture when deciding whether to 
undergo genetic testing in pregnancy. 
CaseI 
Lara is a 37 year-old woman, pregnant for the first time. At her 
first prenatal visit, she asks her obstetrician about prenatal diagnosis. She 
is told that the generic risk for a person of her age for having a child with 
Down's Syndrome is I in 227 (-0.4%) and the total risk for chromosomal 
abnormalities is I in 130 (-0.8%). Her options are the following: I) 
chorionic villus sampling (CVS), which is a diagnostic test taken at 10 to 
11 wee~ and which carries with it a 1 to 1.5% risk of pregnancy loss; 2) 
an amniocentesis at 16 to 17 weeks, which is also diagnostic and has a 
0.5% loss rate; 3) or, maternal serum screening at 16 to 17 weeks, which 
will not diagnose a fetal abnonnaIity, but will tell Lara her individual risk 
for having a child with Down's syndrome or an open neural tube defect. If 
the screening test is positive, she can elect to have a detailed ultrasound 
and/or an amniocentesis. Depending on the timing of her screening test, 
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she would receive the results of her amnio at about 19 to 20 weeks. ll 
Lara tries to determine what her risk for having a child with a 
disability means to her and what the risks of the different procedures 
mean as well. Her financial situation requires that she work, and she is 
worried that her work schedule would not allow her to care properly for a 
child with a disability, a child for whom she would be the sole care-giver. 
Intellectually, she is not opposed to abortion, but emotionally, it is 
difficult for her to imagine terminating this pregnancy, for she has longed 
to have a child for years and, until now, has had no success in conceiving. 
Hence, the loss rates of the diagnostic procedures worry her considerably. 
She is also concerned that any choice she makes would elicit negative 
responses from people she respects.12 For example, if she decides to 
forego the diagnostic tests, some would regard her as irrespoDSlble. If the 
results of an amnio, undergone after serum screening, convince her that 
she should terminate her pregnancy after 20 weeks, then some would 
wonder if she had any maternal instincts at all. 
The complexity of her options and the conflicts among her 
concerns and desires leave Lara profoundly confused.. She desperately 
wants to make the right decision, but is not sure that she is capable of 
determining what that is. 
Lam is in a classic double bind situati~ originating partly in the mixed messages she 
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receives from her society about prenatal genetic testing. If she refuses testing, she is 
irresponsible,. for a strong voice in her community assumes it is irresponsible to bring a 
child with a disability into the world. It might be irresponsIble for Lam. to refuse,. 
moreover,. if she could not care properly for a child with a disability,. given her financial 
situation. Consenting to testing, on the other hand,. could place Lam on a path toward a 
second-trimester abortion,. which is a heartless act for any mother, according to the 
dictates of at least one segment ofLanis community. It would also be an extremely 
difficult act for Lara because of her past history of infertility. 
Lam distrusts that she will choose well about prenatal testing because of the 
double bind she is in and also because of the complexity of her options. Her options are 
complex because of the small risks they entail for Lara and for her potential~ future child. 
Weighing small risks is difficult for anyone and it is especially difficult when one's 
values or goals conflict in the relevant domain. Interpreting risks involves making value 
judgments, for what a risk means, however small, depends on how much we devalue 
whatever we are putting ourselves at risk for. Lara is probably confused about what a 
0.4% risk for Down's should mean for her, not only because it is such a small risk, but 
because she does not know how much she should devalue having a child with a disability 
(compared to maybe having no genetically related child at all). Even if that risk were to 
increase significantly,. say to 4.4%, she would not necessarily be in a better position to 
choose weD. Hence,. the option of discovering what her individual risk is through 
maternal serum screeniogmay not be very appealing. 
While individual obstetricians cannot be expected to free women from the double 
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binds of prenatal genetic testing, nor eliminate the difficulty for them of deciding in the 
face of small risks~ they can give them the support, time, and information they need to 
sort through their decision. For example~ Lara's obstetrician could give her equal support 
for authorizing testing or for refusing i~ as well for the termination or the continuation of 
her pregnancy if she learns that her fetus has a genetic abnormality. Contrary to what 
some advocates of the process model recommen~ it is not always appropriate for 
physicians to reveal their values to patients. In the context of prenatal diagnosis~ they 
should refrain from adding to the pressure that many women feel to ''be responsible't and 
have some testing done. One study found that 75% of women believe that they would 
not be able to refuse an offer of prenatal diagnosis once that offer was made to them 
during a pregnancy (Sjogren 1988, cited in Gates 1994, 188}.13 There is already a strong 
connection, in North America especially, between maternal responsibility and prenatal 
diagnosis (Mitchell & Georges 1998,. 118; Charo & Rothenberg 1994). However~ as the 
case ofLara reveals, that connection is riddled with inconsistencies. "Good mothers" do 
not risk bringing a child into the world with a disability (Charo & Rothenberg 1994)~ but 
how "good" can they be as mothers if they can terminate a pregnancy in the second-
trimester'? 
It is questionable whether some pregnant women autonomously accept the 
responstbility of undergoing prenatal diagnosis. Some have values conflicting with that 
view of their maternal obligations, and furthenno~ with that kind of medical 
intervention in pregnancy. Not all women, or me~ are adverse to having a child with a 
disability, for example., and tfIat is especially true of parents who already have such a 
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child (Wertz, RosenfieId, Janes et a11991~ cited in Charo & Rothenberg 1994,. 106). 
Others simply do not want to be placed in the position of having to choose "the kind of 
baby [they]'dget" (Rapp 1997, 138). RaynaRapp has shown (contrary to the findings of 
Browner and Press, 1997) that many white middle-class women, in particular, are 
ambivalent towards prenatal diagnosis (1997). Many seem to feel that with that kind of 
medical intervention in their reproductive lives,. they have less control over their 
pregnancies than they otherwise would (Rapp 1997, 139). Thus, it is not the case that for 
every woman, it is an autonomous choice to accept prenatal testing as her maternal 
responstbility. However,. for many women, including Lara, rejecting testing altogether 
would not be an autonomous choice either. Some women may feel that they have little 
alternative but to seek testing because for them,. raising a child with a disability is simply 
not an option, given their social and financial circumstances. StIlI, those women may not 
believe that it is any woman's maternal responsibility,. necessarily,. to have prenatal 
screening or diagnosis. 
Some would argue that although the social pressure to have prenatal testing may 
limit the reproductive freedom of some women, that limit is justified because of the 
suffering and financial burden on society that accompanies the birth of a cluld with a 
disability. [f women are morally obligated to have testin& then obstetricians and other 
clinicians should encourage them to have it:. rather than support the options of 
authorization and refusal equally. However,. that view is highly contentious for a number 
of reasons. One is that the diagnostic tests for fetal abnormalities rarely reveal the degree 
of suffering that a child with a disability will experience. A positive test result for many 
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conditions,. including Down's syndrome,. neural tube defects~ and sickle-cell anemia, 
indicates only the presence of the abnormality but not the severity of it. [4 Furthermore~ 
only a small percentage of disabilities are genetic, and thus,. if it is in society's interest to 
prevent disability~ IS then before infringing on women's reproductive freedom, society is 
obligated to strive to prevent forms of disability that are not genetic (e.g., by improving 
road safety or the safety of workpIace environments; see Cbaro & Rothenberg (994). 
In medical contexts where patients do have a moral responsibility to choose one 
option over another, it would be inappropriate for health care providers to support each 
option equally. Consider the example of a pregnant woman who is HIV positive and has 
the option of taking a drug during pregnancy that would significantly reduce the risk of 
viral transmission to the fetus. Her physician would probably be remiss in giving as 
much support to the option of refusal as she does to consent (which should not be 
confused with the act of revoking the fonner option). But prenatal diagnosis is not a 
situation of that sort-that is,. one where it is clear where the woman's moral 
responsibilities lie-an~ certainly, neither is infertility treatment, for example. In those 
situations~ physicians should avoid disclosing their values to patients as much as 
poSSIble, especially given the epistemic authority they wield with many patients. 
Physicians could also help to loosen the double binds of prenatal diagnosis for a 
patient such as Lara with the aim of enhancing her trust in her decision-making capacity, 
by offering her some counselling to sort through her decision.. Lara must develop that 
trust in a way that is justified if she is to choose autonomously~ Thus, her self-trust must 
reflect some self-knowledge in her ability to make a. choice that is consistent with her 
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goals and values~ and that is realistic given her own competencies and commitments. For 
Lam to have that knowledge,. she needs to be informed of the posSIble and probable 
changes that would occur in her life if she were to choose each of her options. Lam 
seems to assume that her life would be altered in mostly negative ways if she were to 
give birth to a child with a disability. But before she can know that with any certainty~ 
she needs to find out what the known disabling conditions are of different genetic 
disorders and which social services woul~ in ~ be available to her if she had a child 
with one of those disorders who might live for a significant length of time. She should 
be able to seek counselling from social workers who could descn"be the available social 
services~ and from genetic counsellors who could discuss with her the nature of different 
disabilities with genetic origins~ and perhaps even get her in touch with parents who have 
raised children with those disabilities themselves. 
Some would argue that proliferating discussion about a woman's decision of 
whether to terminate her pregnancy by adding or improving the kind of counselling I 
have recommended would simply increase the "tentativeness" of modem pregnancies. 
Barbara Katz Rothman urges that as a result of prenatal diagnosis,. women are forced into 
"tentative pregnancies,." where they are hesitant about developing an emotional 
connection with their fetus because they cannot know until the test results are back 
whether their pregnancy is truly wanted or unwanted (1986). Rotbman's view suggests 
that if we want to allow women to have positive pregnancy experiences,. it might be 
better,. overall,. not to even have prenatal testing as an option. But it is not clear that 
eliminating testing altogether is the solution,. especially in an ableist society where social 
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assistance for the care-givers of people with disabilities and for those people themselves 
tends to be poor. Moreover, it is not the best solution for women who have fetuses with 
horrendous abnormalities (e.g., anencephaly) who would want to be spared the shock and 
emotional pain of giving birth to their child. Still, if women are to have the option of 
prenatal screening and diagnosis, it is important that they be adequately informed of it, 
and of the alternative of possibly having a child with a disability. Only then can they 
develop justified trusting attitudes towards their decision. 
To advocate counselling in an obstetrical setting about raising children with 
disabilities is to object to the way "health care" is often understood in that setting. As 
Abby WiIkerson descnbes (1998), "providing health care" in medicine usually means 
fixing whatever physical problems patients have, but not attending to aspects of their 
social circumstances that might shape their health status. There is an implicit message 
conveyed in many physician-patient encounters that it is not the job of medicine to 
provide patients with information beyond biological facts and facts about medical 
treatments. But if patients are to trust their ability to choose well in a justified way, often 
they need information that goes beyond mere biology or pharmacology. They need 
health care that attends to the constraints of their social environments. As WiIkerson 
recommends, they need for medicine to interpret human health not in a purely biological 
way, but in a ''biosociaI'' way, where the health status of patients is determined partly by 
their social context (1998, 133).16 A patient, such as Lata, cannot trust herself to make a 
decision that would promote her health status or the status ofherpotenti~ future child, 
unless she knew what her future social context would probably be like for each of her 
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options. Physicians do not have the expertise to give out such informatio~ but they can 
take the need for it seriously by advocating for the type of counselling I have 
recommended for patients in their clinics. 
For patients to have justified sett:trust at the level of choosing we14 it is also 
crucial that they receive some information, and some guarantee~ about the follow-up care 
they could expect upon choosing each of their options. Women, such as ~ who are 
faced with the choice of whether to have prenatal diagnosis need to know whether, 
where, and for how long abortion services would be available to them if they were to 
receive a positive test result and decide in favour of terminating their pregnancy. [fthey 
were to choose prenatal testing without that knowledge, and had the goal of not having a 
child with a disability, then their choice would not necessarily enhance their self-
direction. They might not have the option of a second-trimester abortion, given that in 
Canada. at least, they have no legal right to have those services available. Normally. 
whether that option is available to them in Canada depends on how far along they are in 
their second trimester. Restrictions on when second-trimester abortions can be 
performed are dictated in Canada by hospital policy. which tends to vary from one 
province to the next. 17 
From the point of view of promoting patient sett:~ it is important that women 
and their partners have the time they might need to sort through. the complex array of 
factors potentially influencing their choice of whether to have prenatal diagnosis or of 
whether to terminate a pregnancy when faced with a positive diagnosis. Providing that 
time by loosening restrictions on second-trimester terminations is not the best solution, 
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given how emotionally wrenching those abortions can be. Still, the current time 
pressures on couples to decide about prenatal diagnosis or pregnancy termination are 
inappropriate. For example, if the woman has a positive serum screen, she and her 
partner are usually forced to decide about further testing during an appointment for 
genetic counselling, where the results of the test are explained along with information 
about genetics and genetic disorders. Usually, a tentative appointment has been made 
already for prenatal diagnosis immediately following the counselling session, since the 
window of opportunity for further testing and for a possible termination is so small, 
given the restrictions on terminations (Charo & Rothenberg 1994, 109). Clearly, that 
gives women, or couples, very little time to absorb the relevant information and weigh all 
of the relevant factors. The counselling sessions need to come earlier in the pregnancies 
of women who opt for testing, at which point they and their partners should be 
encouraged to reflect on the information they receive, rather than be forced to reflect on 
it all of a sudden after they receive their test results. 
But giving patients more time and more information with which to decide about 
prenatal diagnosis cannot ensure that they will be able to trust themselves in a justified 
way to choose well. Even ifLara were given ample time and information, she may 
persist in distrusting her ability to make the "right decision." Such self-distrust would be 
understandable because her decision is inherently difficult, given the small risks she must 
weigh and the various social factors she must take into account Because of its inherent 
difficulty,. Lanis obstetrician is in no better position than Lara to make the decision. In 
fact,. the obstetrician is probably in a worse position given her limited understanding of 
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Lanrs values and social circumstances. Hence, the obstetrician. should not intervene 
paternalistically on the assumption that she knows better than. Lara what is best for her 
with respect to prenatal diagnosis. Such a response would be unwarranted even ifLara 
were 47 instead of37 (and so had a higher risk for Down's syndrome) and also had a 
family history of a congenital abnormality. In that case, even ifher obstetrician felt 
strongly that Lara should consent to prenatal diagnosis, she should not take the decision 
away from her, especially since there is, in filet, no moral obligation on Lara.'s part to 
accept (or to refuse) testing. 
The objection against paternalism in the above scenario is not that it is 
disrespectful ofLara's autonomy; the objection is that the obstetrician is not in any better 
position than Lara to know what to decide. It is not clear that there is any space for 
autonomy in that scenario because ofLara's persistent and profound self-distrust. Thus, 
ifLara were to request that her obstetrician decide on her behal( it would probably not 
violate Lara's autonomy for her obstetrician to do so. Whether Lara defers to her 
obstetrician's judgment or struggles to choose from a position of profound seIf-distrust, 
she does not exercise her autonomy_ By deferring. she only fuIfilIs a desire to have 
someone else decide for her, and I would not count that even as a minimally autonomous 
act. Since there is no room for Lam. to act autonomously, there would be no objection 
from the point of view of respecting her autonomy to a kind. ofpatemaIism that is 
consensual on her part. StiI4 there is good reason for her obstetrician to be 
uncomfortable in consenting herself to that solutio~ forto decide on Lar;{s behalf, she 
would have to assume at some level to knowwbat is in Lara.'s best interests, which, as I 
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have suggeste<L would probably be an unwarranted assumption. 
Overall, self-trust as a condition for autonomy should not be viewed as a potential 
avenue for paternalistic intervention. Like the condition of understanding, physicians 
have an obligation to promote or preserve self-trust in patients,. but not to remove 
patients' decision-making authority if they do not trust themselves. Such a paternalistic 
response is inappropriate even where the physician does understand the values, goals, 
and social circumstances of the patient well enough to make a decision on her behalf that 
would truly promote her interests. If that is the case, then he also knows how the patient 
should be trusting herself, and he can encourage her to develop that trust in ways that 
preserve her autonomy. Part of providing such encouragement is for the provider himself 
to trust the patient to decide welL It is hard to expect a patient to trust her autonomy 
competency ifher physician distrusts it, and hence, it is reasonable to suppose that 
physicians have an obligation to trust, or at [east to cultivate trust, in the autonomy skills 
of their patients. 
The distrust of some patients in their ability to choose well may persist because 
they cannot rely on the information they receive that is relevant to their choice. As I 
argued in chapter 5,. to have self-trust at the level of choosing well requires that one can 
rely on the relevant medical information, which,. in ~ requires that one can trust the 
purveyor of it As Rapp has shown, some women are skeptical of the accuracy of the 
information provided by prenatal testing (1998, 155). Other women distrust medical 
professionals because of how members of their minority group have been treated by them 
historically, or even recently. IS Rapp descnbes a case of a black couple who refused 
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amniocentesis once they discovered that the left-over amniotic fluid could be used in 
medical experiments (1998~ 146,. 147). They were informed that they could say 'tno" to 
its experimental use~ but they refused nonetheless, which suggests that they distrusted the 
technicians not to experiment with it against their wishes. Their distrust probably 
stemmed from fears that the results of the experiments could be harmfuI to black people, 
just as the methods of performing some experiments in the past (e.g., the Tuskegee 
syphilis experiment) were harmful to them. 
To bolster patient selt:trust at the level of choosing weIl,. it is therefore important 
for health care providers to gain the trust of their patients, and to strive to overcome 
barriers to trust in relationships with patients who may have good reason to distrust them. 
To do that, they must display moral integrity and competence in addressing their patients' 
health care needs. Acting with integrity means that they honour their commitments to 
patients, and if they fail to meet a specific commitment, that they at least try to make 
amends for the harm or disappointment they caused. Along with optimism about the 
competence and moral integrity of others~ interpersonal trust also involves two different 
expectations~ as I argued in chapter 2: I) the expectation that the values of trusted others 
are similar to our own values in the relevant domain; and, 2) the expectation that they 
perceive their relationship with us similarly to the way in which we perceive it. To try to 
encourage the first expectation in patients,. health care providers could state what they 
value generally about patient care. For example, they could assure patients that they are 
committed to promoting their well-being and to respecting their autonomy. Declaring 
such values to patients would be beneficial, unlike declaring values around issues such as 
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prenatal diagnosis and infertility treatment. 
AIso~ to encourage patients to trust them as professionaIs~ it is important for 
health care providers to assure patients that they perceive their relationship with them to 
be professionaL Trust requires that the trusting person expect the trusted other to have a 
similar perception of their relationship. roughly. because the commitments that the 
former can expect the latter to fulfill differ depending on the type of relationship they 
have with one another. Hence. it would be easier for patients to trust health care 
providers to honour the sorts of commitments one would expect from different care 
providers if the latter ensured that their relationship with patients remained on a 
professional level. 
However. health care providers should be cautious in trying to establish trust with 
patients whom they know or suspect to be in abusive relationships or who have histories 
of sexual. physical, or emotional abuse. Obstetrical patients are even more likely than 
other patients to be experiencing severe abuse because the abuse of women in 
heterosexual relationships tends to increase in pregnancy (Stewart & Cecutti 1993). 
People who suffer severe abuse often have problems with trustin& or distrusting. because 
they have trusted others whom they should have been able to ~ but who betrayed 
them severely (Herman 1992, 51~ 52). Rather than perpetuate any damage to their trust 
skills, health care providers should not expect substantial trust from them until the 
patients have received sufficient evidence that the providers themselves are trustworthy 
(Lepine 1990.275). What that would mean in practice. for example. is that in 
performing physical exams or procedures, physicians would continually ask those 
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patients if they are all right or feel comfortable~ rather than simply expect them to 
assume everything will be all right and that they will not be violated (once again). 
Abuse and oppression can also damage ones ability to trust oneself to make 
autonomous choices. A patient may, in fact, possess that ability but be convinced that 
she lacks it because she has intemaIized bateful messages from an abuser or from a 
racist, sexist, or classist society. Altematively~ her oppression or abuse may have starved 
her of the sla1ls necessary for choosing well based on her own goals and values~ and 
consequently~ she may distrust her ability to choose well. Hence, the seIf-distrust of a 
patient in Lara.'s situation may persist not because of the complexity of her decision or 
because she cannot rely on the relevant medical informatio~ but because she either 
cannot or does not know how to trust herself well. That patient would have a tendency to 
defer to the judgment of others whenever she is forced to make a decision. Rather than 
reinforce that tendency, physicians should take the time, if they can, to guide her through 
the decision-making process~ or involve a counsellor in that process who could take the 
necessary time. If physicians were to allow that patient to defer to their judgment they 
would only be perpetuating her self-distrust and the damage to her skill in self-trusting. 
Furthermore, they would be risking that the care she receives is inconsistent with 
whatever goals and values she may have that are relevant to her choice. 
In this sectio~ I have described a variety of ways in which health care providers 
can enhance justified self-trust in patients at the level of making choices about prenatal 
diagnosis~ in particular. They can give equal encouragement for the decisions to opt for 
testing or to refuse it. They can ensure that patients have information that increases their 
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knowledge of the consequences of choosing each of their options and of whether they 
could cope with those consequences. Moreover, they can give patients as much time as 
possible to think carefully through the relevant factors and information that WIll 
ultimately inform their decision. Lastly. they can ensure that patients can rely on that 
information by allowing them to trust its source (Le., the health care providers 
themselves). 
3.2 Patient Trust in Acting on Choices: Combatting Stereotype Threats 
Many of the barriers to self-trust at the level of acting on one's choices are similar 
to the barriers at the level of choosing welL For example, double binds can interfere at 
the former level by making a woman distrust her ability to act on a decision to forego 
prenatal testing because of a lingering desire to avoid the censure she would receive from 
some members of her community. Thus, many of the recommendations of how health 
care providers can reinforce or build a patient's trust in her ability to choose 
autonomously also apply for trust in the patient's ability to act autonomously. For 
example, providing equal support for each of the patient's options (where appropriate) 
can promote either form of trust. Promoting either in a justified way can also be 
achieved by disclosing the kind of information that would enhance the patient's 
knowledge in her ability to cope with the consequences of her decision. 
In this section, I want to focus on a barrier to selt:trust unique to the level of 
acting autonomously that concerns the power imbalance whichoften exists in patient-
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physician relationships. The obstacle is a stereotype threat to patients~ where the patient 
has not internalized what the stereotype says about her~ but is anxious~ nonetheless~ about 
confirming the truth of it to her physician. r have often mentioned the influence of 
stereotypes in this thesis~ but as ye~ r have not discussed a case where a patient feels that 
influence without actually believing the stereotype. 
ease 2 
Melissa is 25 years old and in her second pregnancy. She has very 
little formal educatio~ having quit school after grade 9. At each prenatal 
vis~ her obstetrician asks her if she has any concerns or questions about 
her prenatal care. Melissa usually shakes her head, despite often having 
concerns. She is not normally shy~ nor does she believe that her concerns 
about her pregnancy are trivial. She does not have a passive personality~ 
nor does she lack confidence in her own judgment. The problem lies in 
her awareness of a stereotype in her culture of uneducated people as 
intellectually inferior to the educated. Melissa expects that her 
obstetrician's view of her is influenced by that stereotype~ and she does not 
trust herself to be able to express her concerns or opinions to him without 
reinforcing the truth of that stereotype in his miml Just to be on the safe-
side, Melissa decides to keep her opinions to herself.. 
Whenever her obstetrician recommends something to her~ Melissa 
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agrees with his recommendation. When he offers her prenatal diagnosis 
and tells her it is up to her to choose whether she wants it or not, she 
chooses it, assuming that he must believe she should have it, since 
otherwise he would not offer it. Moreover, Melissa assumes that being a 
member of the medical profession, he must be in favour of the use of such 
technologies, since whenever Melissa has met physicians in the past, they 
have always been quick to defend any new form of medical technology. 
Melissa herself would prefer not to have prenatal diagnosis, but does not 
want to risk having her physician think that she is therefore naive or 
ignorant. 
Melissa does not distrust her own ability to make autonomous choices-she seems to trust 
her ability to decide what counts as a non-trivial concern about her prenatal care, for 
example. Also, within her own community, she trusts herself to voice her concerns, or to 
act on her own decisions. She lacks that trust, however, in the environment of her 
prenatal visits. There, she assumes she is in a world that constructs her differently than 
the world she normally inhabits. As Maria Lugones emphasizes, some stereotypes infect 
some "worlds" but not others. and as a result, the behaviour of people who are 
stereotyped can shift dramatically as they move between different worlds (1987). 
Even if stereotypes are not internalized, they can influence our behaviour in ways 
that prevent US from acting autonomously. Lugones explains that r might internalize the 
construction of me in hostile worlds, or, alternatively, "I may not accept [that 
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construction] as an account of myself' (10). But even if I reject it "I may be animatingr 
the stereotype in the eyes of another (Lugones 10; her emphasis). I may be giving life to 
it either intentionally-perhaps as a way of revealing its absurdity-or unintentionally, 
simply because I do not have complete control over the uptake of others. Those with 
"arrogant eyes .... may perceive me through the lens of a stereotype even though there is 
little evidence of the truth of it in my behaviour (Frye 1983). If Melissa is right that her 
obstetrician believes in the stereotype of uneducated people, then even if she were to 
speak articulately and to ask intelligent questions about her prenatal care, it is possible 
that he would judge her stereotypically nonetheless. Still, Melissa assumes that she 
might have the ability to control how he perceives her. She simply distrusts that ability, 
which, in turn, inhibits her from acting autonomously. 
Psychologist Claude Steele has developed a theory of~stereotype threats~ 
confirming that behaviour such as Melissas is not uncommon among people subjected to 
oppressive stereotypes (1995, 1997).19 Steele has found that the threat of being judged 
stereotypically by others can cause some members of a stereotyped group to feel 
exceedingly anxious in some situations about the poSSIbility of confirming a stereotype 
about them. His studies focused primarily on black students in the United States, and 
showed that while writing exams, they can develop intense anxiety about whether their 
results will confirm the stereotype of blacks as less intelligent than whites, and. that 
anxiety can prevent them from performing wen. As Steele argues, to feel the threat of a 
stereotype, one need not accept the truth of~ either on a conscious or an unconscious 
level. One might be inclined to interpret Melissas behaviour by assuming that, 
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unconsciously~ she does accept the stereotype of uneducated people. However, it is 
unnecessary to question her own explanation for why she is behaving passively; as she 
herself claims, she is concerned about reinforcing a stereotype in someone else's min~ 
not about actually living up to that stereotype. 
But there is a stereotype influencing Melissa's behaviour that she does believe: 
one stereotype of physicians is that they rarely call into question the value of new 
medical technologies. Patients often arrive at clinics with preconceptions about the 
commitments of their health care providers. The preconception Melissa holds is 
probably common among patients, and so is the assumption, for example, that 
obstetricians have a strong bias in favour of creating "perfect babies." Given those 
stereotypes, what would probably amount to "equal support" from obstetricians for a 
patienfs options in the context of prenatal diagnosis is for obstetricians to emphasize that 
they do, in fact, support the option of refusaL To minimize the influence of Melissa's 
stereotype of physicians, her obstetrician could tell her that he does not expect her to 
choose prenatal testing, but that if she were to choose it, he does not assume that she will 
want further testing or to terminate her pregnancy necessarily if the results are positive. 
However, care is needed in taking that approach, since it could send the message to 
Melissa that her obstetrician believes she is too stupid to understand what kind of choice 
situation she is in. The obstetrician should also reflect on his own motives for adopting 
that approach and ensure that he does not actually believe that Melissa is too stupid 
because of her lack offormal education. 
It is important for health care providers to be aware of common biases and 
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stereotypes in our culture and do whatever they can to minimize their negative effects. 20 
For example~ instead of being complacent with passive patients~ they could wonder 
whether they are experiencing a stereotype threat. They could even work with the 
presumption that patients are feeling such a threat if they are passive and they are the 
target of an oppressive stereotype. The perceived threat of stereotypes could be common 
in health care contexts, not only among patients who have little education in comparison 
to physicians, but also, for example, among female patients who have male physicians. 
The behaviour of the patient in such relationships may be influenced by the stereotype 
that she is less rational than the man before her or less capable of making sound 
judgments about her own interests. 
Steele recommends ways of diminishing the threats of stereotypes (1997, 624, 
625). He suggests being optimistic about the person's ability to perform well or to make 
good decisions, and challenging her with difficult decisions, which shows respect for her 
abilities. I have already proposed that obstetricians should display trust in their patients' 
abilities to handle decisions around prenatal diagnosis. They could do that while, at the 
same time, acknowledging how complex those decisions can be. The alternative of 
taking away the decision-making authority of passive patients who feel a stereotype 
threat would not only diminish their autonomy, it would also convince them, most likely, 
that they have confirmed the truth of the stereotype, despite their active efforts to avoid 
doing so. Furthermore, physicians could involve other practitioners or counsellors in 
communication with patients whom they suspect are experiencing stereotype threats. A 
female patient with a male physician or a patient who is less educated than her physician 
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may feel more comfortable expressing her opinions to a female doula or a female nurse. 
Another barrier to self-trust unique to the level of acting on one's choices is the 
fear oflosing the support of one's care-providers. That fear stands in the way of the 
patiene s opportunity to refuse the advice of her physician, and therefore. it is a 
substantial obstacle to autonomy. Patients need to know from their physicians that if 
they refuse their recommendations, they will not be abandoned. There may be instances 
where physicians feel that going along with patients' refusals would threaten their 
professional integrity. Physicians could explain that possibility to patients ahead of time. 
even highlighting where those conflicts might arise, and promise their patients that were 
there to be an actual conflict, they would work toward a compromise or refer the patient 
to another care provider, unless, of comse, the patient's request violated fundamental 
moral norms of our society (e.g., if the request was to have an abortion for the purposes 
of sex selection). 
Aside from assurances against abandonment by a physician who might not 
support her decision and against the threat of being judged stereotypically, a woman 
deciding whether to undergo prenatal diagnosis clearly cannot trust herself to act on her 
own decision if she lacks bodily integrity. If a third party is dictating which decisions 
she makes in her pregnancy. and hence, usurping control over what happens to her body. 
then she will lack seft:trust at the level of acting autonomously. However, that is not the 
only level at which an absence ofbodiIy integrity can interfere with self-trust. I argue in 
the next section that bodily integrity is also important at the level of judging whether one 
truly endorses the self-concept goals, and values that are reflected in one's choices. 
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3.3 Patient Trust in Her Own Judgment Respecting Bodily Integrity 
Autonomous agents must trust their own judgment about which self-concept, 
goals, and values should influence their choices. Furthermore, it is important that their 
self-conceptions are consistent with their own moral worth, since self-worth and self-
respect are substantive conditions for autonomy. How agents conceive of themselves 
determines which values and goais they do endorse. If their self-conceptions are 
fragmented or confuse~ then they will likely be confused about what they want, need, 
and desire. We have seen some evidence of that in the case of Lee. The objectification 
she suffered during her infertility treatment alienated her to some degree from the needs, 
desires, and values with which she would normally identify as a self-respecting person 
whose status or worth is not reduced to the level of her reproductive capacity (or lack of 
capacity). She could no longer identifY with that person that she once was, and her loss 
of identity made her distrust her judgment about what she needed and valued. 
However, patients can lose trust in their own judgment without experiencing an 
assault on their identity as persons. As we saw with the case of Anna in chapter 3, a 
woman can be confused after a miscarriage about how she should value her fetus and 
interpret its death if others around her do not give uptake to her feelings. Anna's 
interpretation of her miscarriage was mediated by presumed or" perhaps, actual 
comments from others about how her miscarriage was "a blessing in disguise," or was a 
relatively insignificant event compared to a stillbirth, for example, especially since the 
miscarriage occurred early in the first trimester. Such comments are disrespectful of 
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Anna~s own experience of pregnancy and miscarriage,. an experience that clearly held 
greater personal significance for her than the comments suggest Yet Anna could not 
trust her own judgment about the significance of that experience because her feelings 
about it contradicted what her society implied that she should feel. 
Lee~s seIf-di~ and possibly Anna's as weII~ arose partly because they were 
denied what Catriona MacKenzie calls "bodily integrity" (1992).21 The concept of bodily 
integrity is normally understood in debates on women's reproductive freedom as the 
ability to control what happens to one's own body (Boetzkes 1999, (21).21 Mackenzie 
argues that our use of that concept should be extended to a woman's control over her 
"perspective" on her body. or on her bodily experiences. Such a perspective is always 
mediated by cultural and social images of bodies; we cannot expect to free ourselves of 
those images. Where we lose our bodily integrity is when we are persuaded to adopt 
bodily perspectives with which we do not identify. Lee did not identifY with the view 
that her body, and more specifically~ her reproductive bodily parts, are constitutive of her 
self. That view was reflected in the behaviour of those who ignored her existence and 
denied her emotional needs in the operating room before the hysteroscopy. rn Anna's 
case, her seIf-distrust centred around the emotional significance of her pregnancy and 
miscarriage, yet that significance was probably bound up with how she perceived her 
bodl1y relation to her fetus. Anna may have assumed that in the minds of others that 
relation barely existed since the fetus was only six weeks in gestation before it died. But, 
in her mind, the fetus may have become a part of her already, which could explain, in 
~ why its death had such profound significance for her. 
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In this section, I argue that there are significant barriers to the kind of bodily 
integrity Mackenzie descnDes for patients in modem obstetrics,. particularly in contexts 
involving prenatal diagnosis. Those barriers can interfere with self-trust, and hence with 
autonomy, at the level of the patient's judgment. Overcoming them would require that 
obstetrics become more woman-centred. It needs to be more respectful of the embodied 
relation of women to their fetuses (as opposed to constructing fetuses as "separate 
patients" from pregnant women),. and more respectful of women's embodied knowledge 
of pregnancy. 
Women often feel that they do not have control over their own perception of their 
bodies,23 but they can feel that they have even less control in pregnancy, where they are 
subjected to inner as well as outer assaults on their bodily perspectives. In pregnancy, 
women must contend with cultural images of their inner bodies-that is, of their bodily 
relation to their fetus-as well as with the myths about their outer appearance. As many 
feminist theorists have noted,. prenatal ultrasound has introduced into Western culture the 
image of the fetus as a ftee-floating euti1y (e.g., Overall 1993,40-41; Petchesky 1987). 
Furthermore, enhanced images of the baby-like qualities of free-floating fetuses are used 
by pro-life activists to further their political agendas. By contrast,. in some pro-choice 
literature (particularly in philosophy), fetuses are portrayed as parasitic beings that 
threaten to starve women of their freedom (see,. in particular, Thomson 1971). Any of 
those constructions of the maternal-fetal d.yad can conflict with the way that a woman 
experiences her own pregnancy and views her relation to her fetus. If she is pressured to 
perceive her pregnancy in light of one particular construction,. then her bodily integrity 
232 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
might suffer. She will almost certainly lose some bodily integrity if she is pressured to 
adopt conflicting perspectives on her pregnancy. which is the predicament of the 
protagonist in the ~ Citizen Ruth (l996). Pro-life and pro-choice activists war to gain 
control over how Ruth views her pregnancy. Each group wants to use her as a symbol for 
their cause, offering her the resources she needs to continue on with her pregnancy or to 
have an abortion, respectively. There are scenes in which Ruth. is utterly lost:, not only 
because she is drug addicted, but also because she is forced to contend with these 
warring factions. 
According to how Mackenzie defines bodily integrity in pregnancy, it demands a 
bodily perspective that is compatIble with the way in which the woman views her moral 
respoDSlbilities to her fetus, and presumably, also to herself. Mackenzie writes that 
bodily integrity. 
in pregnancy and abortion ..• is a question of being able to shape for 
oneself an integrated bodIly perspective, a perspective by means of which 
a woman can respond to the bodily processes which she experiences in a 
way with which she identifies, and which is consistent with the decision 
she makes concerning her future moral relationship with the foetus (151). 
For example, ifher decision about that relationship is to end it:, but she is bombarded 
with pro-life images of fetuses, then she may lose her bodily integrity. Similarly, outside 
of or within pregnancy. the contempt for many women's bodies that cultural images of 
female beauty promote can conflict with a woman's conception of her own moral worth. 
Thus, those images are a potential obstacle to her bodily integrity. 
But women can also become confUsed about where their moral respoDSlbilities lie 
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or about whether they are, in tact, capable of being morally responsIble, when they are 
encouraged to view their bodies in ways with which they do not identify. For example, 
when women are objectified according to cultural images that are disdainful of their 
bodies, they can come to questiop their own moral worth, rather than merely lose bodily 
integrity. Similarly, women such as Anna who miscarry can become confused about 
whether they had any moral responsibility for a fetus whose death is deemed insignificant 
by others. Thus, the forces that compromise bodily integrity can also generate distrust at 
the level of evaluating one's own (past and present) moral values and commitments. 
As many feminist theorists have argu~ the dominant construction of pregnant 
bodies in modem obstetrics is that of a female body and a fetus. who is a "second 
patient" (Mattingly 1992, 17; also see Rothman 1989, 160; Overall 1993, 40-41).24 That 
is the image against which many women learn to redescnbe their bodily perspectives on 
pregnancy when they undergo prenatal care. North American women confront that 
image during ultrasounds, and the reason why is not only that the technology itself gives 
them an actual image of the fetus with them "nowhere in view" (Overall 1993, 41). 
Medical anthropologists, Lisa Mitchell and Eugeoia Georges, explain how in North 
America especially, physicians and sonographers usually relate to the fetus of the 
ultrasound image as though it were an active, socialized, and independent agent (1998). 
For example, they tend to descnbe fetal movement as mplayin&t 'swimming,' 'dancing: 
'partying,' and 'waving'" (108). They make comments about its personality, such as its 
shyness or its cooperativeness (109). 
The obstetrical construction offetuses as separate patients can disrupt a womaris 
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own perspective on her pregnant embodiment as well as her perception of the moral 
relation between herself and her fetus. Mackenzie argues that women experience that 
embodiment as the gradual differentiation between themselves and the fetus. fn her 
phenomenological account of pregnancy, she writes that "from the perspective of the 
woman, the foetus becomes more and more physically differentiated from her as her own 
body boundaries alter" (1992, 148-149). In the early stages of that process of 
differentiation, the fetus is more like a part of her than a distinct entity. That may not be 
true for all women, especially those in unwanted pregnancies, who may perceive the 
fetus early on in pregnancy as being more like an alien being than a part of them. But 
what is often alien for many women in the early stages of wanted pregnancies is the idea 
that the fetus is somehow separate from them. Consequently, many women may 
experience an early ultrasound, carried out in the way that Mitchell and Georges 
descnbe, as an assault on their bodily perspective. 
If all of the attention of sonographers is focused on the fetus as an independent 
and active agent, then the woman also might feel objectified by that experience. The 
more that the fetus is constructed as separate from her while it is still growing inside of 
her body, the more she becomes the mere "maternal environment.." That perception of 
herself in pregnancy is inconsistent with a decision to be morally IeSpODSlble for her 
fetus, as well as for herself A passive environment cannot be morally respC>DSlble for 
anything; it exists merely as a backdrop against which others can be respoDSlble for one 
another (i.e., against which sonographers or physicians can care for her and for their 
second. patient). The effect of such objectification on women can be a loss of bodily 
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integrity along with self -distrust about their own moral role in pregnancy. 
Some women also face the image of themselves as hostile maternal environments 
in the context of prenatal diagnosis, an image which can radically alter or confuse their 
perspective on their physical and moral relation to their fetus. Consider the following 
case, documented by Rapp, about a woman's response to amniocentesis (1997, (31): 
Case 3 
I cried for two days after I had the test. I guess I was identifiying with 
universal motherhood; I felt like my image of my womb had been 
shattered. It stilI feels like it's in pieces, not like such a safe place as 
before. I guess technology gives us a certain kind of control. but we have 
to sacrifice something in return. rve lost my brash confidence that my 
body just produces healthy babies all by itsel( naturally, and that if it 
doesn\ I can handle whatever comes along as a mother. (Carola Mirsky, 
white school teacher. 39) 
It sounds as though Carola's experience of amniocentesis was mediated heavily by the 
view that a woman's body is an unsafe place for a fetus. Presumably. an amniocentesis 
can be carried out in a way that is less likely to cause such a harmful shift in a woman's 
bodily perspective. The test itself may be essentially destabilizing for women who 
perceive their bodies as places where healthy fetuses can grow, yet its destablizing 
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effects are greatly enhanced when the test is performed by someone who does not share 
that perception. Like women who are mere maternal environments, women whose 
bodies are essentially hostile toward fetuses cannot be morally responsible for them. 
They will inevitably cause them harm.. That conclusion might explain why Carola lost 
her confidence in her ability to "handle whatever comes along as a mother." She might 
have reasoned that if she could not be responsible in pregnancy, how could she expect 
herself to be responsible in motherhood? 
Thus, the images of pregnancy and fetuses that tend to pervade contexts involving 
prenatal diagnosis can form a barrier to bodily integrity as well as to a woman's capacity 
for moral integrity. In their most extreme form, those images can promote distrust in a 
wotnatis judgment about whether she could even be morally responsible in the ways that 
she assumes she should be. At the same time, they threaten her self-worth and self-
respect, which are essential self-regarding attitudes for autonomy, independently of self-
trust. In their less extreme form, those images may simply generate distrust in a woman's 
own judgment about her physical relation to her fetus. 
The images of pregnancy conveyed in obstetrical encounters are so powerful for 
many women because of the culturally sanctione~ epistemic authority of medicine. That 
authority itself can lead to disintegrated bodily pers(JC\.~es for women whose embodied 
knowledge of pregnancy (i.e., knowledge gained through their own perception of what is 
happening in their bodies) conflicts with the supposedly disembodied knowledge of 
health care providers. If there is a "contest" over knowledge of the fetus between the 
woman and her health care provider, then the woman usually loses, especially if the 
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provider's knowledge is backed by the power of medical technology. Mitchell and 
Georges illustrate that point with various examples,. including that of a woman who told 
her sonographer, ''We could see [the fetus] moving and ... I felt it when I was taking the 
Metro. She said that wasn't it, that I couldn't feel it until a few more weeks. I thought for 
sure it was the baby moving, but I guess notrr (1998, 110). There was a similar outcome 
to the contest over knowledge I descneed in chapter 3 between Janet, who claimed that 
she was pregnant, and her physician, who doubted her. When women are encouraged to 
simply ignore their own embodied or experiential knowledge of pregnancy, it is difficult 
for them to maintain a coherent bodIly perspective. They have to continually explain 
away the significance of their own bodily experience. The result can be distrust in their 
own perceptions of their bodies and of what is happening in their pregnancies. 
Thus, the bodily integrity of pregnant women in modern obstetrics is threatened 
both by the construction of the fetus as a separate patient and by disrespect for a womanrs 
embodied knowledge of pregnancy. The former threat to bodily integrity can be a barrier 
as well to self-respect and to seIt:trust in a woman's perception of where she stands,. 
morally, in relation to her fetus. Both obstacles to a woman's bodily integrity can 
encourage distrust in her own judgment about which beliefs about her pregnant 
embodiment should influence the choices that she makes about her pregnancy. 
To remove the potential barriers in obstetrical contexts to women's bodily 
integrity and to selt-trust at the level of their judgment, substantial changes would have 
to occur in obstetrics. 0veraI4 there would have to be a shift toward what I have called 
"woman-centred obstetrics," where fetuses are constructed in relation to pregnant women 
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and respect is given for a wolllalis own knowledge of her pregnancy. Although there 
may be obstetrical contexts where viewing fetuses as separate patients is appropriate 
(e.g., in fetal surgery), in most contexts, they should not be constructed as separate or 
independent entities. Throughout ultrasound scanning of fetuses,. for example, 
sonographers and physicians should try to avoid descriptions of fetuses suggesting that 
they are self-sustaining agents. 
Constructing the fetus as a separate being is morally problematic because it can 
objectify pregnant women; however, it can be equally problematic to assume that all 
women in wanted pregnancies interpret their embodied relation to their fetus in the same 
way. For some women, the fetus may feel more like a part of them than it is for other 
women. [t is important that health care providers respect the unique ways in which 
women might be experiencing their pregnancies, as opposed to dictating to them what 
their experience should be about. Part of the job of being an obstetrician is to offer 
women advice on how they should be perceiving their pregnancies, but obstetricians can 
do that without imposing alienating bodily perspectives on women. Obstetrics may 
inherently involve some negotiation between health care providers and patients about 
which bodily perspectives patients should adopt However, the risk of avoiding 
negotiation altogether, and being authoritarian instead,. is the undermining of patient se(f-
trust and autonomy_ 
Similarly, in the contexts of miSCJlrriage and abortion, it is important that health 
care providers be sensitive to the unique ways that women might interpret the 
pregnancies they lost or purposefully ended. However sympathetic health care providers 
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are to women in those contexts, they can cause harm by simply assuming that the women 
vie~ their pregnancy experiences in specific ways. Such assumptions can promote 
distrust in women's own perceptions of their miscarriages or abortions, and that self-
distrust can interfere with autonomous behaviour in overcoming those experiences or in 
truly understanding their personal significance. 
To improve respect in obstetrics for womens embodied knowledge in pregnancy. 
there would have to be substantial changes to the existing medical epistemology. There 
is now little room in that epistemology for embodied subjectivity. as authors such as 
Foucault have argued (1975; cited in WiIkerson 1999). There is only room for "pure 
facts." known through objective scientific analysis and untainted by the subjective views 
of physicians and researchers. Not only is that kind of epistemology implausible. it can 
also lead in medical contexts to a (oss of bodily integrity in patients. Health care 
providers need to be aware that if they are dismissive of the embodied knowledge of 
pregnant women, they may actually compromise the bodily integrity of their patients as 
well as their autonomy_ Instead, they should try to incorporate that knowledge as much 
as poSSIble into the bodily perspectives they encourage pregnant women to adopt. 2S 
4. Where a Patient Trusts Herself too Much: The Role of Integrity-Preserving Persuasion 
But wbat if a woman. trusts her embodied knowledge of her pregnancy too much? 
Or, alternatively, what if she trusts herself to choose in ways that are divorced from an 
adequate conception of her own worth? In the former type of case, the patient might 
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assume that she is being responsIble in trusting her own perceptions of what is happening 
in her body,. when,. in ~ her perceptions are unreliable. In this section,. I introduce 
Martin Benjamin's notion of "integrity-preserving" persuasion,. or compromise (1990), as 
a way for obstetricians to deal with too much self-trust in patients without destroying 
their self-trust at the same time. Preserving integrity helps to preserve self-trust because 
self-trust is an attitude about one's moral integrity. As I shall explain, however, there are 
clear limits to the usefulness ofBenjamin's method of persuasion for solving the problem 
of unjustified self-trust in patients. 
First, though, [ want to emphasize that health care providers are often not in a 
position to assess whether a patient has too much self-trust because she has an unrealistic 
conception of her own competencies or of her ability to cope with the consequences of a 
decision. Health care providers are not in that position in many obstetrical situations, 
including many situations involving prenatal diagnosis and the termination or 
continuation of a pregnancy. For example, if a woman decides to continue a pregnancy 
knowing that her child will have a genetic disorder, and she has received ample 
information about raising a child with that disorder, then normally only she and people 
close to her can judge whether her trust in that decision is justified. 
But there are some circumstances where health care providers can assess whether 
a patient is trusting herself too much because of inadequate self-knowledge. For 
example, if a woman. decides to reduce her smoking dramatically during pregnancy 
without accepting any form oftreatm~ and she has often said in the past that she 
would quit but has never succeecled. then her physician could conclude that her trust in 
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her decision is probably unjustified. That does assume, however, that the woman has not 
been claiming to quit all along only to please or appease her physician. 
When it is clear that a patient is trusting herself too much and in a way that could 
jeopardize her own health or the health of her fetus, health care providers could attempt 
persuasion that is integrity-preserving. That method involves encouraging the patient to 
consider all of her values and beliefs, and how her current position may not reflect all of 
them accurately (Benjamin 1990). As Benjamin writes, the aim "is to strengthen or 
encourage the recognition of [an) unacknowledged voice in the [patient)," rather than to 
coerce her to take a position that is somehow alien to her (1990, 34). For example, with 
the patient who trusts herself too much to quit smoking, the physician could assume that 
she knows she was unsuccessful in quitting on her own in the past, and ask her to reflect 
on that knowledge carefully. She, the physician, could also assume that the patient 
values her own health and the health of her fetus (at least to some degree), and that she 
knows that heavy smoking is hazardous to both of them. Thus, the physician could urge 
that from the patient's own perspective, it is important to choose a method of quitting that 
has the best chance of success. That form of persuasion is integrity-preserving, for the 
physician is only trying to persuade the patient to adopt a position that is already 
coherent, hopefully, with the patients own beliefs and values. A physician who uses that 
method would only encourage a patient to change one ofber beliefs or values if the 
majority of her beliefs and values demanded the revision. 
Clearly, the usefulness of integrity-preserving persuasion is limited, however. A 
physician may be mistaken in assuming that a patient has latent desiIes or values that are 
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unacknowledged in the decision which she trusts so much. If the patient makes a choice 
that puts her own health at ris~ for example,. but she is suffering from depression or 
simply has low self-worth., then her physician might be wrong in assuming that she cares 
about her own health. Similarly,. if a patient trusts her embodied perspective too much 
(e.g., she is adamant that she is not pregnant even though there is sufficient medical 
evidence to prove that she is), her physician might suspect, wrongly,. that she values 
being a responsible mower or that she believes that medical information and technology 
has some epistemic worth. Especially where the values and beliefs of patients and 
providers diverge dramatically (e.g., on whether medical technology has any epistemic 
value),. it is unlikely that integrity-preserving persuasion will work. 
Still, it is worth at least attempting such persuasion, particularly before ever 
recommending that a patient lose her decisional authority. Even with patients who trust 
themselves in ways that are incompatible with respect for their own worth, integrity-
preserving persuasion could work. Because the voices of physicians are so powerful for 
some patients,. it could be persuasive for a patient to hear from a physician that she 
should attend more to her own needs, rather than focus merely on the needs of others. 
However, it is unIikely that a physician, alone, could make inroads with patients whose 
self-worth or self-respect has been damaged severely by oppression or abuse. In such 
cases, if the patient is trusting a decision that puts herself at grave risk of serious harm, 
then some counselling for the patient is appropriate with someone trained in helping 
people with histories of abuse or OppressiOIL 
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s. Conclusion 
For patients to be autonomous, they need to be able to trust themselves. Self-trust 
is not the only requirement for patient autonomy, but it is a requirement that is 
overlooked in almost all philosophical and bioethical accounts of autonomy and 
informed choice. The relation between self-trust and autonomy has theoretical 
implications for the way that we conceive of autonomy and of the value of trusting the 
self. Moreover~ as I have argued in this chapter, it has profound practical implications 
for our understanding of the duty to respect patient autonomy, particularly in obstetrics. 
Attending to patient self-trust as a precondition for autonomy is crucial in obstetrics and 
in other areas of reproductive medicine because of the enormous weight that oppression 
can bear on the ability of women to trust themselves in those contexts. 
Many of the recommendations I have made in this chapter about improving 
respect for patient autonomy in obstetrics cannot be found in existing models of 
informed choice, including the process model. It is implicit in that model that patients 
should have sufficient time and information to assess their options. Yet many of the 
barriers in obstetrics to self-trust are more serious than the mere lack of time or 
information. Many concern the power imbalances in obstetrician-patient relationships, 
imbalances that often exist because of the threat of sexist, classist, and/or racist 
stereotypes, or simply because of the authoritative epistemic position of obstetricians. 
There is also the barrier of the construction of pregnancy as a relation between separate 
entities, which permeates obstetrics and can interfere with sert:trust at the level of the 
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patient's judgment about the values and beliefs informing her choices. Obstetricians 
need to try to eliminate or at least mjnimize those barriers for the sake of promoting 
patient autonomy. They could do that, in ~ by avoiding complacency with passive 
patients who might be experiencing stereotype threats. They and other health care 
providers also need to be alive to the importance of appreciating a woman's own bodily 
perspective in pregnancy,. and to be respectfiJL as opposed to dismissive~ of her embodied 
sense of what is happening in her pregnancy. 
On the theoretical side of the relation between autonomy and self-trust,. [ have 
argued in this thesis that the skill of trusting oneself well-that is, of developing justified 
attitudes of optimism about ones own moral integrity and competence-is one of the 
skills involved in what Meyers calls "autonomy competency" (1989). As [ have 
proposed, that competency also demands the skill of distrusting the self well. Self-
distrust can avert the damage that hasty choices can have on our autonomy. l.a.n{s case is 
an example of where some self-distrust may be justified, at least temporarily, with 
respect to a particular decision. Like most people, Lam is probably not a reliable self-
truster when she is forced to decide quickly about issues as complex as prenatal 
diagnosis is for her. However, ifl.a.n{s self-distrust were to persist, it could threaten her 
autonomy. Too much self-distrust, even if it is justified, is an obstacle to the expression 
of ones autonomy competency. 
Melissa's case is an example of where self-distrust is probably justified, yet it 
interferes with autonomy nonetheless. Melissa does not trust herself to be able to 
convince her obstetrician of her ability to make wise decisions about her prenatal care 
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because of the threat of being stereotyped. Since members of stereotyped groups can 
animate stereotypes about them even while they strive to disconfirm their truth, it can be 
unreliable for them to trust themselves to succeed in that goaL Stereotypes are more 
likely to be threatening if they are demeaning to those whom they targe~ and the most 
common targets of negative social stereotypes are oppressed people. There may be many 
more situations~ thetly in which it is unreliable for the oppressed to be self-trusting, yet 
reliable for the privileged simply because of the influence of those stereotypes. As [ have 
argued, onets socio-politicai status tends to determine, in part, when it is reliable to trust 
or distrust 
Oppression as well as abuse can interfere with either the manifestation or the 
acquisition of the skill of trusting the self well. Various mechanisms of oppressiotly such 
as stereotyping and objectifYing, can encourage too much self-distrust in people who 
possess the skills of trusting and distrusting themselves well. Those mechanisms, along 
with abuse that is not oppression-relat~ can also damage or hinder the development of 
those skills. Some people living with the trauma of childhood abuse or in an 
environment of severe oppression may never have experienced what it is like to be self-
trusting most of the time. Self-distrust may be a constant feature of their lives and a 
constant impediment to settled opinions about what they value and desire in many 
contexts. 
Partly for the sake of those who live in perpetual self-distrust as a result of abuse 
or oppressiOtly [ have strived in this thesis to demonstrate that the concepts of seft.trust 
and self-distrust are meaningfu4 and moreover,. that we are obligated to foster and 
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preserve seIf:trust in one another since that attitude is necessary for autonomy. I have 
also made those arguments for the sake of patients such as Lee who are forced into 
positions in health care contexts where they cannot trust themselves. My concern has 
focused on how women's se(t:trust can be undermined in reproductive medicine in ways 
that threaten their reproductive autonomy. 
I have established that understanding the relation between autonomy and self-
trust is important to bioethics,. moral philosophy,. and feminist theory. In bioethics, it 
improves our grasp of how health care providers can relate to patients in ways that are 
respectful of their autonomy. [t expands our understanding in moral philosophy of the 
nature of autonomy and of the conditions that promote it. Furthermore,. a feminist 
account of self-trust as a condition for autonomy brings to light yet another way in which 
oppression works to disempower some members of oppressed groups. 
Notes 
L The closest approximation I have seen to that recommendation is in a paper by Abby 
WiIkinson on "The MedicaIization of Violence against Women. W Wilkinson writes that 
"[wJomen need to be able to trust our own perceptions of our bodies and our experiences,. 
a goal that medical theory and practice should respect and support" (1998,. 133). 
2. There,. I draw on an argument by Catriona Mackenzie (1992) that women need to be 
able to define for themselves their pregnancy experiences if they are to maintain their 
bodily integrity and reproductive autonomy. 
3. That is usually what happens with most foons of genetic testing for fetal 
abnormalities. Patients are told that they have the option ofbaving maternal serum 
screening,. and perhaps evenofhaving amniocentesis orchorionie villus sampling {see 
Case 1 for a description of these tests}. However,. I have encountered physicians who 
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will recommend testing rather than simply offer it, particularly for patients who are at 
higher risk than the average patient of having a fetus with genetic abnormalities. 
4. Moreover, in the study they performed, they did not find any significant ethnic or 
class differences in women~s attitudes toward the medical advice they receive about 
pregnancy (115). However, they do acknowledge that a number of other studies have 
documented such differences (they cite, for example, Kay 1980, Lazarus 1994, Rapp 
1993). 
5. The term "informed choice" is still not widely used in the philosophical, legal, and 
medical literature~ but, following Baylis, [ shall use it in this chapter. 
6. Physicians do prelimjnary assessments of decisional capacity and seek psychiatric 
consultation if a patient seems to lack that capacity. 
7. However, as I argue below, it is not always appropriate for physicians to reveal their 
values to patients. 
8. Versions of the test vary depending on how many markers are analysed. The "triple 
screen" is meant to be the most effective; it tests the serum levels of three different 
substances. Still, its false positive rates are high (they are the rates I gave above; see 
Mennuti 1996, 1442-1443). 
9. It may be directed, more generally, at the competence of the patient in making 
decisions that reflect her own values or interests, for example. For a discussion of why 
oppressive forces that target the self-appreciation of patients count as coercive forces, see 
chapter 5, section 2. 
10. [did that practicum over a period of about six. months. I attended, on average, one 
clinic per week (where that includes prenatal clinics, ultrasound and amniocentesis 
clinics, and infertility clinics), and I witnessed about three or four genetic counselling 
sessions. [did not interview patients, but simply sat in during their appointments, with 
their consent. 
Francoise Baylis was the coordinator of my practicum, and she gave me 
invaluable advice in that capacity. I would like to thank her along with my on-site 
supervisors, Barbara Parish and Glenn Gill. I would also like to thank all of the health 
care practitioners on-site who included me in their clinics. 
I L As Dr. Barbara Parish confirmed for me, these are the options and risks for a 37 
year-oId woman who is receivingprenataI care at the lWK Grace Health Centre in 
Halifax. These risks for the diagnostic procedures are also given in a paper by MichaeI 
Mennuti (1996). 
12. That concern is common among women, according to nurse Diane O'ReilIy, who 
works in grief counselling for women who have had pregnancy terminations because of 
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fetal abnormalities (personal communication 1998). 
13. It is sometimes assumed that middle-class women accept testing more often than 
women who are "working-class or working-poor," which suggests that the former might 
feel more obligated than the latter to accept it (Rapp 1998, 148). However, as Rayna 
Rapp explains, if poor women have access to a clinic where they feel comfortable and 
trust their practitioners,. they are just as likely as middle-class women to consent to 
prenatal diagnosis (1998, 149, ISO). Thus, the disparity in the rates of their refusal 
compared to middle-class women often has more to do with inadequate prenatal care 
services for poor women than with their attitudes toward testing. 
14. That is true for all "mosaic conditions," where the fetal cells are ''both normal and 
atypical in varying proportions" (Rapp 1998, 163). [t is also true that the disabling 
conditions of some genetic anomalies are completely unknown to geneticists (see Rapp, 
161, 162). 
15. And, it is important that society express that interest in a way that does not further 
stigmatize and oppress people currently living with disabilities. See Laurie Nsiah-
Ietferson (1994, 234) on how the very availability of prenatal diagnosis can perpetuate 
ableism. 
16. Wilkinson in her paper focuses on the issue of domestic violence and the woefully 
inadequate way in which medical institutions tend to deal with that problem (1998). 
17. Some American authors, such as Alto Charo and Karen Rothenberg (1994, I 11), 
have pointed out that while the pressure on women to have prenatal diagnosis is 
increasing, their access to adequate abortion services and counselling in the United States 
is decreasing. 
18. For example, distrust in medical professionals in the context of prenatal care may 
have been heightened recently among some aboriginal women in Canada because of the 
actions of a Manitoba physician who bad an aboriginal pregnant woman who was 
addicted to solvents committed against her will for addiction treatment (see WillJlelle~' 
Chtld and FamiLY Services (Northwest Area) v. G. CD F) .. S. C. C.). 
19. IleamedofSteele's studies ftomreadingWalker(1998, 196, 197). 
20. Clearly, health care professionals alone should not have that responstbility, 
especially in deflating stereotypes about oppressed people. However, they can play a role 
in reducing the negative effects of those stereotypes. 
21. She also calls it "bodily autonomy," but I shall avoid thattenninology. As I explain, 
whether we have bochly integrity influences whether we are autonomous, but "bodily 
autonomy" suggests that our bodies can be autonomous-that is, that they can choose and 
act in accordance with a set of values and beliefS-which is mcomprehensIble .. 
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22. As Catriona Mackenzie explains (l992J. that is how many philosophers use the 
concept to defend women's right to refuse unwanted interventions in their pregnancies~ or 
simply to refuse to continue unwanted pregnancies (see~ e.g., Warren 1975, Overall 
1987). 
23. Women in Western culture have few options for how to view their bodies because 
the cultural images of women's bodies are so narrow and exact. It is poSSIble for them to 
construct bodIly perspectives that are imagined variations on the dominant images. But 
to view their bodies continually in light of imagined alternatives is extremely difficult 
because of how much their bodily perspectives tend to be patrolled by others~ who 
pressure them to conform to dominant beauty standards for women. 
24. Many textbooks on obstetrics reveal the patient status of fetuses right in their titles: 
examples are The Unborn Patient: Prenatal Diagnosis and Treatment (Harrison et al 
1990) and The Fetus as a Patient (Kurjak (985). 
25. As a model of how to be respectful of women's embodied knowledge in pregnancy, 
obstetricians could turn to midwifery. Midwives, in general, learn to value that 
knowledge. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Lee: 
Appendix 
The Cases 
Lee~ a nurse and a counsellor, entered an infertility program feeling confident 
about where her boundaries lay in terms of how much she was willing to go through 
emotionally~ spiritually, and physically in trying to get pregnant. She left the program 
feeling powerless~ objectified, and as if her identity had been threatened. Those feelings 
arose~ in part, because of how little control she had over who had access to her body. 
The program she was in utilizes a "team approach" to medicine where patients have no 
guarantees as to who will be examining them at any point in time and who will be 
conducting scheduled procedures. Because of the intrusive nature of the physical exams 
and procedures associated with infertility treatment, the team approach puts the dignity 
of women at risk. As one woman who went through the same program as Lee 
commented, you ttpark your dignity and integrity at the door and pay this price to get 
pregnant" 
With no real relationship with most of the people treating her infertility, Lee had 
the impression that she "was only another procedure to be done" or a mere "number ... in 
a blood work report" At no point did she receive adequate attention to her emotional 
needs, even from the counsellor involved with. the progratIL Moreover,. when she tried to 
advocate for her needs,. she was labelled "a problem": another non-compliant patient 
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The labelling induced shame about what she descnoed as her "sensitivity" and it also 
made her worry that she might be abandoned by her care providers. Those feelings, 
along with being treated as a mere object of medical scrutiny, caused her to lose her 
sense of who she was and of what she needed Before entering the program, she had 
never thought of herself as uncooperative or as someone who tends to create problems 
where they do not exist, nor had she ever thought of her body as a mere reproductive 
vessel to which anyone could have access. [n. the end, Lee was left in an extremely 
vulnerable position. 
After she left the program. Lee wrote letters to two of the physicians with whom 
she came in contact. Below. I give an excerpt from a letter she sent to the physician who 
gave her a hysterosalpingogram (HSG)-a procedure determining whether the fallopian 
tubes are blocked-and who then conducted a hysteroscopy to repair damage to the lining 
of her uterus which could have been caused by the HSG itself. The excerpt focuses on 
the events that led up to her hysteroscopy, an experience which Lee herself descnees as 
objectifying. The events are not isolated; rather, they are representative of a larger 
pattern of unethical patient care. 
When you did the informed consent over the phone, I specifically asked 
you how many people would be in the OR. [operating room} suite. You 
told me there would be three people-the anesthetist, the circulating nurse, 
and yourself. This was a very important issue for me because of my past 
history of tramna. [don't know if [John} told you that I originally was 
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asking for spinal anesthesia because I did not want to be unconscious in 
this type of situation. After talking with the anesthetist and with you over 
the phone, I felt reassured that I was heard. I couldn't believe when I was 
wheeled into the room I counted eight people (men and women) there 
cleaning instruments, laughing and showing no signs of finishing up 
before you got started (with my entire lower body fully exposed and my 
legs in stirrups). I looked at you to help me in this and to try to honor my 
need for control and personal dignity-and you responded in defense of the 
staff that were cleaning instruments rather than on my behalf. I still 
remember crying and begging the anesthetist to knock me out because 
what I was feeling at that moment was unbearable. [now wish that I had 
gotten up off the table and left the room. fn addition, [ was not informed 
that [ would be catheterized as part of the procedure. When [ awoke, I bad 
searing urethral pain and knew I had been catheterized, which you 
confirmed when I asked you later. If I bad known this ahead of time, I 
would have begun a preventive course ofPyridium because I have chronic 
inflammatory urethritis. I also find myself wondering which of the five 
extra people in that room actually catheterized me. I guess it wasn't 
supposed to be an issue because I was unconscious. [t was another 
episode where I felt objectified. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Janet: 
Janet miscarried her first child at seven and a half weeks gestation.. In 
order to conceive the child, she had "charted and monitored [her] cycle with great 
care untiI the exact moment" that she knew she could get pregnant. Because she 
had used a natural method of contraception in the past, she was already very 
fanuliar with her cycle. When she got pregnan~ her charts showed i~ and her GP 
accepted her charts as evidence (Hey et a11996. 42). 
Here is an excerpt from what Janet writes about the miscarriage: "Every 
morning the bleeding stopped and every afternoon it started and on the 
Wednesday we went back to our doctor. He feI~ palpated, and prodded and 
questioned that [ had ever been pregnant at all: 'You told me you were pregnant 
and I believed you. t And r. knowing that [ had been pregnan~ started to doubt 
myself and my knowledge of my body. I felt concerned for the doctor. that he felt 
he had made a mistake. and it was my fault. You are very willing to believe that 
everything is your faull. .. [ was afraid that the whole episode had just been 
hysteria. and he (the GP) was thinking 'neurotic womaIi ... [she then explains that 
she had an ultrasound which confirmed that she bad been pregnant] ... I had 
known that I was pregnan~ and I had doubted i~ doubted me~ doubted this little 
baby's existence because some forms of knowledge are seen as more valid than 
others" (Hey et al1996. 44,. 45). 
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SheiIa: 
In her second pregnancy~ Sheila had a miscarriage at eleven weeks 
gestatiOIL She writes that at the first sign of trouble,. ''1 knew immediately that I 
would lose the baby. It was the first moment after the full-term pregnancy and 11 
weeks of the present pregnancy that I felt scared that something could go, and in 
fact now was going, wrong. The possibility of problems had never before 
occurred to me. I knew things could go wrong in pregnancy but I felt I was the 
<sic> one of the lucky ones who would sail through it with very little alteration 
from the norm .... [ was totally shattered. I was someone whose life revolved 
around bodily activity. [had worked hard to gain control in body action, to be 
aware of how my body moved and reacted to stimuli. I was fit and healthy. Now 
I felt I had lost all control of my body. I kept bleeding and there was nothing I 
could do about it It was the first feelings of guilt (feelings that were to remain 
with me for a long time)-that I of all people should be experiencing something 
otherthan a normal pregnancy. 'Pregnancy is not an iIlnest; you should be able 
to continue as before with slight limitations. I, who enjoyed fitness and activity, 
was now faced with temble guilt. Had I brought on this miscarriage myseIfl Oh, 
why had I been so selfish to go away the weekened <sic> before? I had felt the 
need for a break: so had naturally gone to the mountains. I must have overstrained 
myseIf-itwasmyfault. Ifonly ..• " (HeyetaI1996,. 21). 
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ADoa: 
Anna had a positive pregnancy test at six weeks gestation, but the day 
after the t~ she started bleeding severely and had a miscarriage. As a result of 
the miscarriage, she suffered a lot of emotional confusion. She had a loving 
partner who was deeply concerned about what she was going through, but who 
did not seem to be able to help herto get through it. 
Wf found it really difficult to express just how difficult I was finding it emotionally 
after the miscarriage, and ... I guess partly because I didn't know anyone else 
who'd miscarried and I felt sort oflike, well, it was only six weeks. It wasn't like 
I'd lost, ... lost a baby or that rd had a stillbirth or something like tha~ .. and you 
know that maybe I shouldn't be as upset as I was" (Leaney & Silver 1995). 
CHAPTERS 
JoaDoe: 
Wft was so bad, so stressful. And I consider myself pretty good at coping with 
things usually. But at one point ... honest to God I almost packed up and left. I 
thou~ 'I cannot stand this another second.' It was like a time capsule of all of 
your expectations and all of your stress just jam packed into five days or six days 
or whatever it was. And you never got any reliefftom it" (W'dIiams 1989~ 136). 
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Lom: 
" ... I remember getting in the car and crying all the way home. I'm never going 
back there. They've had enough£ I'm not a guinea pig any more! (she laughs 
nervously) And I was just '" I'd had it. I thought-this is it. I'm not doing this 
again. But about two days afterwards it was, okay, lets go back in (she laughs)" 
(WiIliams 1989, 130). 
Steven: 
It ••• all of a sudden ['m in the TW1light Zone. Its not a hospital, its a. .. garage[ 
And my wife is the car and these are the grease monkeys, down to the bad radio 
blaring and the power tools. I feel a surge of anger at this; how could they treat 
my wife's body as if it were a machine? Then [ waver-no; its just that they've 
done this so many times it is mechanical for them. [t shows confidence, not 
disrespect After all, I'm in their shop" (Mentor 1998,68). 
CHAPTER 6 
Lara: 
Lara is a 37 year-old woman, pregnant for the first time. At her first 
prenatal visit, she asks her obstetrician about prenatal diagnosis. She is told that 
the generic risk for a person ofher age for having a child with Down's Syndrome 
is 1 in 227 ( -0.4%) and the total risk for chromosomal abnormalities is 1 in 130 
(-0.8%). Her options are the following: 1) chorionic villus sampling (CVS)~ 
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which is a diagnostic test taken at 10 to 11 weeks, and which carries with it a I to 
1.5% risk of pregnancy loss; 2) an amniocentesis at 16 to 11 weeks, which is also 
diagnostic and has a 0.5% loss rate; 3) or, maternal serum screening at 16 to 11 
weeks, which will not diagnose a fetal abnormality (as I have mentioned), but 
will tell Lam her individual risk for having a child with Down's syndrome or an 
open neural tube defect. If the screening test is positive, she can elect to have a 
detailed ultrasound and/or an amniocentesis. Depending on the timing of her 
screening test, she would receive the results of her amnio at about 19 to 20 weeks. 
Lam tries to determine what her risk for having a child with a disability 
means to her and what the risks of the different procedures mean as well. Her 
financial situation requires that she work., and she is worried that her work 
schedule would not allow her to care properly for a child with a disability, a child 
for whom she would be the sole care-giver. Intellectually, she is not opposed to 
abortio~ but emotionally, it is difficult for her to imagine terminating this 
pregnancy, for she has longed to have a child for years and, untIl now, has had no 
success in conceiving. Hence, the loss rates of the diagnostic procedures worry 
her considerably. She is also concerned that any choice she makes would elicit 
negative responses from people she respects. For example, if she decides to 
forego the diagnostic tests, some would regard her as irresponstble. If the results 
of an amnio, undergone after serum screening, convince her that she should 
terminate her pregnancy after 20 wee~ then some would wonder if she had any 
maternal instincts at all. 
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Melissa: 
Melissa is 25 years old and in her second pregnancy. She has very little 
formal educatio~ having quit school after grade 9. At each prenatal visi~ her 
obstetrician asks her if she has any concerns or questions about her prenatal care. 
Melissa usually shakes her head, despite often having concerns. She is not 
normally shy~ nor does she believe that her concerns about her pregnancy are 
trivial. She does not have a passive personality. nor does she lack confidence in 
her own judgment. The problem lies in her awareness of a stereotype in her 
culture of uneducated people as intellectually inferior to the educated. Melissa 
expects that her obstetrician's view of her is influenced by that stereotype~ and she 
does not trust herself to be able to express her concerns or opinions to him 
without reinforcing the truth of that stereotype in his mind. Just to be on the safe-
side, Melissa decides to keep her opinions to herself. 
Whenever her obstetrician recommends something to Melissa, she agrees 
with his recommendation. When he offers her prenatal diagnosis and tells her 
that it is up to her to choose whether she wants it or no~ she chooses i~ assuming 
that he must believe she should have i~ since otherwise he would not offer it. 
Moreover, being a member of the medical profession, he must be in favour of the 
use of such technologies, since whenever Melissa has met physicians in the ~ 
they have always been quick to defend any new form of medical technology. 
Melissa herself would prefer not to have prenatal diagnosis, but does not want to 
risk having her physician think that she is therefore naive or uninformed. 
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Carola: 
''{ cried for two days after I had the test I guess I was identifiying with universal 
motherhood; I felt like my image of my womb had been shattered It still feels 
like ifs in pieces,. not like such a safe place as before. I guess technology gives us 
a certain kind of control. but we have to sacrifice something in return. ['ve lost 
my brash confidence that my body just produces healthy babies all by itseIt: 
naturally. and that if it doesn't, I can handle whatever comes along as a mother" 
(Rapp 1997. 131). 
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